

# THE MODERN SCHOOLMAN

A Quarterly Journal of Philosophy

## THE UNITY OF HUMAN ACTIVITY

GEORGE P. KLUBERTANZ, S.J.

One of the notable changes introduced by St. Thomas into medieval thought was his doctrine of the unity of man. St. Thomas himself was fully aware that when he insisted that man was *one and composite*, he was opposing himself to previous and contemporary Christian thought. He stated this doctrine of the matter-form composition of human nature in formal opposition to the traditional dualism, which he qualified as Platonic. This doctrine of the unity and composition of human nature has been studied repeatedly and is accepted by the followers of St. Thomas.

What about human *activity* and its unity? It seems that studies of human operation have concentrated on the method of faculty analysis. The result is that human operation is looked at as sensation, imagination, reasoning, willing, and so forth. If we count only the sensitive and rational operations, there are at least thirteen separate operations. Many of these go on simultaneously; for example, in adult perception we use some of the external senses, the internal senses, the intellect, the will, and perhaps one or the other sense appetite on one and the same external object. Normally, these operations make up one apparently undivided perception. This is one aspect of the unity of consciousness.

---

THE REVEREND GEORGE P. KLUBERTANZ, S.J., is an associate editor of THE MODERN SCHOOLMAN and an instructor in the Department of Philosophy of Saint Louis University. He received his doctorate degree from the University of Toronto.

Acquaintance with the methods of medieval Scholasticism makes its students expect that St. Thomas would not have treated this question in these terms. But if we are ready to ask his questions and study their answers, we often can find the answer to our own.

There are four questions in St. Thomas that contain data about the unity of human operation. They are: (a) Is charity the form of the virtues? (b) Are *imperium* and the commanded act one or many? (c) What is the nature of *imperium* and *consilium*? (d) Is choice an act of intellect or will? These may seem to be disconnected questions; only a textual study can show how St. Thomas looked on them.

## PART I. THE "FORMATION" OF VIRTUES

That virtues, and especially the virtue of faith, receive a "form" of some kind, is a common doctrine among the thirteenth-century theologians.<sup>1</sup> The immediate impetus to this doctrine came from Peter Lombard;<sup>2</sup> in his work, the distinction between *fides informis* and *fides formata per charitatem* is based on St. Ambrose<sup>3</sup> (though really it seems to go back to St. Augustine<sup>4</sup>).

St. Thomas adopted this doctrine from the very beginning<sup>5</sup> and made it an important part of his teaching. The followers of St. Thomas have likewise kept it as an integral part of their system; unfortunately their interpretations of its meaning do not agree.<sup>6</sup> Indeed, they vary all the way from the theory that "form" means "presence together with" to a doctrine of intrinsic modification of the formed virtue even in the state of habit.

Most of these Thomistic discussions are theological-ascetical<sup>7</sup> or meta-

<sup>1</sup> Cf. Dom Odon Lottin, O.S.B., *Principes de Morale* (2 vols.; Louvain: Mont César, 1946), II, 201-6; M. D. Chenu, O.P., "Notes de travail: I. La surnaturalisation des vertus; II. L'Amour dans la foi," *Bulletin Thomiste*, IX (1932), 93\*-99\*.

<sup>2</sup> Peter Lombard, *Libri IV Sententiarum* (2d ed.; 2 vols.; Quaracchi, 1916), Vol. II, Lib. III, d. 23, p. 656.

<sup>3</sup> "quasi mater animarum" (*In Ep. ad Romanos*, chap. 14, vs. 1 [inter opera Ambrosii, PL, XVII, 167]); "mater omnium bonorum" (*In I Ep. ad Cor.*, chap. 8, vs. 1 [*ibid.*, 226]).

<sup>4</sup> The Quaracchi editors of St. Bonaventure suggest that the terminology and the idea may have come from St. Augustine's "charitas, quae est forma omnium virtutum," *In Ep. Joann.*, tract. 10, no. 1 or *Sermo LIII*, chap. 10, no. 10; this suggestion is made in St. Bonaventure's *In III Sent.*, d. 23, a. 2, q. 3 (10 vols.; Quaracchi; III, 492, n. 7).

<sup>5</sup> *In III Sent.*, 26. 1. 4 ad 5; 9. 1. 1 ad 2; 23. 3. 1. 1; 27. 2. 4. 3.

<sup>6</sup> Lottin, *op. cit.*, II, 207-9.

<sup>7</sup> That is, they deal with questions of merit, or explicit *vs.* implicit intention. Thus, Reginald Garrigou-Lagrange, O.P., "La fin ultime du péché véniel," *Revue Thomiste*, XXIX (1924), 314-17, and *Perfection Chrétienne et Contem-*



physical.<sup>8</sup> Dom Lottin seems to be almost alone in dealing with it in terms of Thomistic psychology as well as ethics and theology.<sup>9</sup> This is a promising lead and can be carried quite a bit further.

From the very beginning, St. Thomas makes one thing quite clear: the "formation" of the virtues by charity takes place in the *acts* of those virtues.<sup>10</sup> This point of view is maintained consistently in the later works.<sup>11</sup> But the more detailed explanation varies, and so it is necessary to consider the various discussions separately.

In the *Commentary on the Books of the Sentences*, charity seems to have three distinct functions: it is the moving cause, the root, and the form of all the other virtues.<sup>12</sup> It is form insofar as it directs the acts of all the virtues to its end.<sup>13</sup> It has the same relation to all the virtues as prudence has to the acquired moral virtues.<sup>14</sup>

The *De Veritate* tells us that charity is not a form which is part of the essence of the other virtues.<sup>15</sup> It is extrinsic, like an efficient cause<sup>16</sup> and also something like an exemplar cause.<sup>17</sup> This relationship is like the relationship between intellect and sense appetite in temperance, based on the order of efficient causality.

plation (2 vols.; St. Maximin, 1923), II, 530; A. Landgraf, *Das Wesen der lässlichen Sünde in der Scholastik* (Bamberg: Görresverlag, 1923) and the review of this book by M. de la Taille, S.J., "Le Péché véniel dans la théologie de S. Thomas d'après un livre récent," *Gregorianum*, VII (1926), 28-43; V. Cathrein, S.J., "Gottesliebe und Verdienst nach der Lehre des hl. Thomas von Aquin," *Zeitschrift für Aszese und Mystik*, VI (1931), 15-32; J. E. Cardinal Van Roey, *De Virtute Charitatis Quaestiones Selectae* (Malines: Dessain, 1929) and the review of this book by Th. Deman, O.P., *Bulletin Thomiste*, VII (1930), 79-85; A. Zychlinski, "De caritatis influxu in actus meritorios juxta Sanctum Thomam," *Ephemerides Theologicae Lovanienses*, XIV (1937), 651-56.

<sup>8</sup> That is, solely in terms of the relationships of means and ends among themselves. Thus, Van Roey, *op. cit.*; Reginaldus M. Schultes, O.P., "De Caritate ut forma virtutum," *Divus Thomas* (Piacenza), XXXI (1928), 5-28; V. Urmannowicz, *De Formatione Virtutum a Caritate seu de Caritate ut Forma Virtutum secundum Doctrinam Sancti Thomae Aquinatis* (Freiburg: S. Adalbert, 1931).

<sup>9</sup> *Principes de Morale*, I, 173-75 and 313-14; II, 210.

<sup>10</sup> "Charitas enim est forma virtutum ex parte actus. . ." (*In II Sent.*, 26. 1. 4 ad 5 [ed. Pierre Mandonnet, O.P., and M. F. Moos, O.P. (Paris: Lethielleux, 1929-33), II, 679]).

<sup>11</sup> *De Ver.*, 14. 5; *De Virtut., de Caritate*, 3; *ST*, II-II. 4. 3.

<sup>12</sup> *In III Sent.*, 23. 3. 1. 1.

<sup>13</sup> *In II Sent.*, 26. 1. 4 ad 5.

<sup>14</sup> *In III Sent.*, 27. 2. 4. 3; cf. *De Ver.*, 14. 5 ad 11.

<sup>15</sup> *De Ver.*, 14. 5 ad 1.

<sup>16</sup> *Ibid.*, 14. 5.

<sup>17</sup> "Ad tertium dicendum, quod modus quo caritas dicitur forma appropinquat ad modum illum quo exemplar formam dicimus. . ." (*De Ver.*, 14. 5 ad 3; cf. ad 1 [ed. Parma, IX, 236]). This doctrine was already proposed in *In III Sent.*, 27. 2. 4. 3 ad 1 (ed. Mandonnet-Moos, III, 890).

Wherever there are two moving or agent principles ordered to each other, that in the effect which is due to the higher agent is as it were formal, and that which is due to the lower agent is as it were material. . . . Similarly, reason commands the lower powers, the concupiscible and irascible appetites. In the habit of the concupiscible appetite, that which is from the concupiscible appetite, namely, a certain inclination to use desirable things in a certain way, is as it were material in temperance, but the order which is of reason, and the rightness is as it were its form. The same is true in the other moral virtues. . . .

Since faith is in the intellect, that which is from knowledge is as it were material in it; but its formation must be received from the part of the will.<sup>18</sup>

Furthermore, precisely in line with this argument, St. Thomas says that something intrinsic in the virtue of faith results from its formation by charity.<sup>19</sup>

The *Commentary on the Ethics*, as is well known, lays great stress on the necessity of prudence for all virtue; and there is no need to go into this point here. However, a cursory reading fails to show any definite expression of this doctrine in terms of a matter-form relationship.<sup>20</sup>

In the *Quaestio Disputata de Caritate* there is a special article on charity as the form of the virtues. The argument here is clearly stated and proceeds logically, step by step. The evidence will be drawn from acts, because we can only know about habits through acts. If in the act of one habit there is a formal element belonging to another habit, then the latter habit is like a form.

In all voluntary action the end is formal. Every act receives its form and species from the form of the agent, as heating from heat. Now, the form of the will is its object, which is the good and the end, as

<sup>18</sup> *De Ver.*, 14. 5 (ed. Parma, IX, 236); cf. *De Malo*. 8. 2.

<sup>19</sup> ". . . cum caritas est in voluntate, ejus perfectio aliquo modo redundat in intellectum: et sic caritas non solum actum fidei, sed ipsam fidem informat" (*De Ver.*, 14. 5 ad 9 [ed. Parma, IX, 236]); cf. *ibid.*, 14. 7.

This does not seem to agree with the doctrine previously held, for example, in this text: "Dicitur autem [fides] formata et informis per relationem ad aliquid extrinsecum, scilicet ad voluntatem" (*In III Sent.*, 23. 3. 4. 1 [ed. Mandonnet-Moos, III, 754]).

<sup>20</sup> There is apparently only one reference, very shadowy and indirect: "Perficiuntur autem in nobis per assuetudinem, in quantum scilicet ex eo quod multoties agimus secundum rationem, imprimatur forma vi rationis in appetitiva. Quae quidem impressio nihil est aliud quam virtus moralis" (*In II Ethic.*, lect. 1 [ed. A. Pirotta, O.P. (Turin: Marietti, 1934), no. 249]); cf. *In VI Ethic.*, lect. 11 (nos. 1277-78; 1283).



the intelligible is the form of the intellect. Consequently everything pertaining to the end is formal in the will act. And thus the same act, when ordered to one end, is under the form of virtue; when to another, under the form of vice. For example, an alms may be given for God or for vanity. And the act of one vice, ordered to the end of another, receives the latter's form. For example, the man that steals in order to lust is materially a thief, but formally intemperate. But it is clear that the act of any virtue is ordered to the proper end of charity, namely, the supreme good, which is charity's object.

And so it is clear that in the acts of all the virtues what is due to charity is formal. To this extent, then, is charity called the form of all the virtues, that it orders (directs) the acts of all the virtues to the supreme good.<sup>21</sup>

The argument of the body of the article is further clarified by the objections and their answers. Two of these objections are drawn from the general theorem of matter and form: that a form does not have a further form,<sup>22</sup> and that in the order of generation matter precedes form, whereas charity is naturally prior to the other virtues.<sup>23</sup>

In the first of these objections St. Thomas seems to be concerned with the general doctrine that "an accident does not belong to another accident."<sup>24</sup> St. Thomas's answer is somewhat in the nature of a retort; nevertheless, we can gather from it that the "formation" of virtues is not a question of absolute constitution,<sup>25</sup> but a question of order.

To the second argument it is to be said that to a form another form does not belong, so that one form is the subject for another. But nothing prevents there being many forms in one subject according to some order: namely, that one be formal with respect to the other, as color is formal with respect to surface. In this way charity can be the form of the other virtues.<sup>26</sup>

<sup>21</sup> *De Virtut., de Caritate*, 3 (ed. Parma, VIII, 586-87).

<sup>22</sup> *Ibid.*, arg. 2, p. 586.

<sup>23</sup> *Ibid.*, arg. 16, p. 586.

<sup>24</sup> Cf. Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, Γ, c. 3, 1007b2.

<sup>25</sup> "... de forma quae intrat constitutionem rei. Sic autem caritas non dicitur forma virtutum, sed alio modo ut supra dictum est" (*De Virtut., de Caritate*, 3 ad 4 [ed. Parma, VIII, 587]).

<sup>26</sup> "Ad secundum dicendum quod formae non est forma, ita quod una forma praestet subjectum alteri. Nihil tamen prohibet plures formas in eodem subjecto esse secundum quemdam ordinem; scilicet ut una sit formalis respectu alterius, sicut color est formalis respectu superficiei; et hoc modo caritas potest esse forma aliarum virtutum" (*ibid.*, ad 2 [p. 587]). This is a much clearer statement than the corresponding one in *In III Sent.*, 23. 3. 4. 3 ad 3.

The second objection concerned the temporal relations of matter and form. In answering it, St. Thomas points out that the special kind of matter and form which is found in the virtues does not require the pre-existence of the material. For charity is not a form in the sense of being part of the essence of another virtue, as substantial form is part of the essence of material things. On the contrary, charity is an "informing" form.<sup>27</sup> This last expression is not further explained.

In the *De Veritate* St. Thomas expressed the formal causality of charity in terms of exemplarity. The fifth, sixth, seventh, and eighth objections of this article of the *De Caritate* argue that this cannot be. In the answer to the sixth objection, the position undergoes some modification: "charity can be called the exemplar form of the virtues, not in the likeness of which the virtues are produced, but to the extent that they act somehow similarly."<sup>28</sup> The answer to the fifth objection leaves the notion of exemplarity untouched, but brings out a different idea which will be considered below. The seventh and eighth answers run along the same lines as the fifth.<sup>29</sup>

In the general theory of habit it is said that a habit is specified by its act and by its object. Since a virtue is a kind of habit, it must be specified in the same way. But this seems to exclude formation by another virtue. Objections 1, 3, 5, 9, and 10 bear on this general point of view. St. Thomas answers that charity specifies a virtue to be a virtue (that is, a meritorious virtue), while the object (or proximate end) of a virtue makes it to be this virtue—for example, faith.<sup>30</sup>

An interesting objection accuses St. Thomas's doctrine of inconsistency. In the order of moral virtue, formation takes place through prudence; in the order of virtue absolutely speaking, through charity. But prudence is an intellectual virtue, charity an appetitive one, and to make them both forms is inconsistent.

<sup>27</sup> "Ad decimumsextum dicendum, quod caritas non est forma virtutum quae sit pars essentiae virtutum, ut oporteat eam sequi tempore virtutes, vel aliquam materiam virtutum, sicut in formis rerum generatarum; sed est forma quasi informans; unde oportet esse naturaliter priorem aliis virtutibus" (*De Virtut., de Caritate*, 3 ad 16 [ed. Parma, VIII, 588]).

<sup>28</sup> "Ad sextum dicendum quod caritas potest dici forma exemplaris virtutum, non ad cujus similitudinem virtutes generantur, sed in quantum ad ejus similitudinem quodammodo operantur" (*ibid.*, ad 6 [p. 587]).

<sup>29</sup> For example, "Ad octavum dicendum quod caritas quantum ad actum non solum habet exemplaritatem, sed etiam virtutem motivam et effectivam. Exemplar autem effectivum non est sine exemplo . . ." (*ibid.*, ad 8 [p. 587]).

<sup>30</sup> For example: "Ad nonum dicendum, quod a proprio fine et a proprio objecto quaelibet virtus habet formam specialem, per quam est haec virtus; sed a caritate habet quamdam formam communem, secundum quam est meritoria vitae aeternae" (*ibid.*, ad 9 [p. 587]; cf. ad 1, 3, 10).



In answer to the thirteenth objection it is to be said that the act of the will is according to the relation of the one willing to things themselves as they are in themselves; while the act of the intellect is according as the things are in the one understanding. And so, when the things are inferior to the one understanding, the understanding of them is more noble than willing. . . . but when the things are superior to the one understanding, then the will goes higher than the intellect can reach. And so it is that in the moral order of things inferior to man, an intellectual virtue informs the appetitive virtues, as prudence informs the other moral virtues; but in the theological virtues, which concern God, a virtue of the will, that is, charity, informs a virtue of the intellect, that is, faith.<sup>31</sup>

In this answer St. Thomas points out that the situation wherein prudence forms the moral virtues, and that wherein charity forms all the virtues, are objectively different. He does not say that the formation in the two cases is different, but from his remarks it can legitimately be concluded that "formation" is brought about only analogously by prudence and by charity.

In the *Secunda Pars* the doctrine of the formation of the virtues by charity recurs again.<sup>32</sup> There are also references to the relation between prudence and the moral virtues.<sup>33</sup> The doctrine of the formation of virtues is further completed by the statement that legal justice can also order the acts of the other virtues to its end, the common good.<sup>34</sup>

In the *Secunda Pars* a more deliberate effort is made to show clearly how the formation of virtues is to be understood. As before, St. Thomas insists that the form of virtue is not an intrinsic form.<sup>35</sup> Moreover, he completely abandons the notion of exemplarity.<sup>36</sup> We meet again the objection that an accident cannot inhere in another accident, and it is

<sup>31</sup> *Ibid.*, ad. 13 (p. 587).

<sup>32</sup> "Et ideo caritas dicitur forma fidei, inquantum per caritatem actus fidei perficitur et formatur" (*ST*, II-II. 4. 3 [ed. Ottawa, 1429b]).

<sup>33</sup> *ST*, II-II. 47. 5 ad 2; I-II. 65. 1; 66. 2, 6 ad 1; 74. 4 ad 2.

<sup>34</sup> *Ibid.*, 58. 5, 6. Compare the theory of Dom Lottin that in the supposition of a purely natural order, the form of the virtues would have been religion (which is a part of justice). (*Principes de Morale*, I. 251-52.)

<sup>35</sup> "2. Praeterea. Forma et id cuius est forma sunt in eodem, quia ex his fit unum simpliciter. Sed fides est in intellectu, caritas autem in voluntate. . . . Ad secundum. Dicendum quod obiectio illa procedit de forma intrinseca. Sic autem caritas non est forma fidei, sed prout informat actum eius, ut supra dictum est" (*ST*, II-II. 4. 3, arg. 2 and ad 2 [ed. Ottawa, 1429b]).

<sup>36</sup> "Ad primum ergo. Dicendum quod caritas dicitur esse forma aliarum virtutum non quidem exemplariter aut essentialiter, sed magis effective, inquantum scilicet omnibus formam imponit secundum modum praedictum" (*ST*, II-II. 23. 8 ad 1 [ed. Ottawa, 1528a]).

answered by pointing out that what is meant is that, because of the order among the accidents, the subject as under one accident becomes the subject for another.<sup>37</sup>

To understand the positive exposition of the doctrine, we can begin with the simple statement that by the formation of a virtue is meant the formation of the *act* of that virtue. Now, there is no reason why one act should not be informed by different habits simultaneously, and thus belong, in an ordered fashion, to several species.<sup>38</sup> From another point of view, acts can be one species *secundum genus naturae* and of another *secundum genus moris*.<sup>39</sup>

I answer. It must be said that there is no reason why something cannot be one according as it is in one genus, and many according as it is referred to another genus. Thus, a continuous surface is one, as considered in the genus of quantity; and yet it is many as considered in the genus of color, if it be partly white and partly black. In this way, there is no reason why a certain act cannot be one as referred to the genus of nature, which act is not one when referred to the genus of moral act; and con-

<sup>37</sup> "Ad secundum. Dicendum quod accidens per se non potest esse subiectum accidentis. Sed quia etiam in ipsis accidentibus est ordo quidam, subiectum quod est sub uno accidente, intelligitur esse subiectum alterius. Et sic dicitur unum accidens esse subiectum alterius, ut superficies coloris" (ST, I-II. 50. 2 ad 2 [ed. Ottawa, 972b]).

<sup>38</sup> "Ad primum ergo. Dicendum quod caritas dicitur esse forma fidei inquantum informat actum ipsius. Nihil autem prohibet unum actum a diversis habitibus informari, et secundum hoc ad diversas species reduci ordine quodam; ut supra dictum est cum de actibus humanis in communi ageretur" (ST, II-II. 4. 3 ad 1 [ed. Ottawa, 1429b]). The Ottawa editors suggest that the passage referred to is the following: "Ad primum ergo. Dicendum quod secundum substantiam suam non potest aliquid esse in duabus speciebus, quarum una sub altera non ordinetur. Sed secundum ea quae rei adveniunt, potest aliquid sub diversis speciebus contineri. Sicut hoc pomum, secundum colorem, continetur sub hac specie, scilicet albi; et secundum odorem, sub specie bene redolentis. Et similiter actus qui secundum substantiam suam est in una specie naturae, secundum conditiones morales supervenientes, ad duas species referri potest, ut supra dictum est" (*ibid.*, I-II. 18. 7 ad 1 [ed. Ottawa, 816b]).

Cf. "Ad tertium. Dicendum quod idem actus numero, secundum quod semel egreditur ab agente, non ordinatur nisi ad unum finem proximum, a quo habet speciem; sed potest ordinari ad plures fines remotos, quorum unus est finis alterius. . . . Fines autem morales accidunt rei naturali; et e converso ratio naturalis finis accidit morali. Et ideo nihil prohibet actus qui sunt iidem secundum speciem naturae, esse diversos secundum speciem moris, et e converso" (*ibid.*, I. 3 ad 3 [ed. Ottawa, 713b]).

<sup>39</sup> "Ad primum ergo. Dicendum quod ratio illa probat quod actus interior et exterior sunt diversi secundum genus naturae. Sed tamen ex eis sic diversis constituitur unum in genere moris, ut supra dictum est" (ST, I-II. 20. 3 ad 1 [ed. Ottawa, 834a]). The reference is to 17. 4, which will be more fully considered later on.



versely also, as was said above. For an uninterrupted walk is one act according to the genus of nature; and yet it can happen that there be many walkings according to the genus of moral act, if there be a change in the walker's will, which is the principle of moral acts. . . .

To the first argument. It is to be said that that continuous movement which proceeds from diverse intentions, though it be one with the unity of nature, is not one with the unity of moral act.<sup>40</sup>

By the genus of nature is meant the specification of an act according to its proximate object or end, while the genus of moral act refers to the specification that an act receives from the potency that is the moving cause of that act.<sup>41</sup>

These various considerations and texts show clearly that St. Thomas taught that the act of a virtue, when ordered (directed) to an end beyond its own proper end, is "formed."<sup>42</sup> But how and why can the ordering to an ulterior and extrinsic end be called "formation"? St. Thomas points out that this is possible just because of what form is and does in the order of operation.

I answer. It must be said that in moral acts, the form of the act is considered principally from the side of the end. The reason for this is that the principle of moral acts is the will, whose object and quasi form is the end. Now, the form of the act always follows the form of the agent. And so it is necessary that, in moral acts, that which gives to an act its order to an end should give it also its form. It is clear, according to what has been said, that the acts of all the other virtues are ordered by charity to the ultimate end. According to this, charity gives form to the acts of all the other virtues. To this extent, charity is called the form of the virtues, for the virtues themselves are so called in their relation to formed acts.<sup>43</sup>

In the order of operation, form is object: *actus specificatur per obiectum*.<sup>44</sup> More particularly, in active potencies and practical habits the

<sup>40</sup> ST, I-II. 20. 6 and ad 1 (ed. Ottawa, 836b).

<sup>41</sup> Cf. "Ad secundum dicendum quod a forma quam habet virtus ex ratione potentiae et objecti proprii, habet speciem naturae; sed speciem moris habet a forma quam habet a potentia movente et dirigente" (*In III Sent.*, 23. 3. 1. 3 ad 2 [ed. Mandonnet-Moos, III, 746]).

<sup>42</sup> Cf. also: "Ad quartum. Dicendum quod quaelibet virtus secundum propriam rationem ordinat actum suum ad proprium finem illius virtutis. Quod autem ordinetur ad ulteriorem finem sive semper sive aliquando, hoc non habet ex propria ratione, sed oportet esse aliam superiorem virtutem a qua in illum finem ordinetur" (ST, II-II. 58. 6 ad 4 [ed. Ottawa, 1723b]).

<sup>43</sup> *Ibid.*, 23. 8 (1528a).

<sup>44</sup> ST, I-II. 54. 2, 63. 4, 18. 2; II-II. 5. 3. Cf. Reginald Garrigou-Lagrange,

object and form is the end.<sup>45</sup> The same kind of principle is to be applied in the case of moral (that is, voluntary) activity: its end is for it its specifying object. Now, most ends are intermediate ends, and this means that of their very nature they are such as to be able to be assumed under higher ends.

But here a problem arises. It would seem that the act of any virtue formed by charity is specifically different from the act of that "same" virtue as unformed. For example, it would seem that an act of justice as formed by charity would be specifically different from an act of justice in itself.<sup>46</sup> A consequence of this would naturally be that ethical speculation about justice in itself is not applicable to man in the present supernatural order except through moral theology.

The doctrine of St. Thomas is quite different. According to him, justice with or without charity is still justice. The difference is that with charity justice is a virtue strictly so called; and without charity, justice is a virtue only in a qualified sense, and in the strict sense is not a virtue at all.<sup>47</sup> The principle of this solution is thus expressed:

From this it follows that the specific difference arising from the end is more general; and the difference which arises from the object by its nature ordered to such an end is specific with regard to it.<sup>48</sup>

In other words, the more ultimate the end to which a given virtuous act is ordered, the more generic is the determination given to that act by the end. And, conversely, the specific determination of a virtuous act arises from the determination given to that act by the virtue from which it proximately springs; or, acts are specified by their proper and proximate ends.<sup>49</sup> It is for this reason that the merely ethical consideration of justice, for example, is valid and really useful in any and all existential orders in which man may find himself.

It will be helpful at this point to state three pairs of opposed terms which St. Thomas uses in dealing with this and related subjects. On the one side, there is (*a*) the unformed act, that is, the act in itself as flowing from its own proper principle and directed to its own immediate

O.P., "Actus specificatur ab obiecto formali," *Acta Ponti. Academiae Romanae S. T. Aq.*, 1934 (Rome: Marietti, 1935), 139-53.

<sup>45</sup> *ST*, I, 77, 3.

<sup>46</sup> Compare the point of view that enables St. Thomas to say "non enim est eadem specie sanitas hominis et equi" (*ST*, I-II, 63, 4 [ed. Ottawa 1041b]); and cf. also Averroes, *In I de Anima*, text. com, 3.

<sup>47</sup> *ST*, I-II, 65, 2, 4.

<sup>48</sup> *Ibid.*, 18, 7 (ed. Ottawa, 816b). Cf. 18, 6 ad 3.

<sup>49</sup> Cf. *supra*, nn. 39-41.



intrinsic end. This act is evaluated (*b*) *secundum genus naturae* and is frequently (*c*) an exterior act. On the other side, there is (*a*) the formed act, which as formed is always evaluated (*b*) *secundum genus moris* and always includes (*c*) an interior act, namely, an act of the will. For the moment, it does not seem possible to do more than indicate these contrasts and similarities.

### SUMMARY

In discussing the relations of the virtues among themselves, we find a distinctive relation that has been expressed in the classical formula "Charity is the form of all the other virtues." St. Thomas points out that this is an abbreviated expression for the fuller "Charity is the form of the act of all the other virtues." What charity does in being form is that it orders and directs the acts of the inferior virtues. At first St. Thomas seems to have regarded the act of love and the act of any other virtue directed by love as two acts. In the *De Veritate* he attempted to unite these more closely by the notion of exemplarity. This he later rejected. Applying instead the notion of matter and form to this situation, he found that object, form, and end are convertible terms when we speak of practical habits. Moreover, the particular objects of the particular virtues are proximate and therefore intermediate ends. But an intermediate end is by its very nature ordainable to a further end and in this sense is material, that is to say, determinable.

Hence, St. Thomas's final position can be stated this way: What charity does in being form is that it orders and directs the acts of the inferior virtues by ordering their objects as means-ends to its own ultimate end. This can be done because (*a*) all virtuous acts flow from the will, (*b*) whose object (hence form) is the end, either alone or as composing a single object together with the means to that end. Similar relations can be found between sins and the vicious life.

The meaning of this doctrine seems to be clear, except for the *unity* of the informed act. St. Thomas asserts it, but what does he mean by it? A clue to his meaning may well be sought in the imperium which charity exercises over the acts of the other virtues.<sup>50</sup>

### PART II. IMPERIUM AND THE COMMANDED ACT

Later on, the notion of imperium, and the functions of intellect and will within it, will have to be examined. For the moment, it will

<sup>50</sup> ST, II-II. 23. 8 ad 3; In III Sent., 23. 3. 1. 1; De Ver., 14. 5; De Virtut., de Caritate, 3.

suffice to take imperium as an unquestioned and unanalyzed starting point.

Imperium is a command of reason that something be done, an act of the will being presupposed.<sup>51</sup> What is the relation between imperium and the commanded act? St. Thomas formally asks this question, and he answers that they are in a real sense one act.

In the genus of natural things there is a whole composed of matter and form, as man, of body and soul; and he is one natural being, though he has a multitude of parts. So also in human actions, the act of the inferior power is as matter to the act of the superior which moves it. For this is the way in which the act of the first mover is as form to the act of the instrument. And so it is clear that the imperium and the commanded act are one human act, just as any whole is one, though it is many according to its parts.<sup>52</sup>

The human act, therefore, is a whole, a composite. It is as much a unit in the order of operation as man is a unit in the order of natural substance.

St. Thomas's position is clarified and explained in his answers to the arguments that would seem to deny the unity of the human act. These arguments are three. First, whenever there are distinct potencies, there are distinct acts. Second, whatever things are separable are not one, but many. And the imperium is frequently separated from the commanded act. Third, imperium precedes the commanded act; therefore they do not make up a real unit. The first argument fails to consider that the potencies concerned are ordered to each other; for, whenever there is a natural relation of mover and moved, the act of both is somehow one.<sup>53</sup> The second argument proves indeed that the human act is composed of real parts. But as the parts of man are many and yet, united, are one, so too is it in the case of the human act.<sup>54</sup> The third argument, on priority, merely proves that the parts are not equal, just as the soul is in a sense prior to the body or the heart prior to the other members.<sup>55</sup>

St. Thomas's answers all bear on the point that the imperium and the commanded act are one act, in the sense of being one composite

<sup>51</sup> This definition is gathered from *ST*, I-II, 17, 1.

<sup>52</sup> *ST*, I-II, 17, 4 (ed. Ottawa, 805a).

<sup>53</sup> *Ibid.*, ad 1.

<sup>54</sup> "Ad secundum. Dicendum quod ex hoc quod imperium et actus imperatus possunt ab invicem separari, habetur quod sunt multa partibus. Nam partes hominis possunt ab invicem separari, quae tamen sunt unum toto" (*ibid.*, ad 2).

<sup>55</sup> *Ibid.*, ad 3.



(or whole) act which has many real parts. These real parts are to each other as matter to form. The commanded act, also called the act of the lower potency or the exterior act,<sup>56</sup> is as matter, in the sense that it is something to be ordered or directed. The imperium, being an act of the higher potency, or the interior act, is as form, in the sense that it "orders" the exterior act. The verb "orders" here has two implications: it means both "to move to action" and "to dispose in a dynamic arrangement of means to end."

Only when any activity of man flows from reason and will is it in the strict sense a human act. Any human act is always one act *in genere moris*,<sup>57</sup> no matter how many potencies are involved in the performance of that act.

We have seen that St. Thomas throws the discussion of this problem into the more general framework of instrumentality. A particularly interesting case of this is his discussion of the unity of the operations in Christ. In treating the operations of Christ in the *Commentary on the Sentences*, he had argued simply that the action of the principal cause and of the instrument cannot be numerically one.<sup>58</sup> There is no distinct reference to the unity of the human operations in Christ.

In the *Tertia Pars* the solution hinges on instrumentality again. But this time a clear distinction is made between two kinds of instruments. For one kind of instrument has an operation of its own and this operation is only applied by the principal cause. The other kind of instrument has also an operation of its own but in addition to that it has an operation which it can perform only as moved. An example of

<sup>56</sup> "Id autem quod est ex parte voluntatis, se habet ut formale ad id quod est ex parte exterioris actus, quia voluntas utitur membris ad agendum sicut instrumentis; neque actus exteriores habent rationem moralitatis, nisi inquantum sunt voluntarii. Et ideo actus humani species formaliter consideratur secundum finem, materialiter autem secundum obiectum exterioris actus. Unde Philosophus dicit in *V Ethic.* quod 'ille qui furatur ut committat adulterium, est per se loquendo magis adulter quam fur'" (*ibid.*, 18. 6 [ed. Ottawa, 815]). The reference to Aristotle is *Ethics*, Bk. V, chap. 4, 1130a24.

<sup>57</sup> "Respondeo. Dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, actus interior voluntatis et actus exterior, prout considerantur in genere moris, sunt unus actus" (*ST*, I-II. 20. 3 [ed. Ottawa, 833b]). For some writers, the phrase *in genere moris* seems to mean "as considered by the mind"; e.g., Jesús Muñoz, S.J., "Esencia del libre albedrío y proceso del acto libre según F. Romeo, O.P., Sto. Tomás y F. Suárez, S.J.," *Miscelanea Comillas*, IX (Santander, Spain; 1948), 410-11, 488.

<sup>58</sup> "Ad quantum dicendum quod non potest esse eadem actio numero per essentiam principalis agentis et instrumenti quia idem accidens non est in diversis subjectis; sed dicitur una secundum quid, inquantum scilicet instrumentum non agit nisi motum principali agente, et agit in virtute principalis agentis" (*In III Sent.*, 18. 1. 1 ad 4 [ed. Mandonnet-Moos, III, 556-57]).

the first kind of instrument is fire, whose proper operation is heating something. Heating is therefore proper to fire; heating does not pertain to, let us say, a blacksmith except insofar as he uses it in his work. An example of the second kind of instrument is an ax, whose proper operation is to cut. But when it is used by a carpenter to make a bench, this operation belongs to both the carpenter and the ax. Hence, where mover and moved have different forms, there we find two operations; otherwise there is but one operation.<sup>59</sup>

On the basis of this explanation, St. Thomas decides that we must speak of two operations in Christ, a divine and a human. Then he goes on to ask a further question: Is the human operation of Christ one or many?

The article begins by referring back to the discussion of instrumentality in the previous article. Then the various types of operation that a human nature can have according to its various perfections are thus classified: (a) the merely organic and vegetative levels; (b) the sensitive level, when it acts without dependence on reason; (c) the properly human act.

It was said above that when the lower agent acts by its own form, then there is one operation of the lower agent and another of the higher. But when the lower agent acts only insofar as it is moved by the higher, then there is one identical operation of the higher and lower agent. Therefore, in any merely human being, the operation on the elemental level and the operation of the vegetative soul is not the same as the operation of the will, which is properly human. Likewise, the operation of the sensitive soul insofar as it is not moved by reason is different; but insofar as it is moved by reason, the operation of the sensitive and the rational parts are the same. . . .

Thus in any merely human being there is only one operation which is properly called human; in addition to this there are in a merely human being certain other operations which are not properly human, as has been said.<sup>60</sup>

<sup>59</sup> ST, III. 19. 1 (ed. Ottawa, 2551b-2552a).

<sup>60</sup> Ibid., 2 (2554a).

In the *Quaestio Disputata de Unione Verbi Incarnati*, the two questions which the *Summa* article distinguishes appear in one article. The same conclusion is reached, but the distinction appears in two stages. The first holds only for man. "Et ideo licet in uno homine secundum diversas potentias et habitus videantur esse plures actiones specie differentes; tamen, quia omnes procedunt ab una prima actione voluntatis, dicitur esse una actio unius hominis; sicut si unus artifex per multa instrumenta operaretur, una ejus operatio diceretur" (a. 5 [ed. Parma, VIII, 543]). The second argument is valid for every complete



In the general field of the human act, we find it to be a composite act, a whole, consisting of real but not actually separated parts which stand to each other as matter and form. The exterior or commanded act is as matter, because in itself it is orderable, ordainable to an end which is beyond its own proper specifying object-end; the imperium is as form because it orders or directs to an end what is potentially so ordainable. And, on the level of operation, the end is object and in that sense form.

This doctrine of the unity of the human act is expressed in terms of instrumentality. And the instrument, precisely as such—that is, when it is not acting according to its own form but according as it is moved—does not have an operation apart from the operation of the principal cause. The operation of the instrument and of the principal cause (when both are formally such)<sup>61</sup> are but one whole or composite operation.<sup>62</sup>

### PART III. *IMPERIUM AND CONSILIUM*

In *consilium* (“deliberation”) and *imperium* itself, there is a situation similar to those already analyzed, and yet not the same. For, in the cases previously analyzed, reason and the order of reason appear as formal in the constitution of the composite act. At first sight, this summary statement may not seem to be true of the relationship of the virtues, where charity, a virtue of the will, is as form to all the other virtues. And yet it must be recalled that it is not the act of the will taken simply that plays the role of form, but the act of the will perfected, ordered, “informed” by charity. And if one objects that it is not human reason that orders the will in charity, it must be equally remembered that the virtue of charity, which is an infused gift, is from the Divine Wisdom, the ultimate source of all order. And so the virtue

---

nature, though it is not expressed as formally as the statement in the *Summa*. “Secundo, quia operatio alicujus speciem et unitatem habet a primo principio pertinente ad eandem naturam.” The *Summa*’s distinction of the two kinds of instruments is only implicit here.

<sup>61</sup> “Ad cuius veritatis inquisitionem considerare oportet quod aliter se habet de primo movente, et aliter de instrumento. . . . Si vero principale agens sit unum, quod utatur multis ut instrumentis, nihilominus operans est unum, sed forte operationes diversae propter diversa instrumenta; aliquando autem et operatio una, etsi ad eam multa instrumenta requirantur” (*De Unitate Intellectus*, chap. 4 [ed. Leo W. Keeler, S.J. (Rome: Gregorian Univ. Press, 1936), no. 88, pp. 56-57]).

<sup>62</sup> That the imperium and the commanded act together make up but one composite act is stated by Cardinal Cajetan with all desirable clarity: “. . . actus imperans et actus imperatus sint unus numero actus, non ut simplex, sed ut compositus” (*In I-II Summae Theologiae*, 20. 3 [ed. Leonine, VI, 158]).

of charity can be the form of all the virtues, because it itself is the highest order and source of order in human action. So we are led to suspect that the relationships in deliberation and imperium must be somewhat different.

The Thomist theory of deliberation in the *Scriptum super Libros Sententiarum* is very brief; it concerns itself mainly with the matter for deliberation. About the nature of the act, St. Thomas merely says that it is in intellect.<sup>63</sup> In the *Commentary on the Ethics*, we are told that deliberation is an act of reason,<sup>64</sup> an end being presupposed.<sup>65</sup> In the *Prima Pars*, we read again that deliberation is an intellectual act.<sup>66</sup>

In the *Prima Secundae*, question 14 deals with deliberation, and its first article directly deals with the nature of this act. The body of the article tells us that deliberation is an investigation about things to be done, and that investigation is the work of reason.<sup>67</sup> The first argument, however, had quoted St. John Damascene, who said that it was an act of appetite. St. Thomas's reply to this is an unusually full, careful, and explicit one, which is very important for his theory of operation.

To the first argument therefore the answer is that when the acts of two powers are ordered to each other, in each of them there is something characteristic of the other power, and so each act can be named from each power. Now, it is clear that the act of reason directing in those things which are for an end, and the act of the will tending to them according to the rule of reason, are ordered to each other. And so, in the act of the will, which is the election, there appears something of reason, that is, order; and in deliberation, which is an act of reason, there appears something of will, as the matter thereof, for deliberation is about the things which man wants to do, and also as the moving cause, because from this that a man wants an end, he is moved to deliberate about those things which are for the end. And so the Philosopher says in the sixth book of the *Ethics* [1139b4] that "choice is an appetitive understanding," in order to show that both concur for choice; so Damascene says that "deliberation is an investigating appetite" to show that deliberation belongs in

<sup>63</sup> In *III Sent.*, 35. 2. 4. 1-3 imply, but do not explicitly state, that the subject of deliberation is the intellect. This is said explicitly in *In IV Sent.*, 15. 4. 1.

<sup>64</sup> In *III Ethic.*, lect. 6, no. 457.

<sup>65</sup> *Ibid.*, lect. 8, nos. 475, 480.

<sup>66</sup> *ST*, I. 83. 3.

<sup>67</sup> *Ibid.*, I-II. 14. 1.



some way both to the will, about which and from which investigation arises, and to the reason which investigates.<sup>68</sup>

From this it becomes clear that the will in deliberation has a double relation to reason: will is the matter *circa quam*, and also the moving, or efficient, cause. But the *materia circa quam* is not the matter which enters into the composition of a new reality, while the efficient cause, as such, is distinct from the effect (patient).

It appears, then, that St. Thomas does not use the analogy of matter and form in treating of deliberation. The reason for this would seem to be that reason (and the order of reason) is the first formal principle in man.<sup>69</sup> Moreover, the act of deliberating is an act of inquiry leading to knowledge,<sup>70</sup> even though it is begun by an intention of the will and has action for its object and end. Therefore, deliberation is a simple act or operation, not a composite act, even though two powers are concerned in it. For it is immediately (elicitively) an act of the intellect, though mediately it is an act of the will. For the will is the moving cause or agent, and the intellect is that which is moved, or the patient.

In trying to understand the functions of intellect and will in deliberation, two points must be kept in mind. The first is that in St. Thomas's psychology there is no separation of any kind between intellect and will, but only a distinction based on their formal objects and their causal order. Intellect and will are not just closed, noncommunicating essences; in the order of operation they interpenetrate.<sup>71</sup> The second point is that in St. Thomas's metaphysics of causality, "the action of the agent is *in the patient*."<sup>72</sup> When, therefore, he says that "the power [*virtus*] of the prior act remains in the following act,"<sup>73</sup> he is not using a metaphor or giving a merely *ad hoc* solution.

Those who have a different metaphysics of action, and who close off and compartmentalize intellect and will, will necessarily give an explanation which differs from that of St. Thomas.

<sup>68</sup> *Ibid.*, ad 1 (Ottawa, 791a).

<sup>69</sup> *Ibid.*, II-II. 9. 1.

<sup>70</sup> Compare: "Cuius [prudential] quidem sunt tres actus. Quorum primus est consilium. . . . Secundus est iudicare de inventis; et hoc facit speculativa ratio" (*ST*, II-II. 47. 8 [ed. Ottawa, 1670b-1671a]).

<sup>71</sup> "Sed quando una potentia est movens alteram, tunc actus earum sunt quodammodo unus; nam 'idem est actus moventis et moti,' ut dicitur in *III Phys.*" (*ST*, I-II. 17. 4 ad 1 [ed. Ottawa, 805a]). The quotation is from the *Physics*, Bk. III, chap. 3, 202a18-b20.

<sup>72</sup> In *III de Anima*, lect. 2 (ed. Pirotta, no. 592); In *IX Metaphys.*, lect. 8 (ed. Cathala, nos. 1864, 1865); basically this is the Aristotelian doctrine of *Physics*, Bk. III, chap. 3, 202a13.

<sup>73</sup> *ST*, I-II. 17. 1 (ed. Ottawa, 802b).

In the notion of imperium there is the familiar pattern of development and fullness in expression. In the *Scriptum super Libros Sententiarum* we read that imperium is an act of reason,<sup>74</sup> which begins in the will.<sup>75</sup> In the *Commentary on the Ethics*, imperium is simply said to belong to reason.<sup>76</sup> In the *De Veritate*, imperium belongs to both intellect and will: to will, because it implies an inclination; to reason, because this inclination is ordered.<sup>77</sup> So far nothing is said about the way in which these two powers are related to the act of imperium.

The *Prima Secundae* has a whole question devoted to imperium.

I answer that it is to be said that to command is an act of reason, an act of the will however being presupposed. For the evidence of this it is to be considered that, because the acts of the will and the reason can bear on each other, insofar, that is, as it reasons about willing, and the will wishes to reason, it happens that an act of the will can be preceded by an act of reason, and contrariwise. And because the power [*virtus*] of the prior act remains in the following act, it happens sometimes that there is an act of the will according as there remains virtually in it something of the act of reason, as was said of use and choice; and on the other hand, there is an act of reason according as there virtually remains in it something of the act of the will.

Now, to command is indeed essentially an act of reason; for the one who commands orders him whom he commands to do something, by an intimation or command. Now, thus to order by way of an intimation belongs to reason. . . . Now, the first mover among the powers of the soul, moving to the exercise of an act, is the will, as was said above. Since, therefore, the second mover does not move except in the power of the first mover, it follows that this very fact, that the reason moves by commanding, pertains to it from the power of the will. And so, it remains that to command is an act of reason, an act of the will being presupposed, in whose power reason moves by imperium to the exercise of the act.<sup>78</sup>

Now, it is clear from this that intellect and will are not two successive causes in a univocal series; they are ordered causes ("first and second");

<sup>74</sup> *In IV Sent.*, 15. 4. 1. 1 et ad 3; 15. 4. 1. 2; 15. 4. 6. 3.

<sup>75</sup> "... imperium, quod est actus rationis, in voluntate incipit, ad quam pertinet desiderium finis" (*In IV Sent.*, 15. 4. 1. 1 ad 3 [ed. Parma, VII, 737]).

<sup>76</sup> *In I Ethic.*, lect. 20 (ed. Pirotta, no. 240).

<sup>77</sup> "Ad quantum dicendum quod imperium est et voluntatis et rationis quantum ad diversa; voluntatis quidem secundum quod imperium inclinationem quandam importat; rationis vero, secundum quod haec inclinatio distribuitur et ordinatur ut exequenda per hunc vel per illum" (*De Ver.*, 22. 12 ad 4).

<sup>78</sup> *ST*, I-II. 17. 1 (ed. Ottawa, 802b).



and the will act is prior, not in time, but in causality. Thus, two things are perfectly clear about St. Thomas's thought on the imperium: (a) it is essentially an act of the intellect; (b) it also pertains to the will, in that it moves the other powers of man to their acts.

No explicit text has been found in which St. Thomas states precisely how intellect and will are related to the imperium. There are, however, two reasons for thinking that the imperium is also a composite act, essentially and materially an act of intellect, formally an act of the will.<sup>79</sup> (a) The first reason is based on text and context. St. Thomas says that the imperium is "essentially" an act of intellect, just as he says that choice is essentially an act of the will. Moreover, we gather from the context that the will moves the other powers of man through the imperium; and so the intellect in this act would seem to stand as instrument in relation to the will. We have already seen that in human powers the principal-instrumental relation is a form-matter relation. (b) We have seen, in considering the formation of the virtues by charity, that charity, a habit of the will, forms the acts of the other virtues. But the act of a more particular virtue informed by charity is a composite act, and yet charity moves that virtue to its act through the imperium. Now, the commanded act and the imperium are one composite act. If charity is to inform a commanded act of virtue, it can do so only by informing the imperium, which is the form of the exterior act.

What St. Thomas says about imperium in relation to the other powers of one and the same person<sup>80</sup> is also true of the imperium of a superior over his subject.<sup>81</sup> The imperium of the superior directed to all his subjects in a matter relating to the common good is law.<sup>82</sup> St. Thomas's

<sup>79</sup> Cardinal Cajetan comes to this same conclusion for a similar reason. He sums his doctrine up in these words: "... ordinatio intimativa in imperio se habeat ut materia, et motio ut forma; ac per hoc, imperium est elicitive et essentialiter actus rationis, voluntatis vero primordialiter quoad formam" (*In I-II Summae Theologiae*, 17. 1 [ed. Leonine, VI, 119]).

<sup>80</sup> To the texts already mentioned from the *Prima Secundae*, add also 60. 1; 90. 1, *sed contra*, and ad 3.

<sup>81</sup> "Sic ergo et ratio dupliciter est causa aliorum. Uno quidem modo sicut necessitatem imponens, et hoc modo ad rationem pertinet non solum imperare inferioribus potentiis et membris corporis, sed etiam hominibus subiectis, quod quidem fit imperando. Alio modo sicut inducens et quodammodo disponens, et hoc modo ratio petit aliquid fieri ab his qui ei non subiiciuntur, sive sint aequales sive sint superiores. Utrumque autem horum, scilicet imperare et petere sive deprecari, ordinationem quandam important, prout scilicet homo disponit aliquid per aliud esse faciendum. Unde pertinet ad rationem cuius est ordinare..." (*ST*, I-II. 83. 1 [ed. Ottawa, 1841]). Cf. I-II. 1. 2 ad 1; II-II. 47. 8. 3; 104. 1.

<sup>82</sup> *ST*, I-II. 90. 1, *sed contra*.

explanation of the prayer of petition and of requests is exactly the same as that used for imperium and law.<sup>83</sup>

#### PART IV. THE ACT OF CHOICE

From two different points of view, Dom Odon Lottin, O.S.B.,<sup>84</sup> and Father Bernard J. Lonergan, S.J.,<sup>85</sup> have proved that St. Thomas's theory of the will underwent a notable development from the *Commentary on the Sentences* to the *Prima Secundae*. Dom Lottin, in particular, has pointed out the significance of questions 8 to 17, inclusive, in the *Prima Secundae*. A glance at the table of questions and articles will show that question 18 takes up the line of thought developed in question 7. From the point of view of development, questions 8 to 17 seem to be almost a digression. Moreover, the *Prima Pars* has already treated the will, its object, its act, and its freedom. Though the purposes of the *Secunda Pars* might well call for an amplification of intention and imperium, the extensive reconsideration of will and choice in the *Prima Secundae* finds its full explanation only in the new developments which St. Thomas brings in here.

A study of the development of St. Thomas's theory of will and choice would thus be superfluous, as well as being a long and difficult task. Yet a detailed text study of the final stage of the doctrine is still necessary. In fact, most expositions of St. Thomas's psychology of the will seem to consider the *Pars Prima* the key text, to be filled in perhaps with the *De Veritate*.<sup>86</sup>

The first article on choice in the *Prima Secundae* asks whether choice is an act of intellect or will. St. Thomas answers:

<sup>83</sup> *Supra*, n. 81. Cf. *In IV Sent.*, 15. 4. 1. 1; ". . . oratio est actus rationis per quem aliquis superiorem deprecatur, sicut imperium est actus rationis quo inferior ad aliquid ordinatur" (*ST*, II-II. 83. 10 [ed. Ottawa, 1850b]); III. 21. 1-3.

<sup>84</sup> Dom Odon Lottin, O.S.B., *Psychologie et Morale aux XIIe et XIIIe siècles* (3 vols.; Louvain: Mont César, 1943-48), I, 254, 259 n. 1.

<sup>85</sup> Bernard Lonergan, S.J., "St. Thomas' Thought on *Gratia Operans*," *Theological Studies*, III (December, 1942), 533-35.

<sup>86</sup> Even A. D. Sertillanges, O.P. (*St. Thomas d'Aquin* [4th ed.; 2 vols.; Paris: Aubier, 1925] II, 240) bases his exposition of choice on *De Ver.*, 24. 1, 2 and *ST*, I. 82. 1, 2; 83. 1; *De Ver.*, 22. 5, 6; *CG*, 2. 48. Only at the very end of the exposition does he include the *Prima Secundae*; cf. below, n. 107.

Etienne Gilson, in his otherwise unexcelled *Le Thomisme* (4th ed.; Paris: Vrin, 1944), makes no use of *Prima Secundae*.

M. Browne, O.P. ("De Intellectu et voluntate in electione," *Acta Pont. Academiae Romanae S. Th. Aq.*, 1935 [Rome: Marietti, 1936], pp. 32-45) makes some use of the terminology of matter and form, but not in the sense of composition. He says that the act of intellect is the *extrinsic* form of the act of the will (p. 40 and *passim*).



The term "choice" implies something pertaining to reason or intellect, and something pertaining to will; for the Philosopher says in the sixth book of the *Ethics*: "choice is an appetitive understanding, or an intellective appetite."<sup>87</sup>

Father Lonergan has pointed out that "the term, *liberum arbitrium*, fails to appear in the title of a single [article]."<sup>88</sup> More than this, in the three questions bearing on this topic, the term does not appear anywhere. From the very beginning, St. Thomas had refused to admit that *liberum arbitrium* was a distinct power; in the *Prima Secundae* the very term becomes superfluous. If we speak of powers, there are intellect and will; if we speak of acts, the term "choice" (*electio*) and its cognates are sufficient.

St. Thomas first appeals to the evidence that in choice both intellect and will are somehow concerned. This evidence had already been noted by Aristotle and accepted by all the authorities that St. Thomas knew.<sup>89</sup>

However, in the text referred to by St. Thomas, Aristotle is not directly speaking of will. In him, as in Plato, will does not appear as a distinct power or part of the soul, which could be related to appetite (concupiscible and irascible), sense, and intellect.<sup>90</sup> Is there any reason for the omission of will in Aristotle? The question can be answered from introspection and from the testimony of modern psychologists.

If we watch ourselves while we go through the process from deliberation to imperium, we see that we begin with an investigation, and, after a discussion with ourselves, pass on to a decision and an imperium. During this process, there is no "time" interval that is not occupied by an activity of the reason. There is no movement of the rational appetite interposed between the acts of reason; rather, the appetite seems to be accompanying the whole process. In other words, there is no discoverable moment in which we would be willing and during which the intellect would be in repose, not thinking. If we are going

<sup>87</sup> ST, I-II, 13. 1 (ed. Ottawa, 785b-786a).

<sup>88</sup> *Op. cit.*, p. 533.

<sup>89</sup> Lottin, *Psychologie et Morale aux XIIe et XIIIe siècles*, I, 77-205.

<sup>90</sup> Among modern writers, there are all shades of opinion. Behaviorists even deny knowledge of any kind (as a conscious act). Most psychologists admit knowledge; but some try to reduce appetite (which they call "feeling" or "emotion") to knowledge, by means of the James-Lange theory or something similar. However, the great majority admit at least two kinds of conscious acts: knowledge and feeling. Many admit a tripartite division: sense (and imagination), thought, and feeling. Very few think that voluntary activity is anything above and beyond these three classes of activity, unless they have come in contact somewhere with Christian philosophers.

to classify temporally distinct acts, and from them arrive at the list of powers, we shall never arrive at will as a distinct power.

Many modern psychologists have examined choice. They discover a "conflict of motives," the gradual emergence of one as the stronger, the disappearance of the others, and then the consequent action.<sup>91</sup> They seem unable to discover, not only no *temporally* distinct act of will, but not even an *actually distinct*, concomitant will act. It seems to be impossible to accuse all of them of bad faith; most of them seem to be giving an honest report of experience. And so we must accept this: introspectively, there is no actually distinct act of will from deliberation through to imperium. How, then, did St. Thomas and so many others find a distinct act of will, namely, choice? The answer seems to be that this latter group of thinkers was not practising introspection, but formal-object analysis.<sup>92</sup> And it must be granted, I believe, that most modern psychologists do not know how to do this.<sup>93</sup>

St. Thomas begins, then, with the evidence that the act of choice has something pertaining to intellect and something to will. He continues:

Whenever two things concur to constitute some one thing, one of them is formal with respect to the other. And so Gregory of Nyssa says that "choice is neither the appetite by itself, nor deliberation alone, but something composed of these. For as we say that an animal is composed of soul and body, and is neither the body by itself nor the soul alone, but both, so, too, [is] choice [composite]."

The terminology of matter and form had been used in the discussion of choice before St. Thomas. In Philip the Chancellor, reason is the *principium materiale* of a faculty (*liberum arbitrium*) and will is its

<sup>91</sup> As Wundt, Münsterberg, Külpe, and Titchener said, among others. Among more recent writers, examples are: Charles S. Judd, *Psychology* (2d ed.; Boston: Ginn, 1917), p. 308; John Dewey, *Human Nature and Conduct* (4th ed.; New York: Holt, 1922), pp. 189-98; Robert S. Woodworth, *Psychology* (New York: Holt, 1940), pp. 397-400, and *Dynamic Psychology* (New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 1918), pp. 125-27.

On these and similar theories, cf. Dom Thomas Verner Moore, O.S.B., *Dynamic Psychology* (Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1924), p. 312; Francis Aveling, *Personality and Will* (New York: Appleton, 1931), pp. 71-73; 206-7.

<sup>92</sup> Frequently there is no appeal at all to the experience of willing and choosing freely. Thus, St. Thomas (*De Malo*, q. 6) appeals to responsibility, law, exhortation, and reward. This type of argument is frequently used; it proves *that* there is a will, *that* the will is free.

<sup>93</sup> Most modern psychologists do not even know what is meant by powers ("faculties"), according to the testimonies of C. Spearman, *Psychology down the Ages* (2 vols.; London: Macmillan, 1937), I, 183; Robert S. Woodworth, *Experimental Psychology* (New York: Holt, 1938), p. 177; L. P. Thurstone, *Vectors of Mind* (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1935), pp. 45-53.



*principium formale*.<sup>94</sup> Robert Kilwardby speaks of a composite faculty, a *totum virtuale*, in which will is form and reason is matter.<sup>95</sup> St. Albert the Great says that, in the distinct faculty of *liberum arbitrium*, "what belongs to reason is material, what belongs to will is formal."<sup>96</sup>

From the first, St. Thomas had denied the very possibility of a composite faculty. He did speak of *liberum arbitrium* as a *totum virtuale* in the *Sentences*,<sup>97</sup> but this terminology was dropped as early as the *De Veritate*. Likewise, from the very beginning, he denied that *liberum arbitrium* was a faculty distinct from intellect and will. What brought him then to the notion of a matter-form composition, not in faculty, but in act or operation? Dom Lottin suggests that it was the historical necessity of clarification. That this was the motive at work seems beyond doubt.

We may perhaps represent St. Thomas's movement of thought in this fashion. Choice is an act connected with both intellect and will. The act of intellect must in some sense cause the adherence of will. Now, in the act of will, we must distinguish specification (willing *this good*) from exercise (willing *this good*).<sup>98</sup> With regard to the exercise of choice, the will reduces itself from potency to act. With regard to specification, the will depends on intellect. Now, wherever there is dependence, there is causality; one or more of the four causes must be in evidence. The intellect cannot be exemplary cause of the will's act, because the will is not a knowing power. Nor can intellect be an efficient cause even of the specification of choice without necessitating it and thus introducing an intellectual determinism. Intellectual knowledge is the final cause of the will's operation, in general.

But when we have a pure case of intellectual knowledge being a final cause, that is, when good is known as end without qualification, there is no freedom and no choice. The will-to-the-end as such is never free.<sup>99</sup> If choice were to be explained in the same way—that is, simply by final causality—it would be spontaneous, but by no means free. Such a position St. Thomas emphatically rejects in the *De Malo*.<sup>100</sup> So, on the negative side, it is clear that exemplary and efficient causality are impossible, and final causality is insufficient.

<sup>94</sup> Lottin, *Psychologie et Morale aux xiie et xiiie siècles*, I, 77, n. 3.

<sup>95</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 205.

<sup>96</sup> "... quod est rationis est materiale, quod est voluntatis est formale" (*In II Sent.*, 25. 1 [ed. Borgnet, XXVII, 423]).

<sup>97</sup> *In II Sent.*, 24. 1. 2.

<sup>98</sup> Cf. *ST*, I-II. 10. 2; *De Malo*, q. 6.

<sup>99</sup> *ST*, I-II. 10. 2; 13. 6.

<sup>100</sup> *De Malo*, q. 6.

(Arrived at such a point, some thinkers might succumb to the temptation of throwing the remaining causality into the will: *stat pro ratione voluntas*. Besides being at variance with experience, such a "solution" is more accurately a confession of failure. Our choices are not, and cannot be, causeless. As many modern writers love to say it, "There is no willing without a motive.")

There is another line of thought which most likely had an influence on St. Thomas's solution. Compare the sentence quoted above, beginning "Whenever two things concur," with this statement of Averroes:

Every action made from the bringing together of two diverse things, is necessarily such that one of them be as it were matter and instrument, and the other as it were form or agent.<sup>101</sup>

This statement indicates that it is fully in harmony with Aristotelian doctrine to speak of composite operation precisely in terms of matter and form.

Since it is possible to apply the analogy of matter and form to operation, let us see what this would mean, by considering the relations of matter and form as principles of substance. Matter and form are simultaneous; neither can precede the other in time. Form is the determining, specifying element; matter is that which is determined, specified. The composite substance has hypothetical necessity; that is, while under one form it is necessarily what it is. But the union of form with matter is contingent<sup>102</sup> and so never self-explanatory; it is brought about by an efficient cause. If the efficient cause brings about not only the coming-to-be, but the whole being of the composite, then the union will depend for its continuance in being on that cause.

Now, insofar as there is an efficient cause of the act of choice, it is the will itself (as first principle of exercise in man). Matter and form are simultaneous; and so this type of causality will help us to understand how there need be no moment during which intellect or will is acting alone. The union of form with matter is contingent (in the sense explained); and so we can understand how the act of intellect can formally specify the act of will without predetermining it.

Matter-form composition is obviously an analogy when it is applied to operation or action. That is why Averroes qualified it by saying

<sup>101</sup> *In III de Anima*, text. com. 36 (Venice: Juntas, 1574), Vol. VI. I, 2, fol. 184C.

<sup>102</sup> *De jure* this is true universally. Because of the celestial physics of his day, St. Thomas admitted a *de facto* noncontingence of the matter-form composition of the heavenly bodies; cf. *ST*, II-II, 24. 11.



"as it were" (*quasi*). That is why St. Thomas wants to explain what matter and form mean in such a context, and to offer an example in which the terms at least were common currency.

Now, we must consider, in the acts of the soul, that an act which is essentially of one power or habit receives a form and a species from a higher power or habit, according as the lower is ordered by the higher. For if someone performs an act of bravery for the love of God, that act is indeed materially one of bravery, but formally of charity.

We have already seen, in the first part of this study, what St. Thomas means by a "form of a virtue." We recall that one virtue can modify the act of another virtue, so that two virtues together produce one composite act.

This doctrine is now to be applied to the intellect and will. St. Thomas is going to explain what matter and form mean with reference to choice.

It is clear that reason somehow precedes will, and orders its act, that is, insofar as the will tends to its object according to the order of reason, because the apprehensive power presents to the appetitive its object. And thus that act, by which the will tends to something which is proposed as good because it is ordered by reason to an end, is materially an act of the will, but formally one of reason.

Reason precedes will, not from every point of view, but only from this one: reason presents to will the object to which will tends. Sometimes this object is simply good, and then it exercises only final causality, while the will exercises that act which is called simple willing. Sometimes the object proposed is good insofar as it is ordered by reason to an end, and here the known object (means-as-ordered-to-end) exercises both final and formal causality.

The appetite tends to the ultimate end naturally; and so the application of the appetitive movement to the apprehended end does not have the character of consent, but of simple willing. But those things which are after the ultimate end, fall under deliberation insofar as they are for an end, and so there can be consent about them, insofar as the appetitive motion is applied to that which is judged by deliberation.<sup>103</sup>

Wherever there is order, there intellect is somehow present. And it is equally obvious that the relation of order to that which is ordered is as the determining to the determinable, as form to matter. Hence, in an act in which there is intrinsically a discursive (that is, an

<sup>103</sup> *ST*, I-II. 15. 3 (ed. Ottawa, 797b).

"ordered") movement and which is nevertheless not by its nature so ordered, there must be composition; such an act will have to be formally an act of the intellect, and materially of the other power (here, the will).

How then are we to answer the question, What is the nature of the act of choice?

In such, the substance of the act is as matter to the order which is imposed by the higher power. And so, choice substantially is not an act of reason, but of will. For choice is completed in a movement of the soul to the good which is chosen. And so, manifestly, it is an act of the appetitive power.

Since the substantial (ordered) part of choice is the movement of the appetite to the good, choice is substantially (essentially), yet only materially, an act of will.

Because choice occurs within such a framework of means to an end, it is easy to see why for St. Thomas the *propter quid* proof for freedom lies in the nature of reason apprehending means contingently related to an end.<sup>104</sup>

It will be interesting to see whether we can discover from St. Thomas what this "order," this "formal part" of choice is more concretely.

Choice is an act of the rational appetite which is called the will. For this reason [Aristotle] called choice a deliberative desire, because from this that man deliberates he comes to judge the things which are found by deliberation. And this desire is the choice.<sup>105</sup>

That which is for an end, and about which choice takes place, is so related to the end, as the conclusion to its principle.<sup>106</sup>

The "formal part" of choice, which flows from reason, is the order of means to end, the judgment which follows upon deliberation, the conclusion of the operative syllogism.<sup>107</sup> Or, to use another terminology, the formal part of choice is the last practical judgment.

<sup>104</sup> Once St. Thomas has established the nature of the will and decided that there are nonnecessitating objects in *ST*, I-II. 10. 2, he has only to show how such nonnecessitating objects can be willed. They cannot be willed as ends; they can be willed as contingently related means. And so his whole argument in 13. 6 recalls that there can be in reality contingently related means and that these contingent means can be so known by reason and so presented to will.

<sup>105</sup> *In III Ethic.*, lect. 9 (ed. Pirotta, no. 486).

<sup>106</sup> *ST*, I-II. 13. 5 (ed. Ottawa, 789a). Cf. *ibid.*, 13. 1 ad 2; 13. 6 ad 1 and ad 2.

<sup>107</sup> "... iudicium cui attribuitur libertas est iudicium electionis; non autem iudicium quo sententiat homo de conclusionibus in scientiis speculativis; nam ipsa electio est quasi quaedam scientia de praeconsiliatis" (*De Ver.*, 24. 1 ad



Father A. D. Sertillanges, O.P., expresses this doctrine clearly.

The act of liberty is a mixed act. It is an act of *willed judgment*, or an act of *judged willing*; intelligence and will being joined there in the manner of a single power; form and matter making only one composite, one compound. . . . This act, which has two parts, satisfies the necessity of making all our human actions intellectual, in as much as it is a judgment; in as much as it is willed, it comes to the rescue of the inevitable indetermination of the intelligence in practical matters.<sup>108</sup>

This analysis satisfies the requirements of the case. Introspection shows no gap in intellectual activity, into which a separate act of the will could be introduced. If in introspection we concentrate on the intellectual content, on the determination, the whole process of deliberation, choice, and imperium will seem to take place within intellect. If on the other hand we analyze the act of choice, we will find characteristics of both intellect and will. Furthermore, choice is free, and choice is determined by intellect. Only determination after the manner of an intrinsic formal cause can fulfill both of these requirements. And so it follows that only the explanation of choice as a

17); cf. *ST*, I, 86. 1 ad 2: "Ad secundum. Dicendum quod electio particularis operabilis est quasi conclusio syllogismi intellectus practici" (ed. Ottawa, 536a); *ibid.*, I-II, 13. 1 ad 2; 13. 3; 76. 1; II-II, 47. 3 ad 1.

<sup>108</sup> "L'Acte de liberté est un acte mixte. C'est un acte de *jugement voulu*, ou un acte de *vouloir jugé*, intelligence et volonté se conjugant, ici, à la façon d'un pouvoir unique; forme et matière ne formant qu'un composé, un mixte. . . . Cet acte en partie double donne satisfaction, en tant que jugement, à la nécessité de rendre intellectuels tous nos acts d'hommes; en tant que voulu, il vient au secours de l'indétermination inévitable de l'intelligence en matière pratique" (*St. Thomas d'Aquin* [4th ed.] II, 263).

It seems that this way of understanding St. Thomas was independently reached by Dom Odon Lottin in "L'ordre moral et l'ordre logique d'après saint Thomas d'Aquin," *Annales de l'Institut Supérieur de Philosophie* (Louvain), V (1924), 310-17.

Apparently there have always been some who have seen this to be the adequate way of understanding St. Thomas. For example, John Capreolus (*Defensiones Theologiae*, ed. by Ceslaus Paban and Thomas Pègues, O.P. [Tours: Cattier, 1900], I, d. 1, q. 2, a. 1, *tertia conclusio*) explains choice simply by quoting I-II, 13. 1 (*ed. cit.*, I, 88-89). Cardinal Cajetan has no commentary on 13. 1; but in his interpretation of the matter-form composition of the imperium he refers to St. Thomas's explanation of choice (ed. Leonine, VI, 119). St. Robert Bellarmine, in *De Gratia et Libero Arbitrio*, Bk. III, chap. 9 (*De Controversiis* [Venice: 1599; Vol. IV, cols. 501-2]), uses the terminology of matter and form.

Most recently, this doctrine has been insisted on, with full awareness of Father Sertillange's leadership, by André Marc, S.J., in *Psychologie Réflexive* (2 vols.; Brussels: L'Édition Universelle, 1949), II, 139.

composite act leaves freedom of choice intact. Understood in this way, the last practical judgment ceases to be a perplexing problem.<sup>109</sup>

### CONCLUSIONS

These four questions (about virtue, the commanded act, imperium, and choice) were asked within the more general context of the unity of human activity. In studying the pertinent texts of St. Thomas, it has become clear that the unity of these activities is the unity of composition.

One act flows from several virtues, and it is one by the unity of composition, wherein the higher virtue is as form and the lower is as matter. In other words, the act of any except the highest virtue is an activity ordered to an intermediate end and so of itself is ordainable (determinable) to a higher end, which latter specifies it ultimately and completely as virtue.

The imperium and the commanded act are one act by the unity of composition. The acts of all the powers that are subject to deliberate control are determinable by the order and ends of reason, and serve reason as instruments. And so when any sensory or motor power is actually commanded by reason, the imperium or command itself is the form of the total human act.

The act of choice, too, is one act with which two powers are concerned as matter and form. And so the act of choice is a composite act, in which the material yet substantial part (tendency, adherence) is from the will, and the formal part (order of means contingently related to end) is from reason. Because reason in the act of choice is formal cause, it can give the specification and formal determination to that act, without in any way predetermining it or imposing any antecedent necessity upon it. This explanation renders the act of choice intelligible as being a reasonable act, and goes on to show, not only the fact, but the reason for freedom.

These groups of texts are to all appearances the fullest and most explicit treatments of the unity of composition in human activity.

<sup>109</sup> As is said in the "24 Theses"; "The will follows the last practical judgment, but brings it about that it is the last." If the reciprocal or mutual causality here expressed is taken in the sense of efficient causality on both sides, this explanation can well seem unintelligible. If the causality is that of matter and form, then it is easy to see how the last practical judgment can determine the will (that is, specify it) and yet not predetermine or necessitate it. For, as we have seen above, form determines its matter, but gives it only a contingent necessity; the union of matter and form is and remains contingent.



However, they are not the only places where St. Thomas refers to the unity of human operation.<sup>110</sup> And once it has been established that such a doctrine is an essential part of Thomist psychology, that doctrine can be discovered in other places where St. Thomas has but veiled reference to it,<sup>111</sup> and can be applied to problems whose data demand a similar solution.

---

<sup>110</sup> *In III de Anima*, lect. 4 (ed. Pirotta, no. 621); *ST*, I-II. 74. 4 ad 1 and 2; *In de Mem. et Remin.*, lect. 2.

<sup>111</sup> Two terms in particular can be found to contain such reference, namely, *continuatio* and *reflexio* (in some of its uses).

# PHILOSOPHY AND HISTORY

A. ROBERT CAPONIGRI

## I

Among the most arresting currents in contemporary speculation is the demand, growing constantly more insistent, for a fresh *rapprochement* between philosophy and history. In the light of the relationship which has prevailed between these disciplines and of the immediate intellectual crisis from which this demand for a revision of this relationship arises, this demand may well constitute a revolutionary moment: the end and the beginning, not of an era or a period, but of a basic orientation in the intellectual life of the West. Traditionally, the relationship between philosophy and history has been fraught with ambiguity and at the same time pervaded by a certain disdain on the part of philosophy; nevertheless, history has borne both ambiguity and disdain meekly, principally because there existed no element, no dimension of Western consciousness upon which it could take its stand confidently to challenge philosophy's dominion. That history has now found courage to become vocal, and even more that philosophy contritely concurs, in a demand for the establishment of a less ambiguous, more vital and more realistic contact is unimpeachable evidence that such an element and dimension has finally entered the speculative consciousness of the West, and that that consciousness will know no peace until that revision is accomplished.

Traditionally, the attitude of philosophy toward history has been both ambiguous and touched with disdain; nowhere have these characteristics been more clearly exhibited than in the observation of Aristotle, now become classic, that history is less true, because less universally

---

DR. A. R. CAPONIGRI was formerly lecturer in literature and philosophy in the School of Letters of the State University of Iowa, and is at present a member of the Department of Philosophy at the University of Notre Dame, teaching courses in modern philosophy. He has published in *Ethics*, the *New England Quarterly*, and the *Review of Metaphysics*.



orientated, even than poetry. This observation is important not only because of its source and because of the classic stature to which it has attained, but even more because it recapitulates the entire theoretical bias of traditional Western speculation toward history. This bias rests firmly upon the twin pillars of traditional speculation: universalistic and abstractive theory of knowledge, and permanentistic theory of being. The force of the universalistic and abstractive theories of knowledge has been to allocate significance exclusively in the abstract concept and the universal term; the concrete and the uniquely determined are concomitantly thought to be intelligible only to the degree to which concretion and determination might be resolved into the abstract and the universal. Thus was born the classic aphorism which has dominated Western thought: *scientia est de universalibus*, the complement of which is, *and of singulars only to the degree which they can be reduced to, or subsumed under, universals*. The permanentistic theories of being have exercised an analogous influence: the allocation of reality only in the unchanging, only in being as it is immune to transformation and change, and the assignment of reality to orders of change only to the degree to which these might in turn be reduced to, or found to participate in, the unalterable and immutable springs of being. But history, clearly, alike as science and as an order of existence, resists the forces of these theories with all its being; as a science it is wholly orientated toward the concrete and the uniquely determined; as an order of existence its very essence is ceaseless change and transformation. Hence the irresistible constraint upon Western thought to minimize the stature of history as a science and to debilitate the ontological structure of historical forms of existence.

History, for its part, under the pressure of this speculative dominance, has had to resort to dubious vital strategies to maintain some semblance of identity. As a science it has sought to justify its existence by a programmatic attempt to assimilate the alien canons under which it was condemned, while as an order of existence it has had to mask now under the forms of nature, now under those of spirit, in order to resist total relegation to the realm of illusion. Needless to say, strategies so dubious as these must be self-defeating; and, as a matter of fact, within their framework the ideal task—upon the successful completion of which a genuine *rapprochement* between philosophy and history depends—namely, the formulation of an unambiguous concept of history, has been completely frustrated.

Even more arresting, perhaps, is the fact that history has been compelled to assume these unheroic postures and to resort to these suicidal

techniques even while its antagonist, the philosophical tradition, has been inwardly shaken by the profoundest misgivings as to the very principles on which its programmatic minimization of history had rested. For within the philosophical tradition the dominant epistemological universalism and ontological permanentism have been constantly embarrassed by the irreducibility of the concrete and of the mutable as the terminal reference alike of significant discourse and of the inner conditions of being in existence. Significant discourse has but two alternatives, concretion or tautology, while being can distinguish itself from nothingness ultimately only in the uniquely determined, intimately, and tragically evanescent forms of actual existence. To assimilate these irreducibles to its universalistic and permanentistic insights has constituted the most intimate dialectic of Western speculation. In its efforts to do so, however, it has found itself involved in a paradoxical relationship to history: to the degree to which it has seemed to solve this inner conflict, Western speculation has found itself approaching in its analysis of being the concretion and dynamic from which history has always taken its point of departure. In a word, the proud universal in virtue of which Aristotle had found it possible to subordinate history even to poetry in the order of knowing seemed to approach identity with the concrete and changing of history to the very degree to which Western thought has come to understand the conditions of significance and actuality. So explosive an ambiguity and paradox must eventually, it could easily be predicted, result in precisely such a revolutionary demand as would seem to be taking form in the contemporary clamor for a revision of the relationship between these sovereign disciplines of human thought.

The vocalization of this demand has been retarded, we have suggested, only because there seemed to be lacking in Western experience a dimension or an element upon which the case for such a revision could rest with confidence; at the same time, the fact that this demand has now actually become vocal would seem ample evidence that such an element has now made its appearance. It has done so in the form of the grievous perturbation concerning the humane potential of the natural science approach to the real to which the Western mind would seem, in a Faustian moment, to have committed itself at the Italian Renaissance. Perturbation concerning the human potential of science, we have said, because there would seem to be no serious inclination in the new historicism to question scientific method in the areas in which it has so conclusively demonstrated its power; on the contrary, an almost morbid preoccupation with the fact of this power would seem

to characterize its less buoyant moods. The real point of contact and reaction of historicism and science is the spectacle of the progressive alienation of science, in the course of its historical articulation, from its initial humanistic motivations, and its concurrent self-revelation as addressed and orientated toward the naked powers of nature.

It is a fact too often forgotten in the history of science and even in the general history of culture, but fundamental to the consciousness of the new historicism, that in its beginnings natural science was humanistic both in point of departure and in program, that humanism, as Windelband quaintly expresses it, is the mother of natural science. This is true, in the first instance, in the sense in which Windelband immediately intended his little aphorism, namely, that the principles of the modern natural-science method are to be sought in the humanistic recovery of classical sources; it is even more true, however, in the sense which Windelband understood, but to which he did not advert, namely, that in its beginnings modern science shared the devotion to man and history which was the deeper and more original spring of the Renaissance humanism. With humanism, natural science appears at the dawn of the modern world as an instrument for the transformation of history in the direction of the actualization of human values. Its particular promise was to place in man's hands the instrumentalities for the control of the natural factors in the synthesis of historical forms. It was to be the co-operating—indeed, for some, the unique—principle for the transformation of history from a theatre of tragic renunciations to one of noble fulfillments. Nor has science ever consciously abandoned this initial aspiration and promise; it still advances itself as humanistic, even humanitarian and utopian, in principle and spirit. Its studied theodicy is to vest the instruments of physical prowess which it places in man's hands with moral potency and dignity, to claim for the conquest of nature that it is the path ultimately to the conquest of destiny and history—in a word, to vest its naturalism with man's fondest ethical dreams. This theodicy is acutely embarrassed by the actual development of the plight of Western culture through three centuries of the almost exclusive cultivation of the natural-science method. This development has made it clear that the instrumentalities which science places in man's hands are instruments of nature, that is, brute power. The apologists of science have sought to elude this embarrassment by narrowing the claims and transferring a part of the mission of science: it is with science, they reason, to furnish man with the instruments of power, but with man qua man—that is, as spirit and not as natural power—to translate these forces into moral and historical agencies.



The sophistry of this apologetic of a desperate naturalism, as it has been called, deceives no one, least of all the scientists in whose name it is made; on the one hand it sophisticates the historical and logical claim of science to exclusive status as the methodology of historical transformation through natural control, for from this category no force operative in history can, from the point of view of science, be excluded; while on the other hand it advances a dualism which it is prepared neither to explain nor exploit, since its whole character is that of a tour de force for the evasion of historical eventualities inconsistent with the initial claims of science.

It is precisely at this point of the failure of its humane potential, that is, of its claims to the status of an instrument for the ethical control of history by means of the technological mastery of the forces of nature, that the new historicism, we have suggested, makes contact with, and reacts against, the natural-science approach to the real. The pattern of its reaction is complex, but its result is clear—the demand for a fresh evaluation of the relationship between philosophy and history. In the first place, and at first glance paradoxically, the tendency of the new historical attitude is to relieve science itself of direct responsibility for its humane delinquency; and in this sense it has become a better apology for science than that advanced by the official spokesman of science. It achieves this exculpation by calling attention to the philosophical structure of the method of the sciences; here it discovers, heavily vested, the same universalistic and permanentistic preoccupations which have previously embarrassed the relationship of philosophy directly with history. For this reason the genuine attitude of the new historicism toward science is to regard it as symptom, not as malady, and to demand that the *rapprochement* be made directly with philosophy and in the form of a fresh address to the antinomies which have historically embarrassed their relation.

In this demand that speculation be readdressed to the basic antinomies which historically have plagued it resides the power of the new historicism. The reorientation of metaphysical speculation away from nature and toward history will evoke these antinomies in their most dramatic form and throw into bold relief the need for the re-excogitation of the basic categories of being and significance. A new period of liberation and self-realization for the historical sciences must surely result, for an end would thus be put to the long subjugation of the point of departure of history to that of naturalistic analysis. An end might by this means be brought to the harsh dualisms which have embarrassed the genesis of historical forms, but which spring from these same

metaphysical antinomies, between ethics and politics, between art and morals, in a word, between nature and spirit in history; a synthesis between nature and spirit at the only point at which such synthesis can be genuine and living, not abstract, mechanical, and futile—namely, at the level of historical action—might conceivably close these dualisms forever.

This conception of the possible results of a fresh *rapprochement* between philosophy and history is admittedly sanguine; it needs to be limited and modified by a careful consideration of the conditions under which such *rapprochement* might successfully be achieved. Chief among these conditions, it has been suggested, is the careful control of the euristic form in which the relationship is initially stated. For even a superficial review of the antinomies which have beset the relationship of history and philosophy in the past reveals that while phenomenological, or gnoseological, or ontological in formal character they are radically euristic; that is, they spring from an initial malformulation of the problem. Fundamentally, the euristic failure has lain in the refusal to accord an autonomous status to the philosophical problem of history, in abortive attempts to subsume the problem of history under concepts which have been formulated under other euristic preoccupations. Specifically, this euristic fallacy has taken three dominant forms: the attempts to state, and hence to solve, the problem from the ground of the theoretical problems of historiography, from the ground of the philosophy of nature, and finally from that of the philosophy of spirit. The first of these, it would seem, is clearly a fallacy or perspective, a specialist's occupational contraction of vision; the others would seem as clearly to be fallacies of reduction, for each consists of a formal attempt to bring the area of history in all its aspects—phenomenological, gnoseological, ontological—under a concept, nature, or spirit, respectively, already projected from the ground of other concerns. For this reason, the very first concern of a fresh *rapprochement* between philosophy and history must be the euristic disengagement of the philosophical problem of history from these fallacious entanglements. Even then, however, the chief work still remains to be done, namely, the determination of the positive terms of an autonomous philosophical problem of history, to which an unambiguous and irreducible concept of history might in time be expected to correspond. This euristic task, in both its negative and positive aspects, the disengagement of the problem of history from the fallacies of perspective and reduction which have beset it, as well as the exploration of its positive euristic terms, is the concern of the present paper.

## II

The problem of history and the problem of writing history have come to interpenetrate so closely that the "task of the historian" is the customary, almost the instinctive, point of departure for the theoretical analysis of history. This attempt to project the philosophical problem of history from the ground of the theoretical problems of historiography is the essence of the broad movement called "historicism" and reaches its most complete expression in "absolute historicism" in which philosophy is resolved without residue into the methodology of historiography. From the point of view of the euristic conditions of a philosophical problem of history no point of departure could be less promising. The historicist program, as a matter of fact, constitutes a fallacy of perspective which, persisted in, must render the formulation, to say nothing of the resolution, of a genuine philosophical problem of history impossible.

The theoretical problems of historiography derive chiefly from an ambiguity at the heart of the historian's task; historiography is uncertain as to its own theoretical character, that is, its character and status as a mode of knowing. On the one hand, historiography is orientated wholly toward the concrete, toward its rich and inexhaustible determination in quality; moreover, the concrete toward which it is orientated, is not statuesque, substantively plural and fixed, but fluid, dynamic, continuous. Such concretion can be fixed and rendered for expression and communication only in narration, in images; therefore, as a consequence, written history appears in its own self-consciousness, that is to historiography, most immediately as art. The subsumption of history under the general concept of art as a form of knowing, however, is attended by insuperable difficulties. Chief among these is the fact that the concrete to which history—that is, written history—is addressed is the existent concrete; but the images of art, patently, are unsusceptible of the character of existence, save obliquely and typically. The forms of art, its images, are structures of pure quality, devoid of any determination of real and unreal, of any determination of existence, while the images of history are images of the real. But the character of existence cannot be intrinsic to any image, it cannot be simply a quality among qualities; it is rather the determination of quality to actuality which it does not possess simply as quality. The character of existence cannot consequently pertain to the images of history as images, but must accede to them by a further theoretical act beyond that by which the image is evoked. This further act can only be logical. Existence must enjoy the status of logical predicate, not of aesthetic quality.



This consideration alters profoundly history's own conception of its theoretical character. If the characteristic of the image of history—that is, existence—pertains to it not as image, but in virtue of a further theoretical, logical act, history must be considered in its most intimate character to be, not art, but science. Its constitutive principle must be a logical act, a judgment, and its operative principle, the concept—specifically, the “concept” of existence, which will appear in its constitutive judgment as logical predicate, and the subject of which must be the historical image. The intimate structure of history, consequently, is logical. Yet insuperable difficulties would seem to attend this conclusion also. On the one hand, the status of existence as a logical predicate is highly suspect, while on the other the character of its logical reference in the image is obscure. The appearance of existence as logical predicate would seem to involve its characterization as an essence, for logical predication consists precisely in the essential characterization of images. The reduction of existence to the state of an essence, however, nullifies the whole force of the logical persuasion of history; for essence assigns to the image merely a further formal characterization, and not actuality of its constitutive qualitative structure. The logical reference of existence to the image would consequently be purely formal and extrinsic, and not an intrinsic determination of the image to its actuality such as is demanded by the characteristic nature of the historical concrete.

This tension within historiography—this bivalence, as it were, of written history toward concretion in the image on the one hand and on the other toward the abstraction and formality of the logical act or judgment—this intimately contradictory aspiration toward the status at once of art and of science is the root of all its theoretical difficulties. Programmatically, it can surrender neither of these prerogatives; yet logically it cannot retain both. It can surrender its claim to logical structure only at the price of retirement from the theatre of the sciences into that realm of pure quality, innocent of any distinction of real and unreal, of any intimate character of existence, which would seem to be the realm of art. It can relinquish its claim to the status of art only at the price of the surrender of its precious and characteristic concretion, of falling into a dualism of allegory, or finally of retreating into a geometric method in which its only distinction from the abstraction of mathematics would be the peculiar ineptitude of its symbols.

The deliverance of historiography from this theoretical quandary does not appear imminent, nor would its occurrence justify the program of historicism—that is, furnish an adequate basis for the projection of

the philosophical problem of history. Rather, the whole historiographic problem, when made the focus of the theoretical analysis of history, distorts and obscures the structure of the philosophical problem and must continue to do so until reassigned to the periphery of that analysis. Two indications of this fact, deriving directly from the theoretical quandry already noted, are especially persuasive. The first is the terminal aestheticism which historiography can accept with serenity as proper to written history, but which has no place in the philosophical concept of history. This aestheticism is accepted by Croce, for example, when he writes without ambiguity that history—that is, written history—is contemplation. The basis of this contemplative theory of written history is, obviously, its necessary orientation toward the image. Its inconsonance with a philosophical concept of history is patent. History in its actuality is the theatre, not of contemplation, but of action; its intimate structure, consequently, must be not aesthetic but ethical. Somewhere within the ethical structure of history the contemplative moment of historiography must indeed find its place, but it cannot indicate or delineate the form of history.

This terminal aestheticism of historiography harbors a second element still more fatal to the projection of the philosophical problem of history. This is the violent disorientation of the logical moment or act. In the process of giving logical structure to history, the concept was subordinated to the image as but one more formal determinant. In fact, however, the orientation of the concept and of the logical act is not toward the image as pure intuition, but toward action—that is, toward the solicitation of actuality. The inner dynamic of the idea is not toward the determination of the image, but toward the determination of the will in decision; not, therefore, back upon the self and an initial dream state, but outward upon nature and the real to be actualized, upon history as the public domain of existence. It is at this point, also, that the proper relationship between the philosophical problem of history and the theoretical problems of historiography begin to appear. For once it is understood that the orientation of the logical act of the theoretical moment in general is toward action, and not back upon itself or one of its immanent moments, it also becomes clear that the existence, the existence proper to historical reality, is the term of economic and of ethical action, and not of mere logical predication. The existence proper to the image of historiography is a derived, not a primary, existence.

Historicism, consequently—that is, the attempt to project the philosophical problem of history from the ground of the theoretical problems

of historiography, especially in the form of a theory of the historical judgment as the formal determination of the image to existence—falls short of the minimal euristic demands of the philosophical problem of history because the result of this effort is to throw the logical act back upon the realm of pure intuition rather than forward upon the theatre of action and decision.

### III

The perspective fallacy of historicism has exercised a dominant, but not undisputed, sway over the theoretical aspects of history; it has been challenged at its most vital point by the philosophy of history. While the program of historicism has been the projection of the philosophical problem of history from the ground of the theoretical problems of historiography, the philosophy of history has consistently maintained the character of history as an order primarily of existence, not of knowing, and consequently has maintained that the writing of history must itself be predicated, either overtly or covertly, upon antecedent principles. These principles it has been the concern of the philosophy of history to discover or to formulate, not simply as the preambles to historiography, but rather as autonomous speculative concerns. Thus that complexus of theories which pass collectively under the title of philosophy of history would seem to possess a certain superiority over historicism because it is orientated toward history as a realm of existence and meaning, and is not inclined to confuse that realm with the specific problem of our knowledge of it. Nevertheless, the philosophy of history has in its turn consistently assumed fallacious points of view which wholly dissipate this advantage.

Specifically, the philosophy of history has consistently fallen into a dual fallacy of reduction; on the one hand it has sought to reduce the concept of history to the concept "nature," on the other, to the concept "spirit"; in either case, of course, with the same concern, to secure history as a realm of meaning and existence. Overtly this fallacy has appeared principally in gnoseological form—that is, in answer to the question of the conditions of meaning in history—and has, consequently, consisted precisely in the attempt to bring history as a theatre of meaning within the limits of the gnoseological aspects of nature and spirit; in either case the thesis has been the same: history will have been established as a theatre of meaning, if the conditions of meaning defined in the concepts "nature" and "spirit" respectively can be shown to prevail in its case also. Since the order of meaning scarcely possesses autonomy, however, but tends consistently to revert to more primitive ontological



terms, the overt gnoseological form of this fallacy conceals an ontological substructure, that is, an ontological identification of history with nature or spirit. Basically, however, the fallacy is phenomenological; that is, it rests upon a phenomenological confusion of the order of history with nature and spirit. For purposes of criticism it is sufficient to restrict attention to the overt form of the fallacy, though it is clear that a euristic construction of the philosophical problem of history must extend, and indeed take its point of departure in, the problems which this overt form conceals.

The attempt to bring history under the concept of nature as a theatre of meaning follows two chief lines. The first is the attempt to establish history as a theatre of causality in the gnoseological sense or dimension of this principle; the second the attempt to fix history as an order of objects, to establish the objectivity of history on the same lines as the objectivity of nature. In both these procedures the phenomenological confusion and the ontological identification of which mention has been made hover menacingly in the background.

The naturalistic principle of causality is in the first instance an existential principle; that is, the primary reference of the principle of causality within the concept of nature is to existential natural process. The principle becomes a principle of meaning, in addition to, and as a consequence of, its existential character, when its primary terms are translated into terms of logical inference, and the necessity which constitutes its most intimate character is recognized to be logical necessity. This translation achieves the transformation of the blind interplay of the brute forces of nature into a theatre of meaning, significant, intelligible, and even intentional in its own right. To express this more concretely, we grasp the meaning of events and processes of nature only to the degree to which we grasp the logical, as distinct from the merely existential, necessity of their interrelation—only to the extent, that is, to which the existential ceases to appear simply as given. So clear is this to naturalistic theory that even to say that A is the cause of B in natural process is to profess the power to infer B from an adequate knowledge of A even in the absence of the existential process itself, so that the inferential structure—"if A, then B," "if B, then A"—becomes the classical type of formula for the significant penetration of natural process. The whole meaning of causality and of nature itself is translatable into this type formula, so that to have meaning in nature is nothing else than to fulfill this inferential structure.

The nub of this thesis for the philosophical problem of history is the manner in which this translation from the existential to the logical

level actually takes place. The form of this translation is fatal for history, or, more precisely, for a naturalistic philosophy of history. Logical necessity emerges from existential nexus only by the generalization of causes; as a consequence, in the order of natural causes, the force of inference—that is, of logical necessity—decreases as the existential instance is approached and conversely increases as the system of inference recedes from the immediacy of the instance. This process rests upon a double abstraction, qualitative and temporal. The necessity involved in logical inference between cause and effect is timeless or, more precisely, rests upon a temporal abstraction; to grasp the meaning of natural process in terms of causal inference is precisely to refer the temporal apparition of existential relations to a temporal principle. Thus the time factor, although as a matter of fact actually constitutive and determinative of natural existential process, is logically irrelevant or tangential and does not enter into the interpretable meaning of the process. That natural event X, structuralized causally into the existential stasis A and antithesis B and logically into the form “A therefore B” transpired at time T is not part of the meaning of intelligibility of X; and this, even in view of the fact that natural causal process transpires wholly in time, so that existentially to be in nature is to be in time. Causality as a principle of logical necessity, and consequently of meaning, is thus general with respect to the distribution of natural process in time.

Similarly, the logical necessity of the naturalistic principle of causality rests upon abstraction from the qualitative richness of existence. The quantification of all causal relations becomes the condition of their logical structure. The richness of the qualitative work, in Hegel's powerful phrase, we take up ourselves and relegate to a realm of pure subjectivity—that is, to a world of existential, but nonlogical, relationship.

These strategies to which naturalism has in the past been put in order to translate mere events into intelligible causal relations according to a rule of logical inference have occasioned considerable perturbation among naturalists themselves. They contain the seeds of the formalization of science which has been proceeding relentlessly for centuries. When applied to the interpretation of historical process, they appear clearly self-defeating. Time and qualitative determination are not the accidents, but the intimate substance of historical transaction. The detemporalization and qualitative impoverishment of historical process annihilates it, rather than renders it meaningful or intelligible. The general causes of which the naturalist can speak and

with which he can rest content within the purview of his preoccupations clearly possess no logical force in history precisely because it is the temporal and qualitative dimensions of the historical event and process which demand clarification. The historical process is totally concretion, temporally and qualitatively, and as a theatre of meaning cannot leave these conditions of concretion behind. If general causes are operative in history under the guise of natural factors they operate, as Turgot pointed out long ago, only through conscious concretion—that is, through the human spirit—as it is itself temporally and qualitatively distributed. Any attempt to construct the gnoseological theory of history on the basis of logical necessity as it is developed in the concept of nature has the result only of distorting the intimate structure of history and of translating its qualitatively rich and temporally distributed drama into the pale dialectic of abstractions on the grey field of an eternity which is history's negation, not its fulfillment.

The fallacy of reductive naturalism appears again in the philosophy of history under the guise of the problem of the objectivity of history. The import of the fallacy from this point of view is that historical events and processes, from the gnoseological point of view, occupy the same transcendent reference as do the objects of natural science and that, consequently, the canon for meaning in history must be identical with that of a realistic naturalism, namely, the conformity of idea with object. The root of the fallacy in this respect is clearly the imitative theory of knowledge to which naturalism—in its own area quite rightly, no doubt—is committed. The extension of this theory to the area of history on the basis of mere analogy is a clear case of a phenomenological confusion which erupts on the gnoseological level. It is phenomenologically impossible to reduce the historical event or form; it is consequently at this level that the fallacy of historical objectivity must be met.

The assertion of the phenomenological incommensurability of historical and natural forms appears readily comprehensible in the light of almost any chance example; the work of art is especially impressive in this respect. For that the work of art in its precise character as art is not a natural form, nor its existential conditions those of natural objects or events, is patent. Conversely, the history of aesthetics from Aristotle forward illustrates again and again the impasse into which all attempts to deal with the work of art naturalistically—that is, as an object—are forced. Such attempts result in the annihilation of the work of art in precisely its artistic character and its replacement with some naturalistic substitute such as a psychology, an ideology, an economics, or a sociology of art.



What is here illustrated by the case of the work of art is more generally true of all historical forms. Essentially incommensurable with natural forms, historical forms resist reduction to natural at the phenomenological level. Their confusion with such forms results in the pseudoproblem of the objectivity of history and the second form of the naturalistic philosophy of history.

The reductive fallacy appears again in the philosophy of history in the subsumption of history under the concept of spirit. In this subsumption it is asserted that the conditions of meaning in history are reducible to the conditions of meaning in the concept of spirit. Formally, this reduction of history to spirit is identical with the naturalistic form of this fallacy and has arisen in dialectical opposition to the naturalistic form. The attempt to subsume history under the concept spirit has been motivated by the desire to preserve history from those contradictions into which the naturalistic fallacy plunges it; its result, however, is to expose history to new dangers and difficulties no easier, perhaps even more difficult, to disengage.

The concept of spirit is rooted in the rich humanistic tradition of Western thought. Specifically, it arose in answer to man's need to articulate his sense of transcendence over the necessities and fatalities of nature. Consequently, it has progressively defined itself in the terms in which that transcendence most vividly impresses itself upon him, namely, liberty and consciousness. Just as the dynamic of naturalism has been toward the darkness of utter necessity, so the dynamic of the self-definition of spirit has been in the direction of creative self-conscious idea, a dynamism which may easily override the humanism in which it has its origins.

Spirit has its initial moment of self-definition in the rejection of the imitative theory of knowledge so identified with naturalism. Spirit first enunciated itself in the history of thought in the assertion of the creative character of thought, of the identity of subject and object; this assertion arose when first it was sensed that nature is spirit's own shadow which in its initial ingenuousness it mistakes for substance. The creative character of thought carries with it the identification of meaning as the self-discovery of spirit in its free generation of form. For this reason, spiritualistic attitudes have assigned a high gnoseological value to art, for it is in art that they discover the cell of all significance. Art is the stumbling block of naturalism, but it is the keystone of spiritualism. The final enunciation of spirit is freedom or liberty, which is synonymous with creativity itself. By it man, idea, reality are released from nature's dark necessities, from its bondage, from

its inevitabilities. Over against nature, in terms of the own freedom and creativity, spirit may write large the meaning of life in terms which at every point give the lie to the dark deliverances of natural necessity.

In its initial rejection of nature, whose processes are deployed through time and constitute the substance of time, the tendency of spirit is to reject time and process along with nature and to retreat into the recesses of undifferentiated unity and self-identity. This is the Plotinian moment of transcendent absolutism and in a certain sense would seem to constitute the ultimate self-enunciation of spirit. Actually, however, this is the contradiction of spirit. This negation of time and process within spirit is intimately contradicted by human spirit. Man as spirit is conscious of transcending nature not absolutely, but relatively; not out of time, but in time; in a word, not by the transcendence, but in the creation of history.

Thus it is that the conception of history as a realm of meaning in terms of the transcendence of spirit over nature emerges. History is the substance of that transcendence; it is the transformation which spirit works in the bosom of nature and in response to the challenging limitations and necessities of nature. Nature on every hand presses upon man with its necessities, its fatalities, its inevitabilities, defining in an iron ring of circumstance the limits of meaning; but the necessities of nature are the death of spirit. At every point, consequently, spirit counters the definition of nature by the generations of its proper forms of self-consciousness which, in the words of Paul, transmute death into victory. Thus history as a realm of meaning emerges as the enunciations of self-conscious spirit in defiance of the necessities and limitations of nature. Over against brute power, spirit defines right, and polity is born. Over against the commotion and the unilaterality of passion, spirit defines the ideal; and serene art is born bringing with it the transformation of passion itself into joy in the beautiful. Thus every element in the phenomenology of history—that tight complexus of conscious forms which resist with all their inward power reduction to nature and compose the historical awareness of man: laws, arts, social institutions—takes on significance as the progressive self-enunciations of spirit in the face of nature. Conversely, spirit finds its own concrete reality and definition precisely in these forms, for the transcendence of spirit over nature is but a waking dream until translated into these historical concretions. History in this way becomes not merely an order of meaning generated by spirit but the concrete definition of spirit and its substance; for spirit lives and is actual only

in these moments of the concrete transcendence of nature: in the just deed and law, in the well-wrought form of art, in the aspiration toward life absolute and unconditioned. Finally, this transcendence is rendered complete by the dissolution of nature into the negative moment of spirit, into the realization by spirit that it defines itself not over against the substance of a real world standing over against it in self-sufficient subsistence, but over against its own nonbeing. Nature having been thus swallowed up in history, history becomes the inward process whereby spirit successively transcends not nature, but itself, in every moment of its concretion. The deployment of spirit through time is the condition of its self-transcendence, and not a limit imposed by a dark and alien power.

It is in this last and extreme enunciation, logically implicit in the concept of spirit when that concept is detached from its humanistic moorings, that the fallacy of the reduction of history to spirit becomes apparent. For with the resolution of nature into spirit, the rationale of spirit itself disappears and with it the possibility of significant history. For with the dissipation of nature the laws by which spirit deploys itself into absolute history lose their freedom and take on a character of necessity indistinguishable from the necessities of nature. The freedom which is the essence of spirit is realized in the transcendence of nature and, without nature as a real and subsistent *point d'appui*, loses its specific character. Its temporal process, history, becomes indistinguishable from natural process. This is the reason why in the history of thought the hard bolus of natural necessity has tended to reassert itself in the bosom of all spiritualisms which lose their humanistic cast and the concrete reason why the reduction of historical process to the self-articulation of spirit is destructive of history alike as a realm of meaning and of form.

#### IV

These considerations would seem to make one fact transparently clear: heretofore the formulation of the philosophical problem of history has foundered upon the rocks of alien supposition. Successive and often-repeated attempts to formulate this problem—now on suppositions proper to historiography, again on those proper to the concept of nature, and finally on grounds of the concept of spirit—have proved uniformly self-defeating. As a consequence, disengagement from these alien suppositions becomes the first euristic condition for the philosophical problem of history.

Such disengagement would at first appear to be a negative dialectical process; as a fact, however, it can be accomplished finally only by a



positive enunciation of the supposition proper to the problem of history. This positive disengagement must consist in the formulation of euristic canons which will on the one hand prevent the intrusion of alien supposition into the formulation of the problem and on the other describe the fundamental lineaments of the autonomous concept of history, by making clear the basic material supposition within which the problem of history arises.

A further euristic condition is suggested by the reflection that alien suppositions have entered the formulation of the philosophical problem of history invariably at the phenomenological level. They have gained access and plausibility because of the confusion which has always existed in even the descriptive account of historical forms. Here the power of analogy has been overwhelming, and precisely because it has proved so fruitful in the history of thought in other respects has outweighed the otherwise clear necessity for an unambiguous descriptive disengagement of historical forms. That historical structures or forms are not forms of nature or spirit would appear easily comprehensible; as a matter of fact, however, the distinction is not readily granted, or, if granted, is immediately nullified. As a consequence, the primary euristic condition of the philosophical problem of history is further refined: a canon which operates for the unambiguous discernment of historical from other forms at the descriptive or phenomenological level.

To this end, a bulwark must first of all be erected against the overpowering solicitation of analogy. This bulwark is readily provided by a canon of irreducibility. Such a canon might well be formulated in something of the following manner: the characterization of the phenomena of history, of historical forms in their descriptive aspects may bear an analogous, but only an analogous, relation in denotation and connotation of terms to the characterization of any other order of phenomena, such, for example, as those of nature, or of spirit; further, where possible this analogy should be one only of simple proportionality. In this manner, any reduction of historical forms to nonhistorical even at the descriptive level becomes impossible, while the powerful aid of analogy is still retained. The force of this canon must be to preclude those fallacies which result in the explanation of history in terms borrowed from other theatres of discourse and other structures of meaning.

Nevertheless, the canon of irreducibility is but a negative rule, for it provides no basis for the positive characterization of historical structures even at the descriptive levels, save perhaps by a system of residues. It must be complemented by a positive canon of equal or greater force, which might secure the characterization of historical forms in positive

terms. Such a canon is to be found in the time-form relationship.

Abstractly, and in the character of a descriptive rule, the time-form canon may thus be stated: those forms belong to history whose characterization demands the inclusion of the time factor, not as extrinsic and formal, but as intrinsic and constitutive.

The force of this canon is readily seen as it operates to enforce and re-enforce the canon of irreducibility with respect to the phenomena of nature. The unambiguous character of natural form is timelessness; or, more accurately, time enters natural form as extrinsic and formal, not as intrinsic and constitutive. Processes of nature, consequently, which are subject only to the law of indefinite repetibility are clearly excluded from the order of historical phenomena, while a positive criterion for the descriptive and constitutive time is provided.

The canon is seen to operate with equal force in the direction of the clear distinction of the phenomena of history from those of spirit. It is obviously most doubtful whether deployment through time is an essential dimension of consciousness as such; an assertion that it must be might well represent a persistent anthropomorphism. For while it is true that human consciousness is subject to a dialectic and thus is intimately constituted of time-form, this can be taken to mean only that man belongs to history (or, more accurately, that history belongs to man) and that to the degree to which spirit is characterizable absolutely in terms of consciousness time is not an absolute character of spirit. In a word, humanistic spiritualism may perhaps be abortive, and human history cannot exhaust the concept of spirit.

However, it is not thus abstractly and dialectically that the time-form canon is finally justified. Rather, its power is revealed as an instrument for the erection of a concrete phenomenology of history. Conformity to the time-form canon is the single infallible note of historical structures, and by this note the concrete content of history is unambiguously identified. By this canon the area or field of historical forms is irreducibly distinguished on the one hand from the forms of nature and on the other from those of spirit, from absolute or transcendent ideas or essences. Nevertheless, this power as an instrument for the descriptive phenomenology of history, does not exhaust the time-form canon; it is further the chief instrument for the analysis of the concrete content of the field of historical forms.

The employment of the time-form canon as an analytic rather than merely as a descriptive instrument brings into focus a further dimension of the philosophical problem, the gnoseological. As an instrument of analysis, the time-form canon is directed toward the isolation of the

primary constitutive principle of historical structures. The immediate result of this application is the conclusion that form in historical structures is primarily a category of meaning or intention. Historical forms, civil institutions, for example, art, or the sciences themselves, regarded even abstractly are opaque to any penetration or comprehension save in terms of meaning or intention. They resist, on the one hand, treatment as objects of contemplation—that is, as eternal ideas or essences—and on the other hand dynamic and pragmatic analysis. The structure of Roman civil law, or of a concrete work of art, resists on the one hand contemplative construction, for in neither can the mind rest as in the absolute idea either of justice or of beauty; equally, on the other hand, do they resist a pragmatic or practicalistic construction, for both are theoretical discernments, not structures of power. They respond only to analysis as structures of meaning or intent; structures in which theoretical discernment passes over into dynamic and practical transformation of a material.

The peculiar character of historical forms as structures of meaning or intent is the entrance of time into the constitution of these structures precisely as intentional and significant. Unlike natural forms as structures of meaning, the forms of history demand deployment through time as the absolute condition of significance. The ideal discernment which is an intrinsic principle of the historical form is such that it demands time as the theatre of its significance. It is never an instastial and self-contained intuition whose subsequent deployment is tautological. When reduced to such intuition, the ideal discernment of time-form becomes sterilely abstract and self-denying. Witness is borne to this truth by the fallacy of primitivism as well as by the complementary fallacy of utopianism; both, while pretending to be historical interpretations, actually constitute the negation of the time element of historical form and hence of history itself.

History, then, as the province of time-form immediately involves the first speculative question of the philosophical problem of history, namely, the character and conditions of meaning in time. This, frankly, is a problem with which Western thought has dealt only obliquely. Its initial gnoseological insight has held the conditions of meaning to be timeless, and Western thought has been faithful to this insight. When confronted with the problem of meaning and time in any of its aspects it has tended to adopt a strategy of reduction resolving the time aspect into some form of continuity of generality.

The gnoseology of time-form is not, however, the ultimate question involved in the phenomenology of history; beyond it lies the ontology of



historical forms. Meaning is a medial term; its anchors are in the forms of being, and it demands conversion into these terms. The problem is historical existence; that is, the problem of the existential conditions and implications of time-from structures of meaning looms as the terminal question of the philosophical problem of history. The concrete form of this problem is the relation between thought and action, between meaning and existence, between intent and decision. For it would seem immediately evident that the only term which can relate meaning to existence or, more properly, which can fulfill meaning in existence is will or decision.

These, consequently, would seem to constitute the three pivotal questions about which the complex philosophical problem of history must be constructed. It is in terms of these questions alone that the philosophical problem of history can be formulated without the intrusion of nullifying alien suppositions. It is along the lines of the solution of these questions that speculative penetration of historical actuality may be hoped for, and the actualization of the desire for a fresh *rapprochement* between history and philosophy so keenly felt by contemporary culture may be secured.

## A NOTE ON GEOMETRICAL POSSIBILITY

BERNARD J. F. LONERGAN, S.J.

In the preliminaries to his *Elements*, after assigning twenty-three definitions and before adding five common notions, Euclid listed five postulates. Of these the first three are practical: they ask to join points, to produce straight lines, and to draw circles of any size about any centre. But the other two postulates are theoretical: they ask not the performance of operations, but the truth of propositions, namely, that all right angles are equal and that under certain conditions two straight lines will meet.<sup>1</sup>

These theoretical postulates have stimulated considerable speculation. Geometers began by seeking substitutes and ended by developing non-Euclidean geometries. Logicians began by trying to define their precise status and function, and have ended with a technical analysis that classifies types of axioms and lists what combinations of what types will yield what geometries.<sup>2</sup> But there is also a metaphysical question of possibility. It is distinct from the geometrical and logical issues and, to some extent, independent of them. I do not think it has been discussed frequently, but Father Hoenen in his *Cosmologia* adverts to it and contends that only Euclidean three-dimensional extension is known as possible.<sup>3</sup>

---

THE REVEREND BERNARD J. F. LONERGAN, S.J., got his B.A. degree at the University of London and his S.T.D. at the Pontifical Gregorian University. He was professor of dogmatic theology at L'Immaculée Conception, in Montreal, from 1940 to 1947, and has held a like position at the Jesuit Seminary, in Toronto, from 1947 to the present. His articles have appeared in *Theological Studies and Thought*.

<sup>1</sup> Sir Thomas L. Heath, *The Thirteen Books of Euclid's Elements*, trans. from the text of Heiberg, with introduction and commentary (2d ed., rev.; Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1926), I, 154 f.

<sup>2</sup> See H. G. Forder, *Euclidean Geometry* (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1927).

<sup>3</sup> Peter Hoenen, S.J., *Cosmologia* (Roma, 1931), Nota III, pp. 443-54. The 1945 edition does not seem to modify this note but places it some ten pages later.

I think the issue is of interest, both because of the light it may bring to problems of integration, the so-called *quaestiones annexae* and also because of the opportunity it provides for working out a concrete application of the Thomist theory of intellect and science. The latter aspect interests us more directly; and we shall find, I think, that Father Hoenen's own contributions to Thomist intellectual theory<sup>4</sup> can be developed into a broader view on geometrical possibility than he has admitted.

It will be simpler to base the discussion on Euclid rather than his modern correctors. Euclid is generally familiar, and, once one is aware of his slips from rigor,<sup>5</sup> allowance may easily be made for them. On the other hand, not only is the work of modern analysts not generally familiar, but also it is not altogether successful in handling the problem of consistency of foundation propositions;<sup>6</sup> and, further, consistency is a little less than the positive intelligibility that grounds possibility. In due course the nature of this type of analysis should be examined; but, I think, a study of Euclid himself is a very useful, if not necessary, preliminary.

## THE DIVISION OF DEFINITIONS

Our basic assumption is that science primarily is understanding, that only secondarily in virtue of self-scrutiny and self-appraisal is scientific understanding expressed in definitions, postulates, deductions. It follows that definitions are expressions of understanding and may be divided by differences in what is understood. But it is one thing to grasp the language proper to a science; it is quite another to grasp the nature of the object investigated in the science. Hence, definitions will be of at least two kinds, namely, nominal and essential. Nominal definitions express one's understanding of a linguistic system, of how terms

<sup>4</sup> Hoenen. "De origine primorum principiorum scientiae," *Gregorianum*, XIV (1933), 153-84; "De philosophia scholastica cognitionis geometricae," *ibid.*, XIX (1938), 498-514; "De problemate necessitatis geometricae," *ibid.*, XX (1939), 19-54; "De problemate exactitudinis geometricae," *ibid.*, 321-50. See also Father Hoenen's *La théorie du jugement d'après St. Thomas d'Aquin* ("Analecta Gregoriana"; XXXIX [Roma, 1946]). The present writer has dealt with allied questions: "The Concept of *Verbum* in the Writings of St. Thomas Aquinas," *Theological Studies*, VII (1946), 349-92; "The Concept of *Verbum* in the Writings of St. Thomas Aquinas, II," *ibid.*, VIII (1947), 35-79; "The Concept of *Verbum* in the Writings of St. Thomas Aquinas, III," *ibid.*, 404-44; "The Concept of *Verbum* in the Writings of St. Thomas Aquinas, IV: *Verbum* and Abstraction," *ibid.*, X (1949), 3-40.

<sup>5</sup> See the discussions in Heath, *op cit.*, pp. 242 f., 249 f., 280 f.

<sup>6</sup> I think the difficulty is no more than that mathematicians as mathematicians cannot treat consistency as such, and so have to assume its existence in some simple case to which all others are reduced.



are to be employed, of what employed terms must mean. Essential definitions express one's understanding of a real system, of the necessary and possible and impossible relations of things, of why things are just what they are.<sup>7</sup> In both cases the understanding itself is real; but in nominal definitions the understood has only the reality of names; while in essential definition the understood has the reality of what names name.

The foregoing emphasizes the difference between nominal and essential definitions. But it is equally important to observe how intimately the two are related. In Aristotelian language one may say that essential definition expresses form in matter while nominal definition expresses the matter presupposed by the form.

It is for this reason that nominal definitions are inevitable. For essential definitions are of essences; and material essences are not pure forms, but composites of form and common matter. It may happen that this common matter is another material essence; but in that case it will be composed of another form and other common matter. This may be repeated a number of times, but it cannot be repeated indefinitely. There must be, then, common matter that is not an essence, that cannot be defined essentially itself, yet will be included in the essential definitions of other things, that accordingly will itself need some definition. It seems to follow that nominal definitions have the function of determining the residual common matter involved in essential definition.

But this conclusion may be declared paradoxical. Nominal definitions have been characterized as understanding not realities, but names. Clearly common matter is an element in realities and not merely a name. The paradox is resolved quite easily by the distinction between the empirical and the intelligible. One does not understand everything that one knows; what one knows without understanding, prior to understanding, is the empirical; what one knows over and above the empirical, and precisely inasmuch as one understands, is the intelligible in the strictest sense of that term. Now, nominal definitions involve no understanding of reality, but it does not follow that they involve no knowledge of reality; they do involve empirical knowledge of reality; and we have such empirical knowledge precisely because, besides strictly intelligible forms, there is also common matter to be known.

Since the sensible is empirical and since the intelligibles we know are the intelligibility of empirical and mainly sensible data, one may

---

<sup>7</sup> Heath mentions Aristotle's knowledge of causes in its relations to definition, but fails to identify it with real definition; see *op. cit.*, pp. 143, 149.

cast the argument for the inevitability of nominal definitions in another form. Essential definitions express an understanding of things; prior to being understood, the things are known empirically and, in the present discussion, by sense. Now an understanding of sensible data regularly is a grasp of intelligible unity in sensible multiplicity. It follows from the priority of the sensible that there will be an inevitable residue of sensible elements that are not themselves unifications of lower elements, but only the common matter of all higher unifications. Such residual elements may be generalized by nominal definitions; but they cannot become universalized in the sense that an essence is universal, for they are not essences, but only the common matter of essences.

Nominal definitions, then, suppose no understanding except the understanding of names; but they suppose empirical knowledge which is of things; in geometry this empirical knowledge is sensible; but it admits a generalization, as distinct from universalization, in virtue of the understanding involved in understanding names; finally, in metaphysical terms, the object of such generalized empirical knowledge is the common matter that is mere common matter and not an essence composed of form and other common matter.

It may be well to indicate at once an incidental function of nominal definitions. It has been noticed that one cannot imagine a Euclidean point: one can imagine a minute speck, but if the speck really has no parts and no magnitude, then one's image disappears. Similarly, one cannot imagine a Euclidean line: one can imagine a very, very fine line, but if one imagines length from which all breadth is eliminated, one imagines nothing at all. Again, one cannot imagine the indefinitely produced straight lines of the definition of parallels: insofar as they are actually imagined, they are not indefinitely produced. On the other hand, one cannot do geometry without imagination and solely by using concepts. For the abstract straight line is unique; there are not two of them to run parallel to each other; and similarly whenever there is question, and perpetually there is question, of more than one geometrical entity of a kind, it is necessary for intellect to convert to phantasm. The solution to this anomaly is the symbolic image, that is, the image that stands for things it does not resemble. The geometer boldly imagines blobs and bars but understands them and thinks of them as Euclidean points and lines. The geometer does not bother producing lines indefinitely; he produces them a bit but understands them and thinks of them as indefinitely produced. He can do this because in between his images and his understanding there intervene his definitions, which

settle for understanding and thought what the images stand for, no matter what they resemble.<sup>8</sup>

Let us now turn to essential definitions. They presuppose nominal definitions of common matter at least symbolically represented in imagination. They proceed from acts of understanding in which is grasped the intelligible form of the common matter. The essence that is defined is the compound of form and common matter. Conversely, the form is the *propter quid* that functions as middle term between common matter and essence. Why are these bones and this flesh a man? What is the middle term between the empirical data of bones and flesh and the conceived essence, man? It is the formal cause of a man, that is, his soul.<sup>9</sup> Or to take an illustration from geometry, Why is this symbolically imagined uniformly round plane curve a circle? What has to be grasped to effect the transition from empirically given uniform curvature to the essentially defined circle? It is the formal cause of the circle, what grounds both the circularity of the circle and, as well, all its demonstrable properties. But such a formal cause is the equality of all radii in the circle.<sup>10</sup> If all radii are equal, the plane curve must be round; if any are unequal, it cannot be round; and similarly for the other properties of the circle. The "must" and the "cannot" reveal the activity of understanding; and what is understood is not how to use the name circle, but circularity itself. Further, not only does understanding intervene, but it intervenes with respect to sensible data; the necessity results from the equality of all radii, but only sense knows a multiplicity of radii; the abstract radius is unique. Finally, from the understanding of sensible data, there results the definition: without understanding one can repeat the definition like a parrot; but one cannot discover the definition, grasp what it means, without understanding equality of radii as the ground of circularity.

<sup>8</sup> The distinction between sensible and intelligible matter is perhaps relevant here. See Aquinas, *In de Trin.*, 6. 2 (ed. Paul Wyser, O.P.; Fribourg: Société Philosophique, 1948; p. 64, 1. 11).

<sup>9</sup> Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, Z, 17, 1041a9 ff. Aquinas, *In VII Metaphys.*, lect. 7 (ed. Cathala, no. 1645 ff.). Lonergan, "The Concept of *Verbum* in the Writings of St. Thomas Aquinas," *Theol. Stud.*, VII (1946), 360 ff.

<sup>10</sup> Strictly the formal cause is not equal radii qua equal but qua intelligible ground of consequents. There is a more fundamental ambiguity lurking in the context: a soul is a natural form; equal radii refer to an intelligible form. The analogy is that intelligible form stands to sensible matter as natural form stands to natural matter. The difference is that knowledge of intelligible form is prior to essential definition and judgment of possibility while knowledge of natural form is due to metaphysical analysis consequent to judgment affirming actuality. Since we are dealing with knowledge of possibility in this paper, regularly we shall be speaking of intelligible form and sensible matter.



It is of obvious importance to distinguish between this grasp of formal cause, of intrinsic ground, of *propter quid*, and, on the other hand, the verbal form in which it happens to be expressed. Aristotle adverted to this when he pointed out the equivalence of essential definition and scientific syllogism.<sup>11</sup> Both assign the *propter quid*. But what the essential definition expresses in one proposition, the scientific syllogism expresses in three propositions. From the viewpoint of an analysis of science in terms of understanding, the number of propositions is utterly irrelevant. What is significant is exclusively the fact that the *propter quid* has been grasped, assigned, and become operative in the deductions of a science.

This point has a bearing, I believe, on the interpretation of Euclid's theoretical postulates. Had Euclid defined the circle, not essentially by appealing to the equality of radii, but only nominally by affirming circles to be uniformly round plane curves, this nominal definition would prevent him from later introducing his essential definition and so would lead him to presenting the theoretical postulate that all the radii in the same circle are equal. On the supposition we are making, it is quite simple to state the nature of such a theoretical postulate; for clearly it comes to the same thing whether the equality of radii is affirmed in the essential definition of the circle or in a theoretical postulate added to a nominal definition of the circle. Naturally enough this raises the question whether the theoretical postulates, which Euclid did posit, assign the *propter quid* of geometrical entities that had been defined only nominally.

### EUCLID'S DEFINITIONS

It would be unnecessarily tedious to examine all thirty-three terms defined by Euclid in his preliminaries. With the exception of the circle, they are given only nominal definitions. A sufficient paradigm for investigating the others will perhaps be had if we consider the definitions of the straight line and of the right angle.

The fourth definition reads: "A straight line is a line which lies evenly with the points on itself."<sup>12</sup> Sir Thomas Heath in his commentary, while admitting that Euclid's wording is quite obscure, contends that there need be no doubt about his meaning. A straight line is a line that involves no irregularity differentiating one part or side from another.<sup>13</sup> Clearly, this is very much like saying that a circle is a uniformly round plane figure; it enables one to use the name,

<sup>11</sup> Aquinas, *In II Post. An.*, lect. 6-8.

<sup>12</sup> Heath, *op. cit.*, p. 153.

<sup>13</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 167.

straight line, correctly; it does not tell what makes straight lines straight; and it does not provide a premise for deductions about straight lines. It is a nominal definition.

The tenth definition reads: "When a straight line set up on a straight line makes the adjacent angles equal to one another, each of the equal angles is right, and the straight line standing on the other is called a perpendicular to that on which it stands."<sup>14</sup> This cannot be an essential definition, for an essential definition is a premise to properties, just as an essence is a ground whence properties naturally result; despite the above definition Euclid had to postulate that all right angles are equal;<sup>15</sup> if he had had an essential definition of right angles, he would have demonstrated and not postulated their equality. This is confirmed by examining the definition itself. It appears that Euclid is saying no more than that a right angle is half of a straight angle, where a straight angle is the angle in any plane between two different but continuous segments of a straight line. Because the straight line is defined nominally, the straight angle is defined nominally; and because the straight angle is defined nominally, the right angle is defined nominally.

But combine the nominal definitions of the straight line, the straight angle, and the right angle with the theoretical postulate that all right angles are equal. It becomes apparent that the postulate assigns the *propter quid* of the straight line. For if all right angles are equal, then all straight angles are equal; if all straight angles are equal, straight lines must be absolutely straight; they cannot bend in any direction, for if they did, the straight angle on the side of the bending would be less than the straight angle on the opposite side. Conversely, if any right angles were unequal, straight lines could not be truly straight. Thus, the equality of right angles is the necessary and sufficient condition of the straightness of straight lines, just as the equality of radii is the necessary and sufficient condition of the roundness of circles. The equality of right angles is just as much a *propter quid* as the equality of radii. But while the latter could be expressed in the essential definition of the circle, the former could not be expressed in an essential definition of the straight line; for the nominal definition of the right angle presupposed the nominal definition of the straight line; and once the straight line was defined nominally, since two definitions would be anomalous, its *propter quid* had to be assigned in a theoretical postulate.

What accounts for the fourth postulate, will be found to account for

<sup>14</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 153.

<sup>15</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 154.

the fifth. Euclid's fifth postulate is "that if a straight line falling on two straight lines make the interior angles on the same side less than two right angles, the two straight lines, if produced indefinitely, meet on that side on which the angles are less than two right angles."<sup>16</sup> The postulate states conditions under which straight lines will meet. It omits, however, explicit mention of the necessary condition that initially the two straight lines must lie in the same plane. On adding that condition, the postulate appears as a correlation in the plane surface of angles and straight lines.

Now this correlation is intelligible. Down the centuries it has been claimed to be evident to intellect. Nor has the fact of intellectual evidence been disputed. What has been disputed is only the precise nature of the evidence. From that dispute one prescind in affirming the fifth postulate to present an intelligible correlation.

On the other hand, the material correlated is the material of the nominally defined plane surface. The definition reads: "A plane surface is a surface which lies evenly with the straight lines on itself."<sup>17</sup> This definition is nominal: it enables one to distinguish a plane surface from other surfaces; it does not form a premise to deducing, for example, the measurement of plane areas, though plane areas are either constituent or properties of plane surfaces. Now the material of the nominally defined plane surface consists in the straight lines lying evenly in the surface. Within the field of vision, so to speak, some of these straight lines intersect and so make angles with each other. The fifth postulate is a correlation that enables one to argue from given intersections and angles to other intersections and so, through theorems to be established, to other angles and to areas.

In the light of our analysis it seems reasonable to say that the fifth postulate stands to the nominally defined plane surface as does formal cause to common matter. A formal cause is an intelligible correlation or unification. Common matter is the correlated. Combine the two and there result necessary properties which, in the present instance, are the properties of the Euclidean plane surface. As the equality of radii stands to the circle, as the equality of right angles stands to the straight line, so the parallel postulate stands to the Euclidean plane surface. There are differences; but in each of the three cases the first term is related to the second as formal cause to the essence it constitutes.

It follows that the evidence of the parallel postulate is the evidence of a (virtual) essential definition. It is evident that all radii in the

<sup>16</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 155.

<sup>17</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 153.



same circle must be equal, else there would not be a circle. It is evident that things equal to the same thing are equal to one another. But while the latter proposition normally is taken as stating a necessary consequence, the former does not state a consequence but defines a starting point; it defines a starting point because it assigns the first step, namely, the step from the material and nominal to the formal and essential. Further, the fact that it is a first step does not mean that it is a step in the dark, a step taken without evidence, for it is quite evident that all radii in the same circle are equal. None the less, the fact that it is a first step does imply that it is a step taken without necessity. From nominal definitions there follow necessary, though only nominal, consequents. From essential definitions there follows the demonstration of necessary and real properties. But the transition from the material and nominal to the formal and essential cannot be necessitated by the former, else the distinction between them would be illusory; and it cannot be necessitated by the latter, for the latter is not prior to the transition. Just as ontologically an essence is a possible, so psychologically an essence has the evidence proper to a possible. Accordingly, we agree with those who consider the parallel postulate evident and we agree with those who do not consider it evidently necessary.

The foregoing squares with the conclusion of modern geometers that the parallel postulate is independent<sup>18</sup> of other geometrical definitions and postulates. However, it supplies a theoretical context that seems to obviate Father Hoenen's objection<sup>19</sup> that there may exist some unconsidered definition or really evident axiom whence the parallel postulate might be deduced. Such an excursus into hypothetical unknowns can be shown, I think, to lead nowhere. The issue is not whether the parallel postulate is or is not the best possible selection as logical first whence other correlations of straight lines and angles (and areas) in plane surfaces are to be deduced. The issue is whether or not the (nominally) defined plane surface is an essence with the parallel postulate its consequent property. Let us turn to illustrative parallels. Because bodies have souls, they are alive. Because animals are composite, they are mortal. Both "soul" and "composite" are middle terms that assign a *propter quid*. But bodies need not have souls, and so some bodies are not alive. Animals, on the other hand, must be composite and so must be mortal. In terms of this illustration, the issue is not whether the parallel postulate is like "composite" or like "mortal"; the issue is whether the parallel postulate is like "soul" or "alive" or,

<sup>18</sup> Hoenen, *Cosmologia*, p. 449; Forder, *op. cit.*, p. 213; cf. pp. 138, 302.

<sup>19</sup> Hoenen, *op. cit.*, pp. 450 f.

alternatively, like "composite" or "mortal." Once one grants that the parallel postulate is independent of known definitions and axioms, automatically one grants that it resembles neither "composite" nor "mortal" for both of them are deducible from "animal," and so one grants that it must resemble either "soul" or "alive" since neither of them is deducible from "body." It follows that the nominally defined plane surface stands to the properties Euclid establishes concerning plane surfaces, not as essence to its properties, but as common matter to properties that accrue only when a form is added to the common matter to constitute the relevant essence. In other words, Euclid's fifth postulate is the equivalent of an essential definition, and the essence in question is the Euclidean plane surface. Moreover, the same will be true of any substitute fulfilling the functions of Euclid's fifth postulate.

### POSSIBILITY

As the actuality of any X is known in the true judgment that X is, so the possibility of X is known in the true judgment that X can be. For *veritas logica est formaliter in solo iudicio* and *veritas logica consistit in adaequatione intellectus ad rem*.

The grounds of true judgment of possibility are twofold. There is the consequent ground of known actuality: *ab esse ad posse valet illatio*. There is the antecedent ground that, as the unintelligible is impossible, so the intelligible is possible. It is with this antecedent ground that we are concerned, and we note that, as possibility is ontologically antecedent to being, so intelligibility is cognitively antecedent to true judgment; for true judgment is rational, and one cannot rationally affirm the unintelligible.

Broadly, the intelligible is whatever can be understood. But strictly and primarily the intelligible is only what is knowable about the understood inasmuch as one is understanding. Understanding itself is an irreducible experience like seeing colors or hearing sounds. It is what is rare in the stupid and frequent in the intelligent. It is the goal of inquiry, emerging upon the empirical, grounding the formation of concepts, definitions, hypothetical systems, pure implications. It is the grasp of unity (Aristotle's *intelligentia indivisibilium*) in empirical multiplicity, and it expresses itself in systematic meaning. Strictly and primarily the intelligible is the grasped unity; and it is only by their relations to that unity that other instances of the intelligible are intelligible.

Thus, the unity is the unity of the unified. But the unified is the common matter, and so common matter is intelligible by information.

Again, unity and unified together are the essence, and so the essence is intelligible by inclusion. Thirdly, unity and unified are universal, but the universal and the particular are correlative, so that individual matter is intelligible tangentially. Fourthly, the particular essence is the possibility of a contingent existence, so that contingent existence is intelligible again tangentially. Fifthly, since the primary intelligible as such is not necessarily the intelligibility of something else, since it does not necessarily presuppose matter, since it has not intrinsic opposition to particularity, there can be pure forms that are identical with particular essences. Finally, since not all existents can exist contingently, there must be, if anything exists, a simply intelligible existent and in it pure form and existence will coincide.

Now the ground of possibility is intelligibility, and intelligibility reduces to the strictly and primarily intelligible, to what is known inasmuch as one is understanding. To this criterion of possibility the more familiar conceptualist criterion may be reduced. A thing is said to be possible if its notes not merely are not opposed but positively cohere. What is this positive coherence of notes? It is the reappearance of the unity in multiplicity that is known by understanding.

However, one must distinguish two different types of the strictly and primarily intelligible and consequently two different types of possibility. Substantial essence is essence *simpliciter*, but accidental essence is essence *secundum quid*; <sup>20</sup> both types of essence can be defined; and both types of definition proceed from acts of understanding. But while the substantial essence is defined in terms of what it itself is, the accidental essence can be defined only by introducing what it is not; "snubness" cannot be except in a nose, yet "snubness" is not a nose.<sup>21</sup> Thus, the intelligibility of the accident involves a duality: on the one hand there is the grasp of its proper *ratio*, say, of the curvature that makes snubness snubness; on the other hand there is the grasp of its necessary dependence, of the *in alio* that pertains to the accident as accident. It follows that the possibility of the accidental raises a twofold question: there is the initial question of the possibility of the accident as a *ratio*; there is the further question of the possibility of the substance in which such an accident might inhere. This has an obvious bearing on our question. As a *ratio* or intrinsically, an N-dimensional curved "space" might be possible; yet the only possible substances might have properties that excluded more than (N—1) dimensions or that excluded curvature. In that case the geometry in question would be possible

<sup>20</sup> Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, Z, 4, 1030a28 ff.

<sup>21</sup> *Ibid.*, Z, 5, 1030b16 ff.



*secundum quid*, as a *ratio*, but not *simpliciter*, for a fully possible accident supposes as possible its substance. Unfortunately, a discussion of the possibility of substances cannot be crammed into this paper,<sup>22</sup> and so our account of geometrical possibility must be limited to possibility *secundum quid*.

A first point to be made is that the consistency or coherence of nominal definitions is not directly relevant to geometrical possibility. For suppose such consistency to be lacking. Necessarily there will result verbal contradictions. Probably there will result more than merely verbal contradictions: for the incoherence or inconsistency of the language will provide a constant occasion, almost an invitation, for error about things. Methodologically both are deplorable. But the issue before us is not methodological. We are not concerned to ensure that geometers speak coherently or that they avoid mistakes in geometrizing. We leave to the symbolic logicians the problem of coherent speech and to the geometers themselves the business of avoiding geometrical blunders. When both have done their work, there remains the question of geometrical possibility.

A second point regards sense and imagination. They have a role to play, but it is a minor rôle. Possibility as known has its ground in the primarily intelligible which is neither sensible nor imaginable yet of the somehow sensible and somehow imaginable. There must be empirical elements to be unified and correlated intelligibly; such elements must be in the sensible and imaginable order, else they would not be merely empirical. Still a virtual image will suffice, as when Euclid only virtually imagines indefinitely produced straight lines; and a symbolic image will suffice, as when Euclid imagines lines with breadth as well as length but understands them and thinks of them as without breadth. This privilege of using virtual and symbolic images cannot be granted to Euclid and denied to other geometers. Moreover, it is a broad privilege; what cannot be imagined formally, often can be imagined virtually; and what cannot be imagined virtually, always can be imagined symbolically, for symbols stand for whatever one assigns them to stand for.

Directly, then, the limitations of sense and of imagination are not limitations to our knowledge of possibility. But indirectly, and this is our third point, they give rise to a difficulty that can be turned only

<sup>22</sup> The possibility of a substance is the possibility of an *unum per se*; it implies the possibility of its proper accidents which naturally result from it and the possibility of a "world" in which its operations would occur *ut in maiori parte*; it seems to follow that *quoad nos* the possibility of a substance is the possibility of its accidents and of their conjunction.

at the expense of some complexity. Initially the act of understanding is an insight into sensible or imagined data; but to be understood, the data must be presented or represented; hence in the measure that virtual and symbolic images fall short of representation, in the same measure they fail to provide the agent objects that cause insights. This has its effect upon the development of the science: in systems in which the common matter can be represented imaginatively, there is an ever-present tendency for insights, not acknowledged in postulates or axioms, to creep surreptitiously into the argument; on the other hand, in systems in which the images are mainly or entirely symbolic, logical rigor prevails (at least, once the assumptions of the symbolism have been investigated carefully), and for purposes of inspiration thinkers are prone to desert the symbols and appeal to imaginable models of their common matter.

However, what concerns us is the bearing of this absence of insight upon knowledge of possibility. The relevant distinction seems to be between the apprehension of intelligibility and the certitude of the judgment of possibility. There is an apprehension of intelligibility no less with respect to the symbolically imagined than with respect to the representatively imagined; for to apprehend intelligibility is to grasp the one in the many and the many through the one; and such a grasp may be had by using concepts and purely symbolic images. But from the grasp of intelligibility there follows, on the principles we have laid down, a judgment of possibility. In theory that is true. But when one comes to apply the general principle to particular cases, one finds oneself hesitant. For our intellects operate upon concepts eked out with symbolic images pretty much as do our senses in the dark; we may be more or less familiar with the terrain; but we are never certain that things are exactly as we think them to be. The ground of this uncertainty is that the *per se* infallibility of intellect resides in the insight into sensible data; when we proceed by insight, we may be presupposing more than we are aware and we may be proving very much less than we think; but there is no doubt that we have got hold of something; rigorous analysis may reduce it to very little, but not to nothing.

Our conclusion is, then, that as knowledge of possibility rests on knowledge of intelligibility, so certain judgment affirming possibility rests on the *per se* infallibility of intellect grasping intelligibility in representative images. In other words, it is the intuitively possible that basically, though not exclusively, is the certainly possible.

This reveals the significance of techniques of reduction. It has been objected that one does not establish the possibility of the definition and properties of a non-Euclidean plane surface by showing that they are exactly parallel to those of a Euclidean curved surface. While that is true enough, still the objection falls when one distinguishes between the intelligibility of the non-Euclidean plane surface and, on the other hand, our grounds of certitude concerning that intelligibility. One knows the intelligibility of the non-Euclidean plane surface because knowing it is understanding; for to define essentially, to deduce properties, to grasp the many through the one, is to understand; and to understand is to know the intelligible. Still, knowledge of that intelligibility, though it is understanding, none the less is hesitant. To dispel doubts and bring in certitude, the technique of reduction is invoked. What the infallibility of insight secures for the representatively imagined, the technique of reduction secures for the symbolically imagined. One knows intelligibility because one understands; one is certain one knows intelligibility either because of the infallibility of insight or because of the successful use of a technique of reduction; and certain knowledge of intelligibility is sufficient ground for the judgment of possibility. Hence, while granting that the technique of reduction does not establish intelligibility or possibility, we would maintain that it gains certitude for an intelligibility that already has been apprehended in nominally defined and symbolically represented objects.

In applying our conclusion a series of distinctions is needed. Euclidean geometry deals with objects that are possible, for it deals with certainly intelligible essences and their properties. Next, the Euclidean object is only possible; for the essences with which it deals are finite, and no finite essence is necessary. Thirdly, the Euclidean object is not uniquely possible; just as the Euclidean circle is not the only possible plane curve, so the Euclidean plane surface is not the only possible plane surface; besides the Euclidean correlation of straight lines and angles in the plane surface, there are other intelligible correlations yielding formally different plane surfaces, and the intelligibility of these correlations is certain. Fourthly, turning from possibility to actuality, we can be certain only that the geometry relating bodies in our space either is Euclidean or else approximates to Euclidean; this follows from the admission that Euclidean geometry neither is necessary nor uniquely possible, from the rejection of essentialism which would conclude from possibility to actuality, from the fact of a margin of error in all observation, a margin large enough to leave a slight curvature undetected.



Accordingly, we meet with a distinction Father Hoenen's claim that an equivalent of Euclid's parallel postulate belongs to extension as we know it. We admit that such an equivalent, a continuum of directions, is evidently possible in extension as we know it; but we deny that it is evidently necessary. For what is extension as we know it? It is (a) the extension presented to sense, (b) the extension conceived by the nominal definition, *id quod habet partes extra partes*, (c) the extension conceived by the essential definition that involves some geometry. Neither the sensible datum nor the nominally defined object is necessarily Euclidean, while the defined finite essence necessarily is only a possible. It is true that the Euclidean object has the greater simplicity and has to be conceived first from certain viewpoints; but such considerations are not proof of actuality. Similarly, we would meet with a distinction Father Hoenen's claim that we do not know whether or not N-dimensional spaces are possible: we do not know whether they are possible *simpliciter*, but it would seem that we do know that they are possible *secundum quid*.<sup>23</sup>

As a final word, may I say that I suspect there exist in this paper a number of failures to hit things off with complete accuracy; I present it in the hope that I have noted some worth-while points and that others will be moved to complete and perfect my treatment.

---

<sup>23</sup> It is not doubted that N independent variables are possible, but only that N independent spatial variables are possible. Whether there is a significant difference between the two, depends on one's notions on space.

## NOTES AND DISCUSSION

### WAR AND WORK

ELI KARLIN

The consideration of a paper given by Professor Schneider suggests that *war* and *work* may be regarded as key terms in a major disjunction of all social activity.<sup>1</sup> War is destructive, often terrible in its consequences. Modern war has become especially frightful, and we are now at the point in history where the next one may be totally destructive. Work, on the other hand, is constructive. Between it and war there can be no association, no compromise. The business of man is work, not war.

Properly to explore the distinctions of this analysis, it may perhaps be well to add a third term which in one way or another must enter the discussion. This is *the good*, which with Aristotle we may call "happiness." From the standpoint of happiness we can judge the validity and exhaustiveness of the disjunction, and try to see whether the life of man can be carried on in the pursuit of any other but these two activities.

In support of the doctrine that work is the sole valuable activity, the distinction between war and work has often been equated with that between construction and destruction. It is evident that construction is equally as active as destruction. War may be defined as potentiality

---

MR. ELI KARLIN began his secondary education at Harrow, in England, and completed it at Upper Canada College, Toronto; he got his B.A., magna cum laude, and Phi Beta Kappa at New York University in 1944. Mr. Karlin is a Ph.D. candidate at Yale University, where he got his M.A. in 1945 and where he is an assistant instructor in the Department of Philosophy. He has published articles in several philosophy journals and is the managing editor of the *Review of Metaphysics*.

<sup>1</sup> The paper was delivered as part of a symposium on the Distinctive Contributions of Philosophy to the Issues of the Peace, at the forty-second annual meeting of the Eastern Division of the American Philosophical Association. I do not know whether Professor Schneider considers this an exhaustive disjunction or not. At any rate, although I am indebted to him for the suggestion of the problem, the responsibility for the ensuing analysis is entirely my own.

actualized with the form of destruction, work as potentiality actualized with the form of construction. The energy expended in war, in cutting down the tree, is the same as the energy expended in sawing wood, and driving nails, to build a house. Even granted that the perfection aimed at in the building of the house is itself not perfect, that the virtue of construction is not merely the thing constructed, still it is not irrelevant to the concrete whole what form is embodied in it. That is why, in this sense, work is always better than war.

Very often the discussion ends at this point. Unfortunately, we cannot allow it to do so. For we have left out of account one principle which lies outside the disjunction between construction and destruction. Construction may be defined as the determination of potentiality, simply actualized, to a more complex actuality. Thus bricks, which have a simple form, are determined, in an act of construction, to subserve the more complex form of a house. Similarly destruction may be defined as the determination of potentiality, in complex actualization, to a more simple actuality. Thus when housewreckers destroy a house, they make bricks once more.<sup>2</sup> In each case matter takes on a determinate form. It is obvious now that the missing principle is the principle of potentiality qua potentiality, of indeterminateness qua indeterminateness. Embodied in humanity it is called "drive," and actions exhibiting it alone are called wanton.<sup>3</sup> Wanton activity is inherently neither constructive nor destructive, although it may be either. It is merely active, for no reason, but simply because such is its nature. Its perfection is simply its fullest expression and is not to be confused with anything like the "good will" of Kant. Perfect drive qua perfect drive is not the will that wills perfect ends. It is a drive that functions absolutely spontaneously and without restraint.

It is in recognizing (not always fully consciously) the need for this kind of perfection, that serious thinkers have defended war in its generic sense as the exhibition of the fighting spirit. War is equated (to use Aristotle's language) with potentiality, which is matter and/or energy as the sole expression of the dynamic principle; not-war, or peace, with static actuality, which is form. Conscious, with Aristotle, that happiness is an activity, the militarists have sometimes made us

<sup>2</sup>In defining construction and destruction we are of course treating of essence, not existence. Any actual, concrete activity participates in both. Thus in constructing the house out of bricks and cement we are destroying the potentiality of the bricks to serve as weapons for the silencing of unruly cats.

<sup>3</sup>Drive is here used in much the same sense as Spinoza's *conatus*—that is, as the power in man which is not intrinsically end-regarding. Schopenhauer's use of *Wille* is also here suggestive.



believe that theirs is the sole activity. If peace means stillness, they cry, let us have war and action.

William James, although believing that a "moral equivalent" could be and ought to be found, defended some such argument for war in these words:

Martial virtues must be the enduring cement [of society]; intrepidity, contempt for softness, surrender of private interest, must still remain the rock upon which states are built.<sup>4</sup>

We must distinguish in this and similar arguments several propositions which are bound by no logical relations of mutual implication. These propositions are (*a*) that pugnacity itself is a virtue; (*b*) that the exercise of social pugnacity in war entails as a concomitant certain other virtues, for instance, obedience and self-sacrifice; (*c*) that the virtues indicated in *a* are either (1) exclusively the concomitants of pugnacity or (2) more often associated with war than with any other enterprise.

We may begin by granting that at least some virtues are in effect exercised in war. Whether we believe in chivalry or churlishness, egoism or altruism, obedience or initiative, we shall find instances to suit our taste and our conviction. War intensifies and highlights, as perhaps little else does. War is the pomposity of gray battleships on the water and the bedraggled misery of retreat in the snow; war is action and passion, motion and rest, love and hate, publicity and privacy.

Granting *b* above, then, we come to *c*2 and admit that certain virtues in the past have been often exhibited in war. This is perhaps above all true of the virtues of loyalty and community, of the sense of solidarity that the individual has with the not-self, the transcendence of personality that is its highest expression. At what other times, asks the apologist for war, have men ever shown such willingness to sacrifice, have ever died so readily and so nobly? Now it is true indeed that war can call these virtues forth; but, then, so too can other activities. Is there not obedience in the family and in industry? Is there not self-sacrifice in marriage and parenthood? Is there not self-transcendence in the *amor intellectualis Dei* or in the choir that sings a Bach mass? What grounds therefore can there be for holding the argument of *c*1? The virtues that are often associated with war clearly have no apriori synthetic necessary connection with war as such.

<sup>4</sup> See "The Moral Equivalent for War," *The Philosophy of William James*, ed. by Horace M. Kallen (New York, Modern Lib.), p. 261. I am indebted for the suggestion of this quotation to Professor Schneider's paper. (Permission to use the quotation has kindly been granted by the publisher.)

We must turn finally to the most crucial of all these propositions, that pugnacity or the "fighting spirit" in its exercise qua fighting spirit is intrinsically good. The refutation of this doctrine we have already suggested in our disjunction between work and wantonness.

It is an unfortunate fact of the English language, testifying as it does to the failure of proper discrimination, that *wantonness*, the only word we have for generically unreflective activity, is also the only word for specifically *destructive* unreflective activity. This is the sense in which it is usually employed. But we must distinguish another type of wantonness, that which chances to be constructive. In this category would fall all those irrational "premonitions" which have at one time or another saved many of us from death or injury.<sup>5</sup>

We see therefore that the *summum genus*, activity, divides into work, which is planned or reflective activity—activity determinately informed—and wantonness, which is unplanned and unreflective activity. Each of these again subdivides into constructive and destructive. But it is irrelevant to wantonness, as it is not to work, whether it constructs or destroys. How are we, then, without some arbitrary fiat, to reconcile the demands of these two activities? Traditionally the only alternative has been that proposed by Plotinus, who denies reality to the material principle. But for reasons now quite familiar this is an unsatisfactory resolution. Must we then make a tragic decision between mutually exclusive perfections? Not altogether, because, as we have noticed, wanton activity may be incidentally constructive. Reconciliation can be achieved by ensuring that wanton activity, whenever engaged in, be incidentally beneficial. To effect this reconciliation a familiar agency lies readily at hand—habit. Habituation is the agency by which reason schools wantonness to express itself in ways that are, at best, constructive and, at worst, neutral. How powerful this agency of habit may be is evident even in animals. Compare the way in which the trained dog expresses his joy in the springtime by bounding over the fields with his master with that in which the wolf signalizes the same event by ripping open the bellies of sheep. Both of these activities express wantonness; but the first, viewed as work, is not harmful, where as the second is.<sup>6</sup>

<sup>5</sup> I well recall the time when I suddenly jammed on the brakes of a bicycle I was riding, not realizing what I was doing; a car rushed by me which, had I not stopped, would have run over me.

<sup>6</sup> For the purposes of the illustration the wolf is considered to have eaten his breakfast already. It is because Kant failed to appreciate the nature of wantonness that he denied ethical value to the spontaneous care bestowed by a mother on her offspring.

For three reasons, however, habit can never be completely effective in reconciling wantonness with work. In the first place, wantonness must be almost totally suppressed in the early days of forming habit and so loses its perfection in being unexpressed. In the second place, the law of contradiction makes the expression of the perfection of these two principles by the same being only potentially possible, never actually. One cannot both take a walk merely on impulse and take a walk consciously purposing to mail a letter, at the same time, in the same place, even though one can be capable of doing both of these things. Finally, since the essence of the wanton is merely wantonness, no finite wanton being, however often it has acted in a given way in the past, need so act in the future. For even if, which is doubtful, the intrinsic past of a being absolutely determines its future, certainly the extrinsic past cannot.<sup>7</sup> Of the workings of this principle in psychology, and its empirical validity, any practicing psychiatrist could undoubtedly give an adequate account.

But this is no charter for extolling the fighting spirit. For war can now properly be defined as wanton activity resulting in destruction, and the fighting spirit as the expression of destructive wantonness. War is therefore not the necessary expression of any fundamental aspect of the nature of man. The disjunction is between wanton action and work, between potentiality qua potentiality and potentiality informed. It is not the fighting spirit that must be nurtured, but spontaneity; and spontaneity can largely be determined to beneficial results. Unreflective joy needs no cracked crowns as testimony to its majesty.

All this is true, it may be countered, but it leaves out one fundamental aspect of war. War is not only the expression of the fighting spirit; it is also an activity in which death hovers around the corner. The human being is at his most magnificent when, taxed and strained by the fear of death, he rises above his fear and assumes divine proportions. Some such argument is frequently offered by Germans and other people who like to think of themselves as apostles of "manliness." Within it are really contained two propositions, (*a*) that the experience of imminent death introduces a new dimension into the human personality which is both unique and desirable and (*b*) that war involves fear, that real fear is the necessary condition for real courage, and that real courage is a virtue which is both unique and desirable.

<sup>7</sup>For a brilliant, if not yet fully adequate treatment of this point, see Paul Weiss, "Cosmic Behaviorism," *Philosophical Review*, LI (1942), 345-56, and the same author's *Reality* (Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 1938), especially Book II, chapter 8.



The first argument we can deny outright. Our dogmatism is justified by, although not grounded in, the consideration that even were death a new dimension, war is not the only way of involving it in our experience. The scientist who experiments with microbes on his own body and the mountain climber striving to reach Everest represent two extremes of nonmilitary flirtation with death. In each case the threat is serious, and goal either desirable or harmless. It is, then, the second argument that must be met before we can rest in our labors. But this argument, like earlier ones previously discussed, commits the fallacy of identifying war with activity and work with passivity. The aim of the workman is not to construct in order to cease working, but to construct in order that what he constructs may make himself and others more perfect constructors. Construction is then an on-going activity, in which difficulty is faced and overcome. Why cannot a man be a courageous workman?

But this rebuttal, it may be urged, is no rebuttal, for the point at issue is whether pleasure is possible without pain, whether perfection can be appreciated without imperfection. Ever since Socrates rubbed his legs in prison after the chains had been removed, it has been recognized that a man must suffer in order to appreciate the goodness of his being. If you abolish war, you abolish suffering and leave in its place only degenerate self-complacency. The implications of this analysis are of course much too numerous to be dealt with in this paper, and it is not possible to settle the many issues that it raises. Let us, however, try to see what its main presupposition is and whether it is justified. This presupposition, if I interpret it correctly, is that *a human being may be essentially complete and that, since the perfect cannot be self-conscious, such a human being would have to lose worth in order to know that he had any*. But this presupposition, and the arguments built on it, are simply wrong. No finite being can ever be self-complete, for good metaphysical reasons which have been thoroughly and carefully established by a distinguished contemporary thinker.<sup>8</sup> To inflict suffering deliberately is therefore unnecessary and can only be harmful.

Here again we may feel that our task is completed and that war has been shown to be dispensable. But we are still faced with a different type of argument. Where those hitherto considered may broadly be called ethical, this one is socio-political and may be called the "progress argument."

<sup>8</sup> See Paul Weiss, "The Nature and Status of Time and Passage," *Philosophical Essays for Alfred North Whitehead* (New York: Longmans, Green & Co., 1936), pp. 153-73.

The progress argument is that war very often brings in its wake substantial concrete advantages of every description. In this war we have seen rapid strides made in electronics, which will result in improved radio transmission, high-powered microscopes, and hearing aids for the deaf; we have improved immeasurably the quality of our aviation; we have learned about the causes and cures of deadly tropical diseases; we have given many of our citizens an opportunity to travel outside their own country and see something of the world beyond; and even on the purely destructive side we must be grateful for the bombs which wiped out large areas of the London and Liverpool slums, whose filthy tenements might otherwise have stood for an indefinite time. In the United States, production increased, new plants were built, unemployment fell to a minimum. What is true of this war is true of others. Many improvements would have been either impossible or long delayed were it not for war.

All this, and much more, is true about war in the past. But with due apology for triteness, we must remind ourselves of the atom bomb. For better or worse we have on our hands a revolutionary weapon whose power is such that we shall soon (if we cannot now) be able quickly and efficiently to destroy ourselves. It is grim to reflect that the leading pooh-pooher of the bomb, Major Alexander de Seversky, insists that the Hiroshima bomb had "only the effect of two hundred Flying Fortresses." Assuming two bombs to a plane, it is evident that the United States Air Force, even yesterday, could have effected in one day the equivalent of a year's destruction. If this is no cause for healthy alarm, we may suspect nothing else ever will or could be.

This, however, is no conclusive argument against war, because, as we have noted, war in its specific sense as an armed combat between sovereign nations is but a species of war in the generic sense of combat, and it is the argument for war in this sense that demands consideration. The problem has perhaps its most dramatic present implications in the prevailing economic doctrine of competition. This doctrine, given its classical formulation in Adam Smith's *Wealth of Nations*, has since been taken up, refined, modified, perverted, and popularized by later generations till it has become (at least up to the last few years) axiomatic and undisputed in Anglo-American thought. That it has grave difficulties has only slowly been recognized, although its very formulation makes them immediately evident. It is needless to say that the overwhelming expansion of all phases of economic life that went hand in hand with the promulgation of the new doctrines succeeded in effecting the familiar confusion of *post quid* or *non ante quid* with

*propter quid*. The doctrine of individualistic competition, when defended on economic grounds,<sup>9</sup> argues that a society is an aggregate of discrete individuals, externally related, in which the pursuit by an individual of his own interests cannot but benefit the other individuals, provided that, and only provided that, this pursuit is actively hindered by other individuals. Implicit in the whole argument of which this is the summary are the principles (a) that the perfection of the whole equals the sum of the perfections of each individual part, and that this is the only meaning that the perfection of the whole can have; (b) that no part perfects other parts save as it regards the perfection of other parts as perfecting itself, it being clearly recognized that the dependence is extrinsic, not intrinsic; (c) that the perfection of the whole is more desirable than the perfection of any one of its parts (this is the justification of Mill's "greatest good for the greatest number"); (d) that the increased perfection of any part, together with the increased perfections of any parts accidentally perfected, necessarily exceeds the loss of perfection by any other part or parts; (e) that any part, insofar as it is active and conscious, is always conscious (1) of its form of perfection and (2) of the activity necessary to perfect itself; (f) that no part perfects itself save as it is threatened with diminution in perfection by some other part.<sup>10</sup>

Let us examine these principles. Assuming the first principle to be true, the second follows; but the third is a *non sequitur*. If the individual is merely externally related to other individuals, there is no reason whatever for his concerning himself with the social welfare as such, or even for considering the social welfare as in any sense relevant to him, save as prudence makes it so. It is manifestly illogical to defend any institution (e.g., war) on *social* grounds, where the society is conceived of as nothing but the haphazard and chance collection of atomic individuals.<sup>11</sup> It is small comfort to a ruined man to know that

<sup>9</sup> We are only considering here the ethics of "competition," not the ethics of individual liberty, which is sometimes discussed in essays on capitalism as if liberty and capitalism were (which they are in fact not) organically and necessarily related. To make this point fully would of course require another paper.

<sup>10</sup> It may be argued that this is an incorrect statement, since it is admitted that a monopoly, qua monopoly, may seek to improve its own position. But if this once be admitted, the whole argument for a competitive society breaks down. Why, if a private monopoly can use ingenuity to improve its position, should not a total public monopoly, that is, the state, do the same thing? This no apologist for capitalism can admit, save as he makes the whole argument one of degree, and turns the matter over to the historians and statisticians.

<sup>11</sup> It is not always realized that it is at this crucial point that the utilitarian ethics of public hedonism breaks down. Mill inherited Hume's atomistic



society is much better off because of his ruination, if the good of society is irrelevant to him. The only way such a doctrine can gain supporters is by holding out the hope that the society which is to be improved will include oneself. But if this inclusion is only accidental, it will follow that as soon as any individual or group knows its interests to be contrary to the majority with which the society is identified, that individual or group must actively oppose the majority to the best of its ability. Any contract theory of democracy is thus self-defeating, since the democratic postulate is that the organic social interest will always be such as to insure the obedience of the minority to the majority. If there is no such interest (which the notion of a contract by individuals hardly allows), it is difficult to see what but prudence could deter the minority from making war.

The fourth principle is patently absurd. No possible justification can be offered for insisting that there is a necessary connection between the gain and loss in value of individuals that have no necessary connection with each other. If you are nothing to me and I nothing to you, why must the gain in my interest be less than the loss in yours? Suppose I desire a gold watch which you have and kill you to get it—have I gained more than you have lost? Or suppose that a large and powerful corporation consistently undersells its small competitors by trading at a loss, and, when it has destroyed them and achieved a monopoly, then jacks up its prices far above the old ones. Has the community gained or lost by this activity which improves the position of the large corporation?

The fifth principle is susceptible of immediate empirical denial in both its parts. A man clearly does not always, at a given time, see what his interests are. It would straighten out a lot of confusion in classical British economics if this were clearly recognized. Often when these economists are supposedly describing what happens when a man pursues his own interest, they are really talking about what would happen if he did pursue his own interest—which is quite another matter. If the large corporation referred to above were, before it could recoup its losses, challenged by another competitor equally powerful that it could not undersell, would it have pursued its true interests in destroying the original small competitors?

The sixth principle is the key proposition and the one most frequently paraphrased in everyday conversation. It amounts to this, that there is a principle of inertia in mankind that ensures nobody's

---

metaphysics, whose implications could never support his ethical and political doctrines.

ever doing anything to alter the *status quo*, unless some outside force, by threatening to destroy the *status quo*, achieves its modification. So bankers will say that the workingman is naturally lazy and that, if there is not some unemployment (that is to say, tension, or the threat of war), he will not produce as much as he can or ought to. The record of production during the last few years in Russia, Great Britain, and the United States suggests empirically the mistake of this analysis. But the real difficulty with the proposition becomes evident as soon as it is analyzed and recognized to conceal two propositions, one of which is ambiguous. These propositions are (*a*) that nothing contains within itself the principle of its own motion, which implies (*b*) that the principle of motion outside the mobile either is (1) necessarily or (2) sometimes inimical to the being of the mobile.

Granting (on the grounds adduced by Aristotle against Plato in the eighth book of the *Physics*) the validity of *a*, it in no way follows that *b*<sub>1</sub> is true, although *b*<sub>2</sub> may be. The cause of motion may not be efficient at all, but, as Aristotle points out, final. We may want to build a new house in place of the old one, not because anybody threatens our economic prosperity, but because the ideal of a new and more comfortable house draws us on. We may, however, if our house is a store, also replace it with a new one to compete with the modern establishment on the corner. It follows therefore that although war may result in individual improvements contributing to social improvements, these same improvements may be effected in other ways. Translated into the terms of economic theory, this conclusion means that although competition often does stimulate increased productivity, there is nothing that prevents that productivity from being increased in other, that is to say, peaceful, ways.

But the argument, it may be urged, is merely *ad hominem*. Cannot competition be useful to an *organic society* whose parts are in some sense internally related? Surely it is obvious that it is sometimes necessary to destroy a part for the good of the whole, as when a man's leg is amputated to save his life. With the principle that an organism may have to sacrifice parts for the sake of the whole it is impossible to argue. But it is patently absurd to urge that the several parts annihilate each other in a haphazard way, because it is sometimes necessary that some of them be annihilated. Because a dangerous criminal must be locked up or executed, does it follow that the society gains every time there is a sporadic outburst of violence?

We can close now by tying together the strings of our discussion. We began by taking war and work as basic modes of activity, one evil

and one good. We saw that this was an incorrect division, since war, though evil, was really a subcategory of wantonness, which was itself good. We tried to show that the virtues traditionally associated with pugnacity and courage are either virtues of wantonness or work, and do not need war for their expression. Finally we examined the socio-political argument for war as an institution, and discovered that none of its benefits were indissolubly linked with it and could be obtained in other domains. It is perhaps not irrelevant to suggest that one of the important tasks of future philosophy is to explore and chart those domains.

## SECOND ANNUAL MEETING OF THE MISSOURI STATE PHILOSOPHY ASSOCIATION

R. J. HENLE, S.J.

The second annual meeting of the Missouri State Philosophy Association was held on October 28 and 29 at Washington University, Saint Louis, Missouri. The first session was devoted to a symposium on logical positivism. Dr. Richard Rudner presented a clear statement of the position, which was criticized by Dr. Brian Coffey of Saint Louis University and Dr. Lewis E. Hahn of Washington University. The symposium not only clarified issues, but brought out very definitely certain grave difficulties in the position of the logical positivists.

At the informal annual dinner, Professor A. Cornelius Benjamin of the University of Missouri gave the presidential address, "Operationism—A Critical Evaluation." While maintaining that all concepts are in some sense operational, Professor Benjamin yet argued that some were only implicitly or indirectly operational. His position appeared to be an undoubted improvement on the original thesis of operationalism; he also is still too exclusively resting his case, however, on the type of concept proper to the natural sciences and on a very inadequate analysis of "generalization." Dr. Omar Moore of Washing-

---

*THE REVEREND ROBERT J. HENLE, S.J., S.T.L., M.A., is the editor of THE MODERN SCHOOLMAN, dean of the School of Philosophy and Science, and assistant professor of philosophy at Saint Louis University.*



ton University gave an informal report on the East-West Philosopher's Conference, which was held in Hawaii during the summer of 1949.

The Saturday morning session was devoted to three papers, all of which dealt with religion and ethics. Dr. Harold Durfee of Park College attempted to define "philosophy of religion" in terms of a dialectical interrelationship between philosophy, theology, and an "existential commitment." The second paper, "Can Religion Exercise a Progressive Influence in Philosophy?," presented by the Reverend John Gill of the Unitarian Church of Alton, Illinois, had little philosophical content and made no philosophical contribution. Dr. Guy Ranson of William Jewell College outlined the ethical position of Albert Schweitzer in a very clear and competent paper.

Professor Lewis E. Hahn of Washington University was elected president and Miss Caroline G. Nations was re-elected secretary-treasurer. The new president appointed the following program committee: A. C. Berndtson of the University of Missouri, Eugene Hix of Central College, and the Reverend R. J. Henle, S.J., of Saint Louis University.

### CHRONICLE

A "CONFERENCE ON THE TEACHING OF PHILOSOPHY" was held at Western Reserve University, Cleveland, on October 14 and 15. The discussions centered around introductory courses in philosophy, in logic and scientific method, and in ethics. The teaching of the history of philosophy was also considered, as well as the relation of philosophy to other parts of the curriculum.

"BLACKWELL'S POLITICAL TEXTS" can now be had from Macmillan. The following titles have been issued so far:

Bentham, Jeremy. *A Fragment on Government and Principles of Morals and Legislation*. Edited by W. Harrison. \$2.25.

Mill, John Stuart. *On Liberty and Representative Government*. Edited by R. B. McCallum. \$2.25.

Locke, John. *Second Treatise of Civil Government and A Letter concerning Toleration*. Edited by J. W. Gough. \$2.25.

Hobbes, Thomas. *Leviathan*. Edited by M. Oakeshott. \$2.25.

*The Federalist*. Complete edition. Edited by Max Beloff. \$2.25.

Thomas Aquinas, St. *Selected Political Writings*. (*On Princely Government*, Bk. I; *On the Government of Jews; Contra Gentiles*, III. 81; *Summa Theologiae* [selections from the first and second parts]; *Commentary on the Sentences*, from Bk. II; *Commentary*

*on the Nicomachean Ethics*, I. lect. 1; *Commentary on the Politics*, I. lect. 1.) Edited by A. P. D'Entreves. \$2.25.

Filmer, Robert. *Patriarcha and Other Political Writings*. Edited by Peter Laslett. \$2.75.

THE OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS announces a new series, "Medieval Classics." The works chosen for editing and translation will be literary and historical texts. The first volume is *The Chronicle of Jocelin of Brakelond*, edited by H. E. Butler, published on October 20, 1949. The series is under the general editorship of V. H. Galbraith of the University of Oxford and R. A. B. Mynors of the University of Cambridge.

THE BALMESIANA OF BARCELONA has begun a philosophical institute. A series of lectures is planned, along with an evening course in Christian philosophy. The institute plans to undertake and publish philosophical studies. An inaugural lecture on "The Spirit of Balmes in Philosophy" was delivered by His Excellency, Tomás Carreras Artau. The director of the institute is Juan Roig Gironella, S.J.

## BOOK REVIEWS

CIVILIZATION AND RELIGION. By Charles W. Hendel. New Haven: Yale Univ. Press, 1948. Pp. viii + 78. \$2.00.

Professor Hendel, as a member of the staff of the Army University in England after the last war, found his students, but recently done with the indecencies of war, in a mood for questions. Their questions grew out of their own reflections and experiences, and were not such as to be answered by ready-made textbook answers. They had to do with ultimates.

At that juncture in their lives they felt keenly the absence of ultimate values in the civilization of whose failure they were victims, criticized the idolatry of expediency. Man, they felt, was something more than a robot, his end something beyond death and annihilation. Responsibility without some higher authority was empty. The good must be something more than a pragmatic sanction, something greater than either the individual or the social welfare. Responsibility implied an authority higher than themselves, higher than society itself.

In the third part of the book Professor Hendel, under the caption "Politics, Education, Religion," undertakes to answer the questions. Politics, he tells us, is the quickest way to corporate action in large issues, and at the present time demands recourse to a world authority which shall guarantee the principles of democracy: the law of justice for all, equal liberty and rights. There can never be a perfect society, since there is always a danger that one of the principles be emphasized at the expense of the others.

Education, therefore, must prepare the individual and look ultimately to a change in the individual, and, through him, in society itself. For this we cannot go back to the old conception of an authority higher than the state, since this supposes the spiritual nature of man. At the same time we cannot forget the old belief, and must attempt to recapture its values. Education must be humanizing, accepting all that is good in art, science, and in any other field, past and present. Here the philosophers enter to establish a unity in the diversity of scientific and artistic interest, achievement, and conflict, and to promote true freedom.



In changing men and societies the most powerful force is the religious experience: the witness of God in history cannot be gainsaid. Love of God translates itself into love of fellow men, inculcates responsibility, and makes moral obligation real. So long as the churches appear as partisans, and therefore on the same level as nations, institutional creeds are open to doubt. What is essential, and sufficient, in Professor Hendel's view, is fidelity to the insight that religion is a personal thing. There is an "absolute" relationship (in the sense of Kierkegaard) between man and God, from which grows a greater love for man, more inward and personal than one can possibly acquire from the teaching of others or from ritual and ceremony.

CHARLES DENECKE, S.J.

*Woodstock College*  
*Woodstock, Maryland*

**CERTAINTY: PHILOSOPHICAL AND THEOLOGICAL.** By Dom Illtyd Trethowan. Westminster: Dacre Press, 1948. Pp. viii + 170. 15s.

This is an instructive work written by a vigorous and inquiring mind. While the discussion ranges from logical positivism to mystical experience, the central concern is the reconciliation of the properties of the act of faith, which at once is certain yet free, rational yet due to divine grace. Though the author has more material than he can fit smoothly into the space at his disposal, the somewhat choppy presentation of exact information does not interfere with the strong logical structure and its strictly speculative intention. Indeed, I find the basic viewpoint most attractive:

Theology is the queen of the sciences. But a philosopher may say 'I am a philosopher and not a theologian', and, although this is not a satisfactory state of affairs, it does make good sense; whereas the theologian who says 'I'm a theologian and not a philosopher' is talking nonsense (p. 65).

Slightly less than the first third of the book is merely philosophic. The position adopted is a dogmatic intuitionism that recalls Father Sebastian Day's significant work on *Intuitive Cognition*. Certainty is to be taken rigorously (p. 11), and it has to provide its own guarantee (p. 9). By ruling that doubtful knowledge is not knowledge, it seems that incomplete knowledge is not knowledge. There follows an identification of knowledge with certainty. There also follows a disregard of elements or factors within knowledge, so that our apprehensions are

said to be affirmations in the form of judgments (p. 40). This knowledge-apprehension-affirmation-certainty is intuitive: while Aquinas contrasted (*CG*, II. 98, *ad fin.*), the author identifies the Platonist confrontation of knower with known and the Aristotelian identity of knower in act and known in act (p. 22). A sharp distinction between sense and intellect is deprecated, and so an intellectual intuition of bodies is affirmed (p. 36). The doctrine of species is under a cloud, for it risks changing the object (p. 30), and for the same reason the construction by intellect of its object is set aside (p. 37). Indeed, the author is so opposed to distinction, analysis, explanation that, while admitting a difference between immediate and inferred knowledge, he proceeds to contend that the demonstration of God's existence is not syllogistic but an immediate inference (p. 42).

After the reader is introduced to theology and to the supernatural order, various theories of the act of faith, current among Catholic theologians, are passed in review. All are found unsatisfactory. With this pronouncement it would be difficult to disagree. But probably it will be contended that the author's proposal, while headed in the right direction, fails to reach the goal. He would ground faith on a supernatural intuition of God as revealing. This assures the intervention of grace, the sufficiency of evidence, and the certainty of faith. But it leaves faith free not immediately but only *in causa*. The real difficulty, however, is whether the alleged intuition exists. The author appeals to the normality of mystical experience and argues that mysticism involves an intuition of God and that faith is the beginning of the mystical life; what can be overwhelming in mystical experience, should be rudimentary in faith, where it would provide the element of intellectual evidence that is needed. It remains that the author seems to wish he did not have to account for the faith of those in the state of mortal sin. More boldly, in the name of intellectualism, he attacks the theologians who advance that mystical experience radically is affective rather than intuitive.

The weak point of the work seems to me to be the notion of intuition. Faith cannot be a conclusion, for it is a new and supernatural beginning. But on the author's philosophy, certainty must be either a conclusion or an intuition. Really it is this premise that forces the affirmation of an intuition of God in faith, that leads to an a priori interpretation of mystical experience, that brings up the embarrassing faith of sinners, that excludes from faith immediate freedom, that would give rise to further difficulties if the term intuition were given an exact meaning in an adequately systematic presentation.

But it is not in such consequences that the real weakness lies; rather it is in the very notion of intuition. The definition of truth is correspondence between judgment and reality. The criterion of truth is evidence. Now, to postulate intuitions is unquestionably simple and simplifying. At once the definition and the criterion of truth are made to coincide. At a stroke the critical problem is eliminated, for if evidence is evident intuition of reality, there is neither need nor possibility of proceeding rationally from the criterion to the definition of truth. Unfortunately the postulated intuitions do not seem to exist. In its first moment on each level, knowledge seems to be act, perfection, identity; such identity of itself is not a confrontation; confrontation does arise, but only in a second moment and by a distinct act, of perception as distinct from sensation, of conception as distinct from insight, of judgment as distinct from reflective understanding. On this showing confrontation is not primitive, but derived; and it is derived from what is not confrontation, not intuition, nor formal and explicit duality. Admittedly it is difficult to justify such derivation. Overtly to accept such difficulty is a basic and momentous philosophic option. Still it seems to me to be the way of honesty and truth, and I should like very much to see so acute and so transparently honest a thinker as Dom Trethowan explore it.

BERNARD J. F. LONERGAN, S.J.

*Jesuit Seminary*  
*Toronto, Canada*

DANTE THEOLOGIAN: THE DIVINE COMEDY. By Patrick Cummins, O.S.B. Saint Louis: B. Herder Book Co., 1948. Pp. 604. \$6.00.

The first part of *Dante Theologian* is another attempt at a verse translation of *The Divine Comedy*. It is difficult enough merely to translate a foreign poem into any kind of English verse, but the translator who sets out to reproduce both the rhyme scheme and the verse-to-verse metrical pattern of his original has multiplied his difficulties. That is what Father Cummins has done in his new version of *The Divine Comedy*. He has reproduced in English not only the *terza rima* but also the unbroken hendecasyllabic line of the original. But to achieve this, on his own admission, he has had to use "rhyming licenses, overworked participles, archaisms, and neologisms, formations by analogy"—all of which add up to rather graceless and strained English. After granting that the translator has succeeded in his Herculean task of reproducing the rhyme scheme and the metrical pattern



of the original, this reviewer still feels that he chose boldly, but not well. In the first place, the frequent rhymes of the *terza rima* are natural and pleasing in an inflected language like the Italian, but become monotonous, artificial, and sometimes even ludicrous in this English imitation. In reproducing the hendecasyllabic line of Dante the translator aims, he says, not at writing an English poem, but an echo of Dante's poem. Yet merely reproducing the metrical pattern of the original creates a very thin echo of Dante's poem. As much of the music of Dante's as of any poet's line resides in its vowel and consonantal quality. Hence a mere reproduction of the metrical pattern of a poem in another language cannot help being anything but a caricature of the musical qualities of the original.

But *Dante Theologian* is not merely a translation. It gets its title from an essay in which Father Cummins suggests a parallel among the first questions of St. Thomas Aquinas's *Summa Theologica*, *The Divine Comedy*, and Raphael's *Disputa*. Father Cummins tries to show that all three works agree in their treatment of the nature, the end, and the necessity of theology. He makes no attempt to establish any necessary source relationships among these three men, but suggests that it is not unreasonable to see Aquinas as a direct source for Dante since Remigio de' Girolami, a pupil of Aquinas, was in turn the teacher of Dante.

The second part of this book, to which the essay mentioned above is an introduction, is a literal and spiritual commentary on *The Divine Comedy*. The author professes to have added this part of the book only to fulfill one of the conditions laid down by the publishers upon which they would publish his translation. This reviewer, however, is of the opinion that the commentary is more valuable than the translation. Both the literal and spiritual commentaries will be of considerable help to a reader who is just approaching the study of Dante. Equally helpful to the same reader will be the glossary of proper names used by Dante.

The preparation of this book was certainly an arduous labor of love; but I still feel that, if it is merely a musical echo of Dante's poem that you want, you would do better to read the original even though you do not understand the Italian, and that, if it is the meaning of the poem you are looking for, you will get it better in a good prose translation.

MAURICE B. MCNAMEE, S.J.

*Saint Louis University*

THE PERSON AND THE COMMON GOOD. By Jacques Maritain.  
Translated by John J. Fitzgerald. New York: Chas. Scribner's  
Sons, 1947. Pp. 98. \$2.00.

It is evident from the introductory pages that this book was assembled by Professor Maritain from several previously published studies, to make clear his position on the much-controverted question of the respective value of the personal and the common good. The book fulfills this purpose admirably. Possibly because Maritain has been unjustly treated in other controversies, he now gives the impression that he regards all such debates as unfortunate. In reference to the discussions on the present question, he speaks (p. 6) of "the original vice of such a controversy."

Personal attacks on one philosopher by another are not good; but serious criticism of the philosophic opinions of any school of thought, or of the views of any philosopher, has much value. As soon as a thinker begins to feel that he is above such criticism, he has removed himself from the philosophic enterprise. Some contributions to the controversy on the person and the common good were not fair criticisms of the views of opponents. However, one can hardly condemn the discussion as a whole. The present book is evidence of the clarification arising from such controversies. It keeps a balance between the worth of the human person and the good which arises from participation in a community of persons. It underlines the complementary character of person and community, rejecting the notion that they are mutually exclusive. There is no longer any reason for an English reader's misunderstanding Maritain on this point; he is not a "personalist" in the narrow meaning of this term. Those who think that he is should read this book carefully.

VERNON J. BOURKE

*Saint Louis University*

LE BONHEUR CHEZ ARISTOTE. By Jean Léonard, S.J. (Académie  
Royale de Belgique, Mémoires, 2e série, Tome XLIV).  
Bruxelles: Palais des Académies, 1948. Pp. 224.

This work is typical of the painstaking and conscientious studies we have come to expect from Belgian scholars. The author died in 1945 at the age of thirty, after struggling to complete his book amid the exigencies of military service and teaching.

In the first pages, Father Léonard presents us with a bibliography of Aristotelian ethics comprising the editions, the commentaries, and

various modern studies. He treats his subject in six lengthy chapters, to which we must add a number of appendices on particular points such as the chronology of the *Ethica Nichomachea*, Books VI and X. As a whole this work does not impress one by its unity; in fact, much too often one has the impression of rambling along at the mercy of texts rather than receiving the fulfillment of the promise formulated in the title.

The author appears hostile in his general approach to Aristotle (p. 152 and *passim*). He falls in line with the perennial efforts of commentators and philosophers, ancient and modern, who tried to make Aristotle into an idealist—*sous ce réalisme bon teint, se dissimule un idéalisme, qui se bride pour se cantonner dans l'expérience* (p. 58). He takes up the theme of those who would read frustration and pessimism into Aristotle's search for happiness (p. 63); this is a strained chord on which the present tune of Christian ethics is more than slightly dependent.

Too often in the course of his study the author gives us the impression of unwittingly fabricating problems which he attributes to Aristotle. He is surprised to find that Aristotle does not describe anywhere a sort of direct intuition of spiritual things in the manner of Plato, since the author deems this intuition essential to contemplation (p. 148). However Father Léonard does not bring up Plato's name in this connection.

The imperfections outlined here need not deter anyone from reading Father Léonard. There is much valuable material in his study. Let me point out the author's sincere endeavors to corroborate his statements with the best texts, and his treatment of the meaning and evolution of *φρόνησις* in Aristotle, which is well worth the effort involved in reading this book.

VENANT CAUCHY

*Saint Louis University*

LEGAL PHILOSOPHY FROM PLATO TO HEGEL. By Huntington Cairns. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1949. Pp. xv + 583. \$7.50.

Mr. Cairns has set himself the ambitious task of examining the legal philosophies of outstanding thinkers from Plato to Hegel. Besides these two leaders in philosophic thought, he considers the philosophies of Aristotle, Cicero, Aquinas, Bacon, Leibniz, Hobbes, Spinoza, Locke, Kant, and Fichte. In this volume, together with the work on *Law and the Social Sciences* and *The Theory of Legal Science*, both already



published, the author seeks to construct the foundation of a theory of law which he deems a necessary antecedent of a possible jurisprudence. The work gives evidence of wide reading, careful study, and considerable erudition. How "central" and "impartial" the author is, and he says that he attempts to be, in the treatment of various philosophies may be left as an open question. From the point of view of the general interest and the value of the work perhaps it is well that he does not completely succeed in his efforts at impartiality. A scholar of Mr. Cairns's stature should not attempt to be neutral.

A careful reading of the work indicates that Mr. Cairns leans not a little towards the classical Greek and Roman philosophers together with St. Thomas. In fact, his treatment of St. Thomas shows singular clarity and understanding. He understands better, for instance, than does Hans Kelsen where positivism and relativism lead. As to the latter, he says:

. . . we may expect in our own day, if indeed it is not already present, to find reflected in legal practice doctrines which have their origin in the recent speculations with respect to philosophical relativism and its offspring, absolutism.

Despite this statement and others like it, here and there sections appear which puzzle, surprise, and generally confound the reader. Perhaps they come as a result of Mr. Cairns's effort to be "impartial." Perhaps they result from his sympathetic approach to each philosopher, until he finally ends in confusion himself. We are a bit puzzled at the start when we read the following statement: "Their (philosophy and jurisprudence) primary instrument is reason, which in view of the attacks upon it, even by philosophers themselves, cannot be taken for granted as a self-evidently valid tool." Then follows a consideration of Hume's intuitionism which is called unsatisfactory, to be followed by: "Nevertheless, reason, as philosophy's instrument of inquiry, still awaits vindication." Not only that, but: "Although reason is the main instrument of philosophy it has not developed a method for the discovery of truth that commands general assent." Evidently the attacks of Hume and his followers have shaken Mr. Cairns's faith in reason a bit. Yet his criticism of Hume is excellent. Does an invalid attack upon reason as the chief tool of philosophy weaken the case for reason? As for logic, we are assured that "a knowledge of logical rules is of much assistance in the analysis of philosophical questions." A little baffling, too, is such a statement as

We need not assume that a philosophical position necessarily states doctrine of truth or falsity. Our first question may be: Is the doctrine a serviceable one? Does it help us in the verification of hypotheses and in the prosecution of our inquiry?

And we wonder whether the author has fallen momentarily a victim to scientism when he asserts, ". . . it has not been demonstrated that the methods of science are not applicable to the evaluation of moral judgments."

What has philosophy to offer to the field of law? The question is important and worthy of continual study. Neither philosophy nor law is static. The problems in both fields require the continual and intensive thought of scholars. One feels, however, that philosophy has furnished the law with more than lawyers are willing or able to use or to admit. When Hegel said that philosophy was accessible to the ordinary knowledge of the cultured public until Kant, he did not go back far enough. He might have said until Descartes. No fact in the whole history of philosophic thought impresses the student more than the contrast between the clear, direct, and well-ordered thinking of classical-medieval philosophy and the complex verbosity of modern philosophical systems. Perhaps there lies the difficulty. Kant, Fichte, Hegel, and others of the modern period are forbidding enough monsters to philosophers. What well might they be to students of jurisprudence? The student of jurisprudence, Mr. Cairns and others, should first try to discover where he will end up by taking as a point of departure, in the quest for a philosophy of law, the traditionalist school of philosophy. Its potentialities have not yet been exhausted.

JEROME G. KERWIN

*The University of Chicago*

# BIBLIOGRAPHY OF CURRENT PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS

## PUBLISHED IN THE UNITED STATES

For the purposes of this bibliography, "philosophy" will be understood in a very broad sense. It will include works in other fields—such as sociology, aesthetics, and politics—that involve philosophical principles and problems.

"Current" books will be understood to include new books, revised editions, and reprints if the previous printing had been out of stock for a notable period of time, or if there is a notable difference in price, format, and the like.

The procedure is as follows:

1. Books announced for publication will be listed in the issue which next appears after the announcement is received.
2. Books actually published will be listed in the subsequent issue, even though they were already listed in accordance with No. 1 above.
3. Books received by THE MODERN SCHOOLMAN will be listed with full bibliographical information and a descriptive and/or critical note in the subsequent issue, even though they were already listed in accordance with No. 1 and/or No. 2. This will be done even if a full review is to appear later.

ADKINS, NELSON F. *Philip Freneau and the Cosmic Enigma: The Religious and Philosophical Speculations of an American Poet*. New York: New York Univ. Press; Aug., 1949. Pp. 84. \$2.50.

AGARD, WALTER RAYMOND and OTHERS. *The Humanities for Our Time*. Lawrence: Univ. of Kansas Press. Pp. 159. \$2.00.

ANDERSON, F. H. *The Philosophy of Francis Bacon*. Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press. \$4.00.

ANDERSON, JAMES F. *The Bond of Being*. Saint Louis: B. Herder Book Co., 1949. Pp. xvi + 341. \$4.00.

This book, as its subtitle tells us, is an essay on analogy and existence. It is a study and presentation of the doctrine of St. Thomas on analogy, seen not only in the context of his own philosophy but in the larger context of the history of ideas. Those who are familiar with the writings of Cajetan and Penido on analogy will recognize them as the sources of most of Professor Anderson's discussions and analyses.

The book is to be highly recommended for students who wish a fuller, more thorough knowledge of the doctrine of St. Thomas and Cajetan than can be obtained from textbooks or courses in metaphysics.

There are a bibliography and index.

ANDERSON, ROBERT GORDON. *The City and the Cathedral*. New York: Longmans, Green & Co., 1948. Pp. 349. \$3.50.

ARMSTRONG, A. H. *An Introduction to Ancient Philosophy*. Westminster: New-man Press; Nov., 1949. \$3.25.

AVICENNA (Ibn Sina). *De Anima*. Edited by George P. Klubertanz, S.J. Saint Louis: School of Philosophy and Science of Saint Louis Univ., 1949. Pp. vi + 143. Mimeographed, flexible binding, \$3.00.

This edition is transcribed from the 1508 edition of Avicenna's *Opera Omnia*. All abbreviations have been expanded; punctuation and paragraphing have been revised to conform to modern standards of editing medieval texts; and the simpler typographical errors of the Venice edition have been corrected. To facilitate reference, the folio numbers of the original edition are given in the margin.



- BECKER, CARL LOTUS. *Progress and Power*. Introduction by Leo Gershov. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1949. Pp. 157. \$2.50.
- BELOFF, MAX. *Thomas Jefferson and American Democracy*. New York: Macmillan Co., 1949. Pp. 282. \$2.00.
- BENDER, RICHARD N. *A Philosophy of Life*. New York: Philosophical Lib., 1949. Pp. 250. \$3.75.

This book is intended to help an intelligent reader, who has had no technical training in philosophy, to form for himself a rational basis of living. This splendid and most praiseworthy aim, however, is not reached because of unnecessary concessions to pragmatism and scientism (in the discussion of truth, knowledge, the origin of the world, free will) and to modern rationalism (in the notion of the fundamental identity of thought and matter, in accepting Brightman's finite God). It may be significant in this connection that the bibliography and references make almost no use of Aristotle or the Thomistic tradition. St. Augustine is said to have held that human nature is depraved by original sin (p. 183).

- BERDYAEV, NICOLAS. *The Divine and the Human*. Translated by R. M. French. New York: Macmillan Co., 1949. Pp. 213. \$5.00.
- BJORSET, BRYNJOLF. *Man and This Mysterious Universe*. New York: Philosophical Lib.; Sept., 1949. \$3.75.
- BLACK, MAX. *Language and Philosophy: Studies in Method*. Ithaca: Cornell Univ. Press, 1949. Pp. x + 264. \$3.50.
- BOYER, MERLE WILLIAM. *Highways of Philosophy*. Philadelphia: Muhlenberg Press; Sept., 1949. Pp. 352. \$3.50.
- BRINTON, CRANE. *English Political Thought in the Nineteenth Century*. Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press; Nov., 1949. Pp. 320. \$4.50.
- BUSH, VANNEVAR. *Modern Arms and Free Men*. New York: Simon & Schuster; Nov., 1949. Cloth, \$3.50; paper, \$1.00.
- CAMERON, MRS. JULIA MARGARET PATTLE. *Scrutiny of Marxism*. New York: Macmillan Co., 1949. Pp. 128. Boards, 75¢.
- CARINGTON, WHATLEY. *Matter, Mind and Meaning*. New Haven: Yale Univ. Press. Pp. 277. \$3.75.
- CARRÉ, MEYRICK H. *Phases of Thought in England*. New York: Oxford Univ. Press; Sept., 1949. Pp. xix + 392. \$7.75.

This is a history of philosophical and related forms of thought in England from about the sixth to the nineteenth centuries. This history is viewed, not in detail, but in the broad currents which are discernible throughout the centuries. Because of the scope of this work, an evaluation of it can be given only in a detailed review. [To be reviewed]

- CHANDLER, ALBERT R. (compiler). *The Clash of Political Ideals*. Revised edition. New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts; Sept., 1949. Pp. xix + 335. \$2.50.

The first nineteen chapters of the original edition (1940) remain unchanged. Nine new chapters contain readings from Pope Pius XI, Franklin D. Roosevelt, Alfred E. Smith, the British Labor party, the program of the Communist International Congress, the Tanaka Memorial, from Chinese and Indian leaders, and from the *Preliminary Draft of a World Constitution*. This book can be very useful in the hands of an intelligent teacher and for the general reader with a mature and critical judgment. For many it will merely breed confusion and thus lead to a merely arbitrary adherence to one of many conflicting ideals or to a rejection of all political ideals.

- CHASE, RICHARD. *Quest for Myth*. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State Univ. Press, 1949. Pp. 161. \$3.25.
- Cicero*. Translated by Hubert McNeill Poteat, with an introduction by Richard P. McKeon. Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press; Nov., 1949. \$6.00.

- CONTU, WALTER. *Emergent Human Nature. A Symbolic Field Interpretation.* New York: Alfred A. Knopf. Pp. 459. \$5.00.
- COOK, ALBERT. *The Dark Voyage and the Golden Mean. A Philosophy of Comedy.* Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press. Pp. 188. \$3.50.
- DAWSON, CHRISTOPHER. *Education and the Crisis of Christian Culture.* Chicago: Henry Regnery Co. Pp. 23. Paper, 25¢
- DESSAUER, FREDERICK. *Stability.* New York: Macmillan Co. Pp. 270. \$3.50.
- DE TYARD, PONTUS. *Three Discourses.* Edited, with an introduction and notes, by John C. Lapp. Ithaca: Cornell Univ. Press, 1949.
- DEWEY, JOHN. *Problems of Men.* New York: Philosophical Lib. \$5.00.
- DEWEY, JOHN and BENTLEY, ARTHUR F. *Knowing and the Known.* Boston: Beacon Press; Oct., 1949. Pp. 330. \$4.00.
- DUNLAP, KNIGHT. *Habits, Their Making and Unmaking.* New York: Liveright Pubs., 1949. \$3.00.
- EASTBURG, FREDERICK E. *Philosophies in Brief.* Boston: Bruce Humphries, 1949. Pp. 78. \$2.50.
- The book consists of brief vignettes interspersed with personal reminiscences. In presenting this book at three cents a page, author and publisher seem to show that they consider the mental age of the college student and general reader to be considerably less than the (cynically estimated) thirteen years. There is no index or bibliography.
- EINSTEIN, ALBERT. *The World as I See It.* Translated from the German by Alan Harris. [Abridged ed.] New York: Philosophical Lib., 1949. Pp. 125. \$2.75.
- ESSER, GERARD, S.V.D. *Theologia Naturalis.* Techny: Mission Press, S.V.D., 1949. Pp. xvi + 271. \$3.00.
- This is the sixth volume of Father Esser's course in philosophy; his volume on ethics is in preparation. Those who are acquainted with the previous volumes of the series will not need any introduction to this work. Those who are not, will need to know that it is characterized by a two-fold aim: to present the traditional doctrine clearly and carefully, and to prepare American students for the problems and theories that they will encounter. The doctrinal content of the work may be inferred from these authors who are frequently referred to: St. Thomas, Garrigou-Lagrange, Descoqs, Hontheim, Suarez, Urraburu, and Manser. The Latin style is clear; an index and bibliography are provided.
- FEIBLEMAN, JAMES KERN. *Aesthetics. A Study of the Fine Arts in Theory and Practice.* New York: Duell, Sloan & Pearce, 1949. Pp. 474. \$5.00.
- FOSS, MARTIN. *Symbol and Metaphor.* Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press; Dec., 1949. Pp. 176. \$3.00.
- FRANK, JEROME. *Law and the Modern Mind.* New York: Coward-McCann, 1949. Pp. 399. \$5.00.
- FRANK, PHILIPP. *Modern Science and Its Philosophy.* Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press; July, 1949. \$4.50.
- . *Relativity—A Richer Truth.* Boston: Beacon Press; Nov., 1949. Pp. 128. \$2.00.
- FREUD, SIGMUND. *Beyond the Pleasure Principle.* New York: Liveright Pubs., 1949. \$2.50.
- . *Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego.* New York: Liveright Pubs., 1949. \$2.50.
- FRIEDLANDER, PAUL. *Structure and Destruction of the Atom according to Plato's Timaeus.* Berkeley: Univ. of California Press, 1949. Pp. 20. Paper, 50¢
- GAUSS, CHARLES E. *The Aesthetic Theories of French Artists, 1855 to the Present.* Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1949. Pp. 108. \$3.00.
- GIDE, ANDRÉ PAUL GUILLAUME. *The Fruits of the Earth.* New York: Alfred A. Knopf. Pp. 292. \$3.00.

- GILSON, ÉTIENNE HENRY. *Dante the Philosopher*. Translated by David Moore. New York: Sheed & Ward. Pp. 350. \$4.00.
- GREGORY, SIR RICHARD ARMAN. *Gods and Men. A Testimony of Science and Religion*. New York: Macmillan Co., 1949. Pp. 214. \$3.50.
- HART, SAMUEL L. *Treatise on Values*. New York: Philosophical Lib.; Sept., 1949. \$3.75.
- HARVEY, ROWLAND HILL. *Robert Owen. Social Idealist*. Edited by John Walton Caughey. Berkeley: Univ. of California Press. Pp. 275. \$3.75; paper, \$2.75.
- HEARNshaw, FOSSEY JOHN COBB (ed.). *Mediaeval Contributions to Modern Civilisation*. New York: Barnes & Noble, 1949. Pp. 267. \$4.00.
- . *The Social and Political Ideas of Some Great Thinkers of the Renaissance and the Reformation*. New York: Barnes & Noble, 1949. Pp. 215. \$4.00.
- . *The Social and Political Ideas of Some Great Thinkers of the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Century*. New York: Barnes & Noble, 1949. Pp. 219. \$4.00.
- . *The Social and Political Ideas of Some Representative Thinkers of the Age of Reaction and Reconstruction, 1815-1865*. New York: Barnes & Noble, 1949. Pp. 219. \$4.00.
- HOGBEN, LANCELOT. *Chance and Choice. An Introduction to Probability*. New York: Chanticleer Press; Nov., 1949. Pp. 400. \$10.00.
- HOOD, FRED C. *Developing the Ability to Assess the Results of Thinking*. Urbana: Univ. of Illinois, 1949. Pp. 54.
- HOPE, RICHARD. *How Man Thinks*. Pittsburgh: Univ. of Pittsburgh Press. Pp. 479. \$4.40.
- HOWE, MARK DE WOLFE. *Readings in American Legal History*. Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press. Pp. 538. \$7.50.
- HUTCHINS, ROBERT M. *St. Thomas and the World State. "Aquinas Lectures."* Milwaukee: Marquette Univ. Press, 1949. Pp. 53. \$1.50.
- In this Aquinas Lecture for 1949 the chancellor of the University of Chicago argues learnedly and eloquently that, if St. Thomas lived today, he would advocate a real world government with full legislative, executive, and judicial powers. The author makes two very important points. The first is that the concept of the "perfect community" is capable of development and is not to be identified with the modern nation-state, any more than it was in the past identified with the the city-state of Aristotle. The second is that "national sovereignty" is not opposed to all forms of world government, but only to unjust assumption of world leadership on the part of one or several national states. World government, when it comes, must come by the free participation of existing states and governments.
- JASPERS, KARL. *The European Spirit*. New York: Macmillan Co., 1949. Pp. 64. Boards, 75¢
- . *The Perennial Scope of Philosophy*. New York: Philosophical Lib.; Dec., 1949. \$3.00.
- JESSOP, THOMAS EDMUND. *Reasonable Living*. New York: Macmillan Co., 1949. Pp. 96. Boards, 75¢
- JOHNSON, A. H. (ed.). *The Wit and Wisdom of John Dewey*. Boston: Beacon Press; Sept., 1949. Pp. 120. \$2.00.
- JOHNSON, MARTIN CHRISTOPHER. *Art and Scientific Thought. Historical Studies Towards a Modern Revision of Their Antagonism*. New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 1949. Pp. 200. \$3.00.
- JORDAN, E. *The Good Life*. Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press; Oct., 1949. Pp. 492. \$5.00.
- JOY, CHARLES R. (ed.). *The Wit and Wisdom of Albert Schweitzer*. Boston: Beacon Press; Sept., 1949. Pp. 120. \$2.00.



- KEITH, SIR ARTHUR. *A New Theory of Human Evolution*. New York: Philosophical Lib. \$4.75.
- KILPATRICK, WILLIAM HEARD. *Modern Education: Its Proper Work*. New York: Hinds, Hayden & Eldredge, 1949. Pp. 26. Paper, 25¢
- KLUCKHORN, CLYDE. *Mirror for Man*. New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1949. Pp. 322. \$3.75.
- KRYPTON. *Quantum Organum. A Genetic Cosmo-Conception*. New York: Krypton Associates, 1949. Pp. 938. \$7.50.
- LANGMUIR, IRVING. *Phenomena, Atoms and Molecules*. New York: Philosophical Lib.; Dec., 1949. \$10.00.
- LEON, PHILLIP. *Body, Mind and Spirit*. New York: Macmillan Co., 1949. Pp. 128. Boards, 75¢
- LEVI, EDWARD H. *An Introduction to Legal Reasoning*. Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press; Oct., 1949. \$2.00.
- LEWIS, WADE V. *One Planet, Many Worlds*. Boston: Christopher Pub. House, 1949. Pp. 64. \$2.00.
- LOEWENBERG, JACOB. *Dialogues from Delphi*. Berkeley: Univ. of California Press; Sept., 1949. Pp. 314. \$3.50.
- LOOMIS, C. GRANT. *White Magic. An Introduction to the Folklore of Christian Legend*. Cambridge: Mediaeval Acad. of America, 1948. Pp. 258. \$5.00.
- MASCALL, E. L. *Existence and Analogy*. New York: Longmans, Green & Co.; Aug., 1949. \$3.25.
- MATCHETTE, FRANKLIN J. *An Outline of Metaphysics. The Absolute-Relative Theory*. New York: Philosophical Lib.; Sept., 1949. \$3.75.
- MATHER, KIRTLEY F. *Crusade for Life*. "The John Calvin McNair Lectures," 1948. Chapel Hill: Univ. of North Carolina Press, 1949. Pp. 112. \$2.00.
- MCCROSSEN, VINCENT A. *The New Renaissance of the Spirit*. New York: Philosophical Lib., 1949. Pp. x + 252. \$3.00.
- Employing the terminology, and to some extent the method, of Sorokin, the author analyzes past and present civilizations and cultures. He foresees the decline and fall of our present, sensate culture and asserts that even now a new, spiritual culture is in the making. The author's fundamental optimism does not blind him to the possibility that the transitional age between these two cultures may be a violently destructive one. But he pleads for leadership and for a renewal of the Christian spirit in order to obviate, or at least lessen, these destructive possibilities.
- MC EWEN, WILLIAM P. *Enduring Satisfaction. A Philosophy of Spiritual Growth*. New York: Philosophical Lib.; Sept., 1949. \$4.75.
- MERRILL, WALTER MCINTOSH. *From Statesman to Philosopher. A Study in Bolingbroke's Deism*. New York: Philosophical Lib.; Sept., 1949. Pp. 284. \$3.50.
- MILLER, HUGH. *The Community of Man*. New York: Macmillan Co.; Oct., 1949. \$3.00.
- MONTESQUIEU, CHARLES LOUIS DE SECONDAT. *The Spirit of the Law*. Translated by Thomas Nugent. Introduction by Franz Neumann. New York: Hafner Pub. Co., 1949. Pp. 686. \$5.00; paper, \$3.00.
- MORE, THOMAS, SR. *Utopia*. Translated and edited by H. V. S. Ogden. New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1949. Pp. xii + 84. Paper, 30¢
- The translation is new; its aim is to make this classic more accessible to the modern reader. The introduction is very brief, and yet it is informative and sympathetic. There is also a short bibliography. An excellent edition at an unusually low price.
- MORLEY, FELIX. *The Power in the People*. New York: Van Nostrand, 1949. Pp. 308. \$3.50.

- NEWMAN, JOHN HENRY, CARDINAL. *An Essay on the Development of Christian Doctrine*. Edited by Charles Frederick Harrold. New York: Longmans, Green & Co. Pp. 496. \$3.50.
- NOTOPOULOS, JAMES A. *The Platonism of Shelley: A Study of Platonism and the Poetic Mind*. Durham: Duke Univ. Press, 1949. \$7.50.
- OTTO, MAX CARL. *Science and the Moral Life*. Preface by Edward C. Lindeman. New York: New American Lib., 1949. Pp. 192. Paper, 35¢
- PAP, ARTHUR. *Elements of Analytic Philosophy*. New York: Macmillan Co.; Sept., 1949. Pp. 526. \$4.60.
- PEGIS, ANTON C. (ed.). *The Wisdom of Catholicism*. New York: Random House. Pp. 1000 (approx.). \$6.00.
- PERRY, RALPH BARTON. *Characteristically American*. New York: Alfred A. Knopf. Pp. 177. \$3.00.
- PLAMENATZ, JOHN PETROV. *Mill's Utilitarianism*. New York: Macmillan Co., 1949. Pp. 228. \$2.25.
- PLANCK, MAX. *Scientific Autobiography and Other Papers*. With a memorial address by Max von Laue. Translated by Frank Gaynor. New York: Philosophical Lib., 1949. Pp. 192. \$3.75.
- This little volume contains a sketch of Planck's scientific history and a group of his latest writings. These latter deal with "Phantom Problems in Science"; "The Meaning and Limits of Exact Science"; "The Concept of Causality in Physics"; and "Religion and Natural Science." In these papers he clearly portrays one of the typical scientific attitudes, though with vision and honesty. [To be reviewed]
- POCHMANN, HENRY A. *New England Transcendentalism and St. Louis Hegelianism*. Philadelphia: Carl Schurz Memorial Foundation, 1948. Pp. 144. \$3.00.
- PRATT, JAMES B. *Reason in the Art of Living*. New York: Macmillan Co.; Sept., 1949. Pp. 296. \$3.25.
- PRIBRAM, KARL. *Conflicting Patterns of Thought*. Washington: Public Affairs Press, 1949. Pp. 184. \$3.25.
- REICHENBACH, HANS. *The Theory of Probability*. Berkeley: Univ. of California Press; Oct., 1949. \$12.50.
- ROGERS, CLEMENT FRANCIS. *Astrology and Prediction in the Light of History, Science and Religion*. New York: Macmillan Co., 1949. Pp. 94. Boards, 75¢
- ROSÁN, LAURENCE J. *The Philosophy of Proclus. The Final Phase of Ancient Thought*. New York: Cosmos Greek-American Printing Co. Pp. xvi + 271. \$3.50.
- ROSS, JULIAN L. *Philosophy in Literature*. Syracuse: Syracuse Univ. Press; April, 1949. \$3.00.
- RUNES, DAGOBERT D. *Letters to My Son*. New York: Philosophical Lib.; Nov., 1949. \$2.75.
- RUSSELL, BERTRAND. *Authority and the Individual*. New York: Simon & Schuster; Oct., 1949. \$2.00.
- SCHLICK, MORITZ. *Philosophy of Nature*. Translated by Amethe von Zeppelin. New York: Philosophical Lib., 1949. Pp. xi + 136. \$3.00.

This book is a translation of a manuscript left unfinished at the death of its author, together with notes of his lectures on the relation between physics and biology; it includes, in an appendix, translations from a previously published work that supplements the present one.

The ideas presented here in a brief and rather comprehensive form are already well known through the author's publications and lectures. It is sufficient to note that he was a prominent member of the Vienna Circle. Thus, the philosophy of nature consists in the logical analysis of the



language of natural science. In making this kind of analysis for physics and chemistry, Schlick shows himself a master. His venture into the field of biology is a much less happy one.

SCHWEITZER, ALBERT. *The Philosophy of Civilization*. Translated by C. T. Campion. New York: Macmillan Co.; Oct., 1949. Pp. 364. \$5.00.

*Selected Readings from the Great Books*. According to the reading plan of the Great Books Foundation. Four sets of readings. Chicago: Henry Regnery Co., 1949. \$9.60 a set.

SELLARS, ROY WOOD and OTHERS (eds.). *Philosophy for the Future. The Quest of Modern Materialism*. New York: Macmillan Co. Pp. 670. \$7.50.

SHERRINGTON, SIR CHARLES SCOTT. *Goethe on Nature and on Science*. 2d ed. New York: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1949. Pp. 53. 75¢

SIMPSON, GEORGE GAYLORD. *The Meaning of Evolution. A Study of the History of Life and of Its Significance for Man*. New Haven: Yale Univ. Press; Oct., 1949. Pp. 379. \$3.75.

SOLMSSEN, FRIEDRICH. *Hesiod and Aeschylus*. Ithaca: Cornell Univ. Press, 1949. Pp. ix + 230. \$3.00.

SWENSON, DAVID FERDINAND. *Kierkegaardian Philosophy in the Faith of a Scholar*. Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1949. Pp. 159. \$2.50.

TAKAKUSU, JUNJIRO. *The Essentials of Buddhist Philosophy*. Edited by W. T. Chan and Charles A. Moore. 2d ed. S. Pasadena, Calif.: P. D. & Ione Perkins, 1949. Pp. 221. \$4.00.

TAYLOR, FRANK SHERWOOD. *Concerning Science*. New York: Macmillan Co., 1949. Pp. 141. \$1.50.

TAYLOR, HENRY OSBORN. *The Mediaeval Mind*. Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press; Oct., 1949. Vol. I, pp. xix + 603; Vol. II, pp. viii + 620. \$10.00.

TEMPLE, WILLIAM, ARCHBISHOP. *Nature, Man and God*. New York: Macmillan Co., 1949. Pp. 526. \$6.00.

THORNDIKE, EDWARD LEE. *Selected Writings from a Connectionist's Psychology*. New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1949. Pp. 377. \$3.50.

THORNDIKE, LYNN. *The History of Medieval Europe*. 3rd ed. Boston: Houghton, Mifflin Co., 1949. Pp. 763. \$5.00.

TOYNBEE, ARNOLD; GEYL, PIETER; SOROKIN, PITIRIM. *The Pattern of the Past: Can We Determine It?* Boston: Beacon Press; Sept., 1949. Pp. 124. \$2.00.

VIERECK, PETER ROBERT EDWIN. *Conservatism Revisited. The Revolt against Revolt, 1815-1949*. New York: Chas. Scribner's Sons. Pp. 202. \$2.50.

VON MISES, LUDWIG. *Human Action. A Treatise on Economics*. New Haven: Yale Univ. Press; Sept., 1949. \$10.00.

VON WEIZSACKER, C. E. *The History of Nature*. Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press; Sept., 1949. Pp. 197. \$3.00.

WADDELL, HELEN. *The Wandering Scholars*. New edition. New York: Henry Holt & Co. \$5.00.

WECTER, DIXON and OTHERS. *Changing Patterns in American Civilization*. Preface by Robert E. Spiller. Philadelphia: Univ. of Pennsylvania Press. Pp. 187. \$2.50.

WHITE, LESLIE A. *The Science of Culture. A Study of Man and Civilization*. New York: Farrar, Straus & Co. Pp. 464. \$6.00.

WIELER, JOHN WILLIAM. *George Chapman. The Effect of Stoicism upon His Tragedies*. New York: Columbia Univ. Press; Sept., 1949. Pp. viii + 218. \$2.75.

WIENER, PHILIP PAUL. *Evolution and the Founders of Pragmatism*. Foreword by John Dewey. Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press. Pp. 302. \$5.00.

WOLF, ABRAHAM. *Textbook of Logic*. 2d ed. New York: Macmillan Co., 1949. Pp. 455. \$2.75.

WORMSER, RENÉ A. *The Law*. New York: Simon & Schuster; Nov., 1949. \$5.00.



## BOOKS RECEIVED

- ANDERSON, JAMES F. *The Bond of Being*. Saint Louis: B. Herder Book Co., 1949. Pp. 341. \$4.00.
- AVICENNA (Ibn Sina). *De Anima*. Edited by George P. Klubertanz, S.J. Saint Louis: School of Philosophy and Science of Saint Louis University, 1949. Pp. vi + 143. Mimeographed, flexible binding; \$3.50.
- BENDER, RICHARD N. *A Philosophy of Life*. New York: Philosophical Lib., 1949. Pp. 250. \$3.75.
- CARRÉ, MEYRICK H. *Phases of Thought in England*. New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1949. Pp. xix + 392. \$7.75.
- CHANDLER, ALBERT R. (compiler). *The Clash of Political Ideals*. Revised edition. New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1949. Pp. xix + 335. \$2.50.
- EASTBURG, FREDERICK E. *Philosophies in Brief*. Boston: Bruce Humphries, 1949. Pp. 78. \$2.50.
- ESSER, GERARD, S.V.D. *Theologia Naturalis*. Techny: Mission Press, 1949. Pp. xvi + 271. \$3.00.
- FLEMING, T. V. *Foundations of Philosophy*. Sydney, Australia: The Shakespeare Head, 1949. Pp. x + 210. 15s. (Australian)
- FOSTER, KENELM, O.P. *Saint Thomas, Petrarch & the Renaissance*. "Aquinas Papers," No. 12. Oxford: Blackfriars Publs., 1949. Pp. 15. 1s. 6d.
- HUTCHINS, ROBERT M. *St. Thomas and the World State*. "Aquinas Lectures." Milwaukee: Marquette Univ. Press, 1949. Pp. 53. \$1.50.
- Lecture of His Excellency, the President of the Argentine Republic, General Juan Peron, at the Closing Session of the First National Congress of Philosophy*. Mendoza, 1949. Pp. 81.
- MARTINEZ, LUIS M. *Secrets of the Interior Life*. Translated by H. J. Beutler. Saint Louis: B. Herder Book Co., 1949. Pp. viii + 207. \$3.00.
- MCCROSSEN, VINCENT A. *The New Renaissance of the Spirit*. New York: Philosophical Lib., 1949. Pp. x + 252. \$3.00.
- MORE, THOMAS, St. *Utopia*. Translated and edited by H. V. S. Ogden. New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1949. Pp. xii + 84. Paper, 30¢
- PLANCK, MAX. *Scientific Autobiography and Other Papers*. With a memorial address by Max von Laue. Translated by Frank Gaynor. New York: Philosophical Lib., 1949. Pp. 192. \$3.75.
- SCHLICK, MORITZ. *Philosophy of Nature*. Translated by Amethe von Zeppelin. New York: Philosophical Lib., 1949. Pp. xi + 136. \$3.00.
- SHORT, DEWEY. *Shall We Save America?* Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1949. Pp. 13.
- THOMAS AQUINAS, St. *Opuscula Omnia necnon Opera Minora*. Vol. I, *Opuscula Philosophica*. Edited by Joannes Perrier, O.P. Paris: Lethielleux, 1949. Pp. xx + 620. Fr. 1500.